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Introductory
note: The origins of Trotskyism in Cuba has its direct roots in a discrepancy within the Communist Party that arose in 1931 and, in its development, soon received influence from the opposition of the Left International.(1) Towards the end of 1930 the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) went through a readjustment of its strategic and tactical line based on the agreements of the XII Plenary Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Communist International and the guidelines received from it Caribbean Bureau. This reorientation extended the radius of action of the Party to the whole country, guided its work towards the most important sectors of the working class (mostly sugar cane workers), the campesinos and the bourgeoisie. Other objectives were to correct sectarian errors; redefine its concept on the revolutionary character, previously considered proletariat, was now renamed agrarian and anti-imperialist. However, the young and immature PCC could not free itself from the sectarianism of class vs. class concept that dominated the international communist movement at the time.(2) Since 1931 discrepancies began to be observed among some militants who had direction responsibilities in their parallel organizations primarily the Ala Izquierda Estudiantil(AIE - the Student's Left-wing organization) and the Defensa Obrera Internacional (DOI - International Worker's Defense). At the same time, by mid year, signs of opposition began to appear to the union line of the PCC in the Worker's Federation of Havana (FOH). (3) In 1931 and the first months of 1932, the opposition that, at first, was against the PCC line in terms of tactics and organization, broadened giving new signs of life. The arrival in Cuba of Sandalio Junco and Juan Ramón Breá put it in direct contact with international Trotskyism; Sandalio Junco was a leader of the PCC from its union ranks and had participated in the fight against Machado acting, since the beginning months of 1928, together with Julio Antonio Mella and other Cuban exiles in revolutionary activities in Mexico. The following year he participated in the First Latin American Workers' Union Conference in Montevideo, Uruguay, as a delegate of the Cuban National Confederation of Workers (CNOC). In 1930 he traveled to the USSR where he worked in the International Red Union (IRU) with Rubén Martínez Villena, both participating in the Congress of that organization held in August, 1930, and participated in the Second Conference of the Latin American Communist Parties during the earlier part of September of the same year. (4) He came in contact with Trotskyism while in the Soviet Union, under the influence of the Spaniard, Andrés Nin, who had been a leader of the IRU and who was linked to the Russian left opposition and later became one of the most noted figures of international Trotskyism. Consequently, when Sandalio Junco returns to Cuba in 1932 he arrives as a convinced Trotskyist. (5) For his part, Juan Ramón Breá had been linked to the student movement since 1929 together with Raúl Roa and under the leadership of Rubén Martínez Villena during which time he participated in the struggle against the Machado dictatorship. He later traveled to France and Spain, making contact with European Trotskyists in both countries, mostly with Andrés Nin, leader of the International Left Opposition and the Spanish Communist Opposition. From Spain, Breá sent Trotskyist literature to Cuba and, upon his return in 1932, he was a full fledged follower of the ideas of Trotsky. (6) Both immediately joined dissatisfied elements with the PCC line and contributed to guide the Cuban Trotskyist movement as such. Trotskyism in the Island took its first organizational steps with the creation of the Cuban Communist Opposition that saw the light in August of 1932 as an organized fraction from within the PCC. (7) The Communist Opposition was not set up as a new party but as a fraction within the PCC that, although during its earlier period had not questioned the ideological and programmatic principles of the international communist movement, proposed as its general and immediate objectives the struggle against the methods of the Cuban PCC that it considered sectarian and bureaucratic. The Communist Opposition was made up of isolated militants and members of parallel organizations of the Party and was unable to count on the incorporation of cells or sectarian committees except in the case of Guantánamo that occurred a few months after its foundation. It was never a uniform movement from the point of view of its social composition nor ideologically and did not become a movement of the masses. It was mostly made up of members of the AIE, the DOI and FOH. (8) Some of these young students and workers, honest revolutionaries, disagreed with the sectarian line of the PCC or rejected some of its decisions such as the one related to the November 1932 elections, considering it was not revolutionary but reformist and played into the hands of the dictatorship. (9) The AIE made up the main group of the Cuban Communist Opposition. By mid 1932 the national direction of the AIE was controlled by the Trotskyist group within the organization and was headed by Marcos García Villareal. The open clash with the PCC occurred in October of that year when the Trotskyist members of the communist fraction of the AIE sent a communiqué to the PCC Central Committee where they protested their inconformity with the expulsion of Gómez Villar (pseudonym of Marcos García Villareal), secretary of the communist fraction of the AIE, from the ranks of the Party and requested a complete revision of the methods and the union and political lines of the PCC. (10) In September, - in addition to García Villareal - Sandalio Junco and other militants were expelled from the PCC for taking up Trotskyist thought. (11) A group of members of the AIE, militants of the PCC and the Young Communist League (LJC) as well as others, although not members of the AIE, worked closely with it such as Luis Busquet, Roberto Fontanillas, Juan Pérez de la Riva (La Habana), Charles Simeón, Manuel García, Bertha García (Matanzas), Carlos Padrón, Juan Ramón Breá, Carlos González Palacios, Lincoln Larramendy (Santiago de Cuba) and Eusebio Mujal (Guantánamo).(12) From the pages of Linea - organ of the AIE directed by Marcos García Villareal, and through the AIE structural organization, the Communist Opposition managed to control and influence this student organization throughout the country. The International Workers' Defense - parallel organization of the PCC whose main tasks consisted of the promotion of aid for political prisoners and solidarity with the progressive movements - was, as already pointed out, another group influenced by Trotskyism that joined the Communist Opposition. The main leaders of DOI, also members of the Communist Opposition, were Luis Busquet, Juan Pérez de la Riva, Vargas Gómez, Roberto Fontanillas, Gastón Medina and José Antonio Díaz Ortega. Some were also, at the same time leaders of the AIE such as Busquet and Fontanillas and others of the FOH such as Gastón Medina. (13) The composition of the DOI was from different backgrounds; part of the members were militants of the PCC and others were from the Aprista Party; some were students, intellectuals or employees and others were workers; its diversity was also evident in its ideology. The ties of the Communist Opposition with DOI were also set in Havana and other regions of the country such as Matanzas, Santiago de Cuba, Guantánamo and the northern regions of Oriente province. (14) The other organization - truly working class - where the Trotskyists won influence was the Workers' Federation of Havana. In 1932 Sandalio Junco, Pedro Varela, Gastón Medina and other Trotskyists gained control of the Executive Board of the FOH that then, according to Gastón Medina himself, "[...] was limited to just a few small unions that had survived the anti-workers crusade of the Machado regime". (15) Under the direction of the Trotskyists, the FOH broke with the CNOC and the PCC and tried to spread its influence and radius of action in the union movement in Havana and the rest of the country; the main influence was felt in the Trade Workers Union in Havana and other regions of the Island. Efforts were made also to strengthen parallel local workers federations affiliated to the CNOC in Matanzas, Santiago de Cuba, Puerto Padre, Victoria de las Tunas and Guantánamo. Evidently,
the presence of the Communist Opposition was manifest in the parallel
organizations of the Party (AIE, FOH, and DOI) and in several cities of the
country. It had a mixed social base formed by elements of the bourgeoisie (16),
intellectuals and students, some communists or Aprista party members and
workers, mostly of Anarcho-Syndicalism origin. A report of the Cuban Trotskyist
party to its international center in Paris noted that "very few militant
workers of the PCC fractions joined the Communist Opposition". (17) At the
root of what later led to the internal discrepancies of Cuban Trotskyism and its
crisis was its social diversity at the beginning together with other factors. The
Cuban Communist Opposition and Sandalio Junco and Juan Ramón Breá, who already had Trotskyist formation and had introduced literatura of those ideals in Cuba and the contacts they had with European Trotskyists - specially with those from Spain - contributed to lead the Cuban Communist Opposition towards definitely Trotskyist leanings and to their affiliation to the International Left Opposition (ILO). Marcos García Villarreal, as the general secretary of the OCC also contributed decisively to this move. (18) Since the constitution of the OCC, some of its members maintained correspondence with the Spanish and US Trotskyists and were sent press reports and literature. (19) According to the Spanish historian, Pelai Pagés, the Communist Opposition of Asturias received contributions from several Cuban militants, expelled by the dictator, Machado, who had settled there. (20) It is highly probable that these exiles sent Trotskyist literature to Cuba. These isolated and unofficial contacts of the OCC members with Trotskyists abroad contributed to keep them up to date on the problems of international Trotskyism and broaden their theoretical knowledge of Trotsky thought. The Spanish Communist Left (ICE) gave special attention to the development of the Latin American Trotskyist movement. In an open letter to the Executive Committee of the ICE sent by its leader, Henri Lacroix, "To the Latin American groups of the Communist Left Opposition" reported the decision taken in its III National Conference (March 26-28, 1932) to set up a post of secretary in charge of relations with Latin American groups that would, also, have the task of promoting the organization of new groups, spread the ideas of the International Communist Left, send literature and help the already existing groups to form relations among them; the ICE sent the Comunismo journal, the Hispanic-American Bulletin as well as books and pamphlets of the Ediciones Comunismo to Latin America. (21) It was precisely through the Spanish Communist Left that the Cuban Trotskyists set up ties with the leadership of the International Left Opposition headquartered in Paris. Juan López sent a letter on March 31, 1933, to Andrés Nin, main leader of the Spanish Communist Left, where he reported the existence of the Cuban Communist Opposition, of its main activities and asking theoretical material from the Spanish Trotskyists and the International Left Opposition. (22) Immediately the Spaniards passed the letter on to the leadership of the International Left Opposition that answered the Cuban Trotskyists informing them that they would send literature in French and Spanish and informing them the means to maintain a sure communication. (23) It was then, after nine months of its foundation, that it was officially affiliated to the ILO. This event was reported by the Spanish and US Trotskyist press. In May of 1933, the theoretical journal of the Spanish Left Opposition published a note where it stated: "A Section of the International Communist Left has been formed in Cuba. Until now the Cuban comrades had limited their efforts to maintain correspondence with the Spanish Section. But now (...) have organically set up our Cuban Section. (24)" Soon after, the following report appeared in the US Trotskyist newspaper: "In Havana, Cuba, a Bolshevik Leninist Opposition within the official party. Currently it is only a small group that requests literature and contacts with other sections of the International Left Opposition. (25)" Correspondence between the Cuban Communist Opposition, the French Trotskyists and the leadership of the International Left Opposition, maintained towards the end of June, 1933, reflected the insistence of the Cubans to receive theoretical material and propaganda while informing the development of its organizational tasks and the formation of its political strategy. Thus, for example, thee asked the ILO for opinions on its programmatic pamphlet, On the road to Revolution (26); for their part, the ILO leadership promised to continue sending literature to Cuba and recommended the study of the problems of Latin America; but at the same time they doubted that it could be done to the necessary extent. They also added that they would help the Cubans to come in contact with Trotskyists from other Latin American countries to exchange experience and collaborate with each other. (27) At the time, the leadership of the International Trotskyist movement, although maintaining contact with Latin America, did not give great attention to that region; the eyes of the ILO and those of Leon Trotsky were focused on Europe, mostly on the problems of Germany and France. For this reason, and other factors such as a common language - in the case of Spain - and geographic proximity - with those of the United States - were the sections of the International Left Organizations of those two countries, specially in Spain, who had the greatest influence on the Cuban Trotskyist movement during its early formative years. This did not prevent Trotsky from paying a certain attention to the problems of the Latin American revolutionary movement. Since 1931, a strong dispute arose between him and the ILO leadership on the one side and Andrés Nin and with the Spanish Left Opposition, on the other. The discussion was about the internal problems in the French and Spanish Sections of the ILO (28) Trotsky was aware of the influence of the Spanish I.C. on the Latin American Trotskyist movement and this worried him because he considered that the Spanish literature, primarily Comunismo, could separate the Latin American Trotskyists from the political line of the International Left Opposition; on this point he wrote: "The events of South America are very satisfying but we must not ignore that the greater part of South America is nourished by Spanish literature. We must attract the attention of all our South American sections towards our differences with the Spanish section. It would be wise to send them, in Spanish, my correspondence with Nin and, at least, two letters on the Spanish question. (29)" However, it seems that the echoes of the Trotsky vs. Nin controversy did not reach Cuba because we haven't been able to find any reference in the documents nor in the Trotskyist press of the time; not even the Trotskyists of those days who we interviewed mentioned these events. During
the period we study, particularly 1935, Leon Trotsky had no direct contact with
the Cuban Trotskyists although he did write to them about the Cuban problems
occasionally. Undoubtedly those from the US and Spain had the greatest influence
on the Cuban Trotskyist movement during those years; and, to a greater degree,
from the Spanish Left Opposition. Strategy and Tactics The Cuban Communist Opposition was not, nor was the Leninist Bolshevik Party, a uniform political force because at its center there were several tendencies of differences on objective questions and on tactics, (30) that had its origin both on its own internal roots, and the influence, mostly of the Spaniards and from the US on international Trotskyism. The Trotskyists intensified their task of propaganda in the workers and student movements as well as within the ranks of the Communist Party and, in its propaganda; the attacks on the PCC leadership were getting stronger. During the last months of 1932 and beginning of 1933, the members of the Communist Opposition were expelled from the CP. (31) In spite of this, the Cuban Trotskyists considered themselves as part of the international communist movement and proclaimed they had the duty to fight to "reform" the Cuban CP and the Communist International. In this manner, they followed the line of the international Trotskyist movement of not forming independent organizations and working within the communist parties to gain control; this line maintained on an international scale until the second half of 1933 was followed in Cuba until, once modified internationally, the Leninist Bolshevik Party was set up in the country in September of 1933. One of the first public expressions of the Communist Opposition that we have found is the manifesto published in Santiago de Cuba in January of 1933 entitled Cuban Communist Party. Bureau of Communist Opposition. What is the significance of the UFON Congress? where it denounced the pro-owner, pro-Machado and anti-workers character of the congress that was called by the reformist union leader, Juan Arévalo to be held in Cienfuegos. Also, in the manifesto it calls to form a United Workers and Campesinos Front and to fight for an eight hour work day, against lay-offs, for social security for the unemployed and the expulsion of the yellow leaders of the workers organizations (32) But the first document published by the Cuban Trotskyists with the political projection defined was the Programmatic Manifesto of the Communist Opposition Bureau made public in Santiago de Cuba on January of 1933 (33) This Manifesto, in addition to On the road to Revolution, Cuba, 1933, published by the Central Committee of the Communist Opposition, (34) and the Statues of the Cuban Communist Opposition, (35) are the three most important documents of this organization because they explain the theoretical and organizational bases as well as political-ideological projection that were a guide for its political action. As already mentioned, the Trotskyist Opposition considered itself part of the communist movement - in fact there were a series of cases of their militants that were active in the CP or the Young Communist League until they were expelled for their Trotskyist leanings -; for this reason the three documents appear under the heading of the "Cuban Communist Party". In the Manifesto ... the programmatic principles are set down to be developed later with broader detail in the Leninist Bolshevik Party program. After a brief introduction where it expresses, among other points, that the "Communist Opposition arose from the revolutionary necessity at a time when all passiveness should be interpreted as treason and where all indecision would presuppose opportunism, the worst of all counterrevolutionary crimes" (36) and that "it is precisely now when doubt appears in the ranks" (37) an analysis of the Cuban historical evolution since 1868 is opportune to attempt to unravel the class structure and the socio-political interests that are in effect in the 30s. Apropos, the document explains how, after the last war of independence, there was economic penetration and US political interference in Cuba that prevented the development of a sufficiently strong native middle class, economically and politically, to prevent subordination to US imperialism and how the Cuban governments served the interests of the United States, often affecting its own Cuban bourgeoisie. But, was the native bourgeoisie only subordinated to the United States, or were its interests closely related to those of the US middle class? What the Cuban Trotskyists did not understand in January of 1933 was that, added to the subordination, there was a strong bond of the native middle classes to those of the United States and, consequently - not only from its weakness - the resultant was its anti-national character. They failed to understand that the government of Gerardo Machado was an expression of the interests of a native bourgeoisie, during part of its government until it lost its social basis and became a government of a small clique at the service of the United States. In other words, it did not consider that the Cuban middle classes were made up by different sectors; although it clearly explains its incapacity to lead a true bourgeois democratic revolution. The Manifesto ... makes a brief analysis of the different forces of opposition to the Machado dictatorship and foresees three possibilities that could be promoted by the group of existing contradictions in the country: 1) an uprising of the bourgeois opposition; 2) a pact with Machado; and 3) US military intervention. In face of these three possibilities a task line is designed to form a united front to fight for the popular, agrarian and anti-imperialist revolution. If an uprising of the bourgeoisie occurred, independent participation was required to transform it into the agrarian and anti-imperialist revolution desired. If a pact was made between the bourgeois opposition and Machado, the response would be: a united front for the revolution; and if the US intervened "once again the Sierra Maestra and comrade Mauser would have the last word". (38) The character of the revolution is defined in the document where US imperialism is the principal enemy and the native middle classes its internal ally. The moving force of the revolution, that would be made up of a united front of the industrial and farm workers, small farmers, unemployed, students and employees. Evidently, at least theoretically, as early as 1933 the Cuban Trotskyists had clearly and correctly defined the character of the anti-Machado revolution as the main enemy and class allies and enemies. Also, they considered that conditions existed to begin the revolution as soon as possible, because "the Popular, Agrarian, Anti-imperialist Revolution was not a beautiful dream to wait for 50 years to begin but an imminent reality that we should undertake immediately". (39) A few months later, in May of 1933, a change of concepts is observed. Thus, En el camino de la Revolucion, Cuba, 1933, expresses: "At present the Agrarian and Anti-imperialist Revolution is not yet ready; instead specific tasks must be undertaken to win over the masses and prepare for the Revolution". (40) Another part of the document states that "there is not yet a radicalization of the masses nor a growth of the workers movement" (41) The concept that conditions did not exist for the revolution was based on the fact that the workers and mass movement was yet to grow; there was no awareness - only three months before the overthrow of the Machado dictatorship - of the rise of mass struggles that, evidently, was constantly strengthening. (42) On the other hand, the revolution was defined as agrarian and anti-imperialist and the term mass, or popular, was dropped. En El Camino de la Revolución (On the road to the Revolution) recognized that imperialism was trying to transform a political peace through mediation; that the bourgeois opposition was a willing tool in these maneuvers; that there were organizations of the bourgeoisie opposed to a mediation that would give continuity to the struggle; that it was not a tactical factor to take up, at that moment, the slogan of a worker-campesino government and that there was no proletariat party sufficiently strong enough to rise up for the immediate conquest of power. (43) They clearly stated: "An error frequently made here and that is the basis of all sectarian errors in confusing the specific character of the classes fighting in Cuba and to qualify and group, under a common denominator, all the revolutionary groups contrary to the communist line (...) Presenting the problem so straightforward, using the terms of "social-fascists" and lackeys of imperialism for Menocal and Mendieta, for the bourgeoisie and students, without trying to take advantage of the internal divisions of these groups, understanding their political leanings (...) is to isolate the workers from the rest of the struggle, to place them in such a position that they would find it impossible to group around them the campesino masses and oppressed and dissatisfied sectors to take power". (44) The above mentioned here demonstrates that the leadership of the OCC made a correct theoretical appreciation of the political and class forces in the scenario of the moment and of the most adequate tactics. However, although it apparently understood the role of the bourgeoisie in the Cuban neo-colonial society of the 30s, in truth this was not the case. While criticizing the leadership of the CP for its sectarian and dogmatic errors under the influence of the "class vs. class" line that emanated from the Communist International of the epoch, they made the same mistakes. In the document they fail to understand the revolutionary role of the most advanced sectors of the Cuban middle classes and if, on the one hand - as we already mentioned - they warned of the necessity to differentiate the bourgeois opposition (Mendieta-Menocal) from the small middle classes that fought Machado and went on to express: "This does not mean that there is a small middle class sector prepared to take a common cause with the proletariat and uphold the principles of the revolution to the end. This statement would be completely false and dangerous. The bourgeoisie groups that support the struggle (...) do so only to conquer better positions". (45) For them the bourgeoisie were excluded from the concept of popular masses. These were only the workers and campesinos, the only revolutionary forces: "Thus, we will win over the popular masses and prevent the middle classes involved in the struggle, to take over, for its own benefit, this important and insurmountable moment of the revolution." (46) At times, the Cuban Trotskyist movement of the 30s has been presented as the logical Marxist alternative in face of the sectarian line followed by the CP. Nothing could be further from the truth. Although they made relevant interpretations in some cases, in general and from the theoretic and practical point of view, followed a line that was, in itself, as sectarian and dogmatic as the CP. The intention was to achieve an alleged unity but not among equals; the others had to acknowledge the hegemony of the Trotskyists, their revolutionary vanguard character and, as such, be subordinate to them. This was their view of the union line: instead of fighting for a union central of unity, as had been the CNOC at the time of Alfredo López, that would bring together workers of several union movements, for the Communist Opposition "the task of unifying the union movement was brought under a ruthless and raw struggle against the sectarians (i.e. followers of the CP line) on the one hand and the reformists, unionists and social-fascists on the other". (47) Their self-proclaimed character of the only and exclusive revolutionary vanguard was declared in their Statues: "The Cuban Communist Opposition is the only revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat and the only organization capable of revolutionary leadership until the end of the struggle of the Cuban working class against their native and foreign exploiters." (48) In
spite of the apparent foresight in understanding the national reality of the
moment, the sectarianism and dogmatism that marked Cuban Trotskyism from the
beginning - together with other factors - prevented them from an effective
insertion in the popular and revolutionary movement of the country moving it
away not only from the small middle class but also from the majority of the
working class. Organizational and structural principles As we have already mentioned, the Cuban Communist Opposition arose from the CP as a movement self-proclaimed as renovator, truly Marxist, genuine follower of Leninism and whose purpose it was to rescue the Party of the Cuban proletariat from the "harmful third period Stalinist influence". Although the initial purpose of the OC was not the formation of a new independent party from the already existing CP, as a fractional group it adopted a structure that was, in fact, a parallel organization within the CP. In practice, the road they followed only led to the creation of a new party. An important moment of this move was the setting up of its own measures of organic life with the preparation of the Statutes of the Cuban Communist Opposition (49) that was made known two months and a half before the creation of the Leninist Bolshevik Party (PBL)that sanctioned and completed a fait accompli. It was the transition point from the OCC to the PBL. After proclaiming itself "the only revolutionary vanguard of the workers" that began within the ranks of the CP and that later fought within the party against the sectarian leadership and after being expelled went on to express that "the O.C. was now set up to prevent the destruction of the Cuban communist movement. Its line corresponds to a Party inspired by the revolutionary principles of Marxism". (50) The Statutes of the Cuban Communist Opposition set down the structure, organizational principles, discipline as well as the duties and rights of the members of the organization. They are similar to any communist party in the world, at the time. (51) According to the Statutes of the Communist Opposition: The O.C. is based on a democratic centralization, the only manner of maintaining absolute unity of the organization from the base up. Democratic centralization consists of a) Elections, throughout the structural organization by cells, conferences and congresses; b) Obligation to accept the decisions of the higher levels of the O.C. and periodically report its activities to all the other members of the Cuban O.C.; c) Obligatory acceptance of the decisions of the higher instances of the O.C. for the lower levels, severe discipline among it members, fast and precise execution of the decision of the C.C and other instances of the Cuban O.C. The resolutions taken in the Congresses, Conferences or Cell boards of the O.C. must be followed even if any member or group of members of the organization giving the orders or receiving them does not approve; d) All questions aired in the cells or any other instance of the O.C. will be freely discussed for the length of time necessary, in all cases, if the discussion is carried out within the organization and has the objective to improve work methods, strategy and tactics of the O.C. Once the Conferences or Congresses decide on the questions discussed, it will be ended and the minority will submit to the decision of the majority. (52) We listed the Statutes related to democratic centralization to demonstrate the theoretic articulation in the broadest internal democracy with a strict centralization as a guarantee of maintaining a solid unity. However, in practice, the Trotskyists either in the CP when they were still members, as outside the party - within the O.C. - did not properly apply these principles. Many of the orientations of the higher instances of the O.C. or the agreements taken were not complied with; many of the problems were not discussed in the organization but were publicly discussed and this refers - we insist - not only to when the Trotskyists were in the CP but at a time when they had been expelled and acted within the O.C. and later in the PBL. As
can be observed, freedom tendencies, nor freedom of fractions is mentioned in
the Statutes; however, the heterogeneity of the Cuban Trotskyist movement and
the international influence led to tendencies - we will discuss below - that did
not adjust to the internal discipline of the PBL and acted as centrifugal forces
that contributed to the crisis of the party a few years later. The
Trotskyists and the struggle What has been mentioned up to know clearly demonstrates that the Cuban Trotskyist movement, at the beginning, in spite of all the inconsistencies and its dissociating role within the workers and mass movement was characterized by its anti-imperialist position, its revolutionary leaning, its adherence to Marxism and the defense of national interests. It was made up, in a majority, by very young men and women who acted honestly guided by the desire to achieve radical changes in the Cuban society, aside from the errors in their political practice or the roads each would follow years later. The Trotskyists considered, in May of 1933, that the revolution was still not ready; however, what was its attitude to the mediation by Welles and the strike in August that overthrew the Machado dictatorship? The answer to this question will bring us close to the position they adopted to imperialist interference in Cuba and its faithful servant. In the already mentioned, En el Camino de la Revolución, Cuba, 1933, in May of that year the OC exposes the objectives of the mediation and condemns it. (53) A month later, June 28, the Trotskyists, from the ranks of the Ala Izquierda Estudiantil, publish a manifesto rejecting "the mediation and the surrender it infers". (54) Already by November of 1932 another manifesto of the AIE warned of the schemes of the United States government. The new solution to the Cuban problems - a solution imposed by imperialism - in no way satisfied the needs of the workers, campesinos and students in Cuba (...) If these "pacifying" attempts came to be the murderous government of Gerardo Machado, guaranteeing his life, opening the door to official intervention of the United States, he would abandon the country preparing the road for new rulers whose submission to Wall Street was no secret. This meant that imperialism would do all in its power to prevent the insurrectional movement of the masses. (55) The mediation was countered from the beginning by the OCC and the organizations controlled by the Trotskyists such as the AIE and the FOH. (56) From the very first days of July of 1933, a Havana transport workers' strike broke out for immediate re-vindications that spread to other labor sectors throughout the country becoming a formidable general political strike against Machado that included not only the working class but all the people and all opposition organizations that had not accepted the mediation; the CP, the CNOC, the DEU and other organizations played an important role in the leadership from the very beginning. The Havana Workers' Federation, headed by the Trotskyists also called on the unions under their control to join the strike for immediate re-vindications and against the dictatorship. When the strike was at its peak, the Central Committee of the CP decided to put a stop to it: giving rise to the "August error". In face of the refusal of the workers organizations of the CNOC to stop the strike, the CC of the CP acknowledged its mistake and continued the decision to maintain it until the fall of Machado. At that time and more recently, the enemies of the revolutionary movement took advantage of this error to attack the CP, accusing it of coming to an arrangement with Machado and of treason. (57) As Raúl Roa stated: "Although of evident value and adverse implications for the revolutionary movement, as the Party acknowledged, in a open criticism and self-criticism, the "August error" was exactly that: a political error arising from a variety of factors and contingencies. Who could claim, without betraying the truth, that it is an action of bad faith or the result of a distorted moral?" (58) We will not continue with a detailed analysis of the circumstances that gave rise to the "August error" to avoid being sidetracked from the objectives of this work. (59) As we already pointed out, the Trotskyists, from the FOH ranks had called the strike and, since August 5, maintained the slogan of not stopping the strike until all the workers' demands were met and the political regime of imperialist oppression was overthrown. In a manifesto released August 12, they reiterated the slogans of "general strike" and "down with Machado" while strongly attacking the CP and CNOC. (60) The Trotskyists intended to capitalize on the error of the CP using it as an argument to present themselves as the principal movers and leaders of the formidable popular movement that overthrew the Machado dictatorship. Attacks went back and forth between the Trotskyists and Communists, not only in terms of the August strike but, in general, emphasizing the contradictions within the most politically advanced leadership of the Cuban workers. The split was a fact and there was no turning back. Although the Trotskyists were small in number - it only managed to lure very few CP militants and did not provoke a scission in its bosom, it was simply a spin off of a small segment of its militants and failed to attract great mass sectors in the country - the division only served the enemies of the revolution of the masses. Notes 1. Some authors, including Victor Alba have suggested that Mella seemed in favor of Trotskyist ideas and was linked, in some manner, to the Trotskyist movement in Mexico; they also add the hypothesis that Mella was not killed by agents of the dictator Machado but by the communists with the direct complicity of Tina Modotti (see Victor Alba, Historia del movimiento obrero en América Latina; Julián Gorkin, Cómo asesinó Stalin a Trotsky; Bernardo Claraval, Cuando fui comunista). Others have echoed these statements (see Octavio Paz, Frida and Tina: non parallel lives; and Phillippe Cheron, Del gusto por la mistificación: a propósito de Tina Modotti, Vuelta, n. 82, México, September, 1983; Jorge García Montes and Alonso Avila, Historia del Partido Comunista de Cuba; Alejandro Galves Cancino, L'auto-absolution de Vidali et la mort de Mella in Cahiers Leon Trotsky, n. 26, París, June, 1986). However, none of these authors have been able to demonstrate any of these statements and all have a common denominator; anti-communist mythology and virulence. Since his arrival to Mexico in 1926 until his assassination on January, 1929, Mella shared in the struggle against the Machado dictatorship, from ANERC, with the tasks of the Mexican Communist Party; he was a member of its Central Committee and was Secretary General during the months of June to September, 1928, when Rafael Carrillo was in Moscow. According to Arnaldo Martínez Veduga, he was accused by Victorio Codovilla and Ricardo Martínez for having Trotskyist positions - based on the discrepancies of Mella with some directions of the Communist International, for example, those related to the creation of a third union central in Mexico, the CESUM-; but, once analyzed in the Central Committee of the MCP this instance decided to contact the Communist International rejecting the accusation as unfounded and to inform them that Mella was the author of the Thesis of the CC defining the MCP position against Trotskyism. Until his death, Mella was an active member in the ranks of the MCP. On the other hand, it has been long proven that those responsible for the assassination of Julio Antonio Mella were José Magriñat and the gunman, López Valiña under orders of the dictator, Machado. See Olga Cabrera, Un crimen político que cobra actualidad, Nueva Antropología, n. 27, Mexico, July, 1988. 2. The Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party, El Partido Comunista y los problemas de la Revolución en Cuba, Library of the Cuban History Institute, Havana, pg 16-8; Lionel Soto, La Revolución del 33, Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, V. II, 1977, pg.162-3 and 169-171. 3. Ibidem, pg.7-8. 4. On the Second Conference of the Communist Parties of Latin America held in Moscow, there is scarcely anything more published, the one most studied today is the First held in Buenos Aires in 1929 with the publication of its documents as well as many works that analyzed their development and importance; and to a lesser extent the Third (Montevideo, 1934). On the Second held in Moscow only a brief reference is found in B. Koval, Movimiento obrero en América Latina. 1917-1959. The participation of Rubén Martínez Villena and Sandalio Junco we have found in a book by Raúl Roa: El fuego de la semilla en el surco (Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, Havana, 1982), and in the letters sent by Villena to Cuba from the USSR published in Rubén Martínez Villena, Poesía y prosa, v. II, Editorial Letras Cubanas, 1984. 5. See Rubén Martínez Villena, ob. cit.; Raúl Roa, ob. cit.; Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba,, September 9, 1932, Archives of the Communist International, Moscow. 6. Roberto Pérez Santiesteban, Introducción, in Juan Ramón Breá and Mary Low, La verdad contemporánea, pg. 362-364; and letters of Mary Low to the author, October 23, 1996. 7. See Bolshevik-Leninist Party (Cuban Section of the International Communist League), To The International Secretariat, (Havana, March 20, 1935), The Trotsky Archives, Houghton Library, Harvard University, 1952. 8. Ibidem, and Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party Resolución sobre la oposición en el Partido, ob. cit., pg. 8. 9. Ibidem, pp. 31-5; Lionel Soto, ob. cit., p. 149; Plataforma electoral del Partido Comunista de Cuba para las elecciones de 1932, in Mirta Rosell, Luchas obreras contra Machado, Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1973, pg 188-211. The enemies of the Cuban communist movement have tried to present the participation of the CP in the elections of 1932 as treason to the mass movement. The CP explained in the document that it was combining several forms of struggle to achieve more flexibility and the Leninist strategy of parliamentary struggle, not with the objective of gaining power but to spread revolutionary objectives. Undoubtedly, it was in no way treason but definitely an error to call to elections casting a blank ballot when the Machado dictatorship had installed a regime of terror in the country and there weren't the slightest conditions of "bourgeois legality" to take advantage of. The decision was not understood by many who drifted away from the CP. 10.See Ladislao González Carbajal, El Ala Izquierda Estudiantil y su época, Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1974, pg.78-79; Carta del Bolshevik-Leninist Party, ob. cit. Fracción Comunista del Ala Izquierda Estudiantil de Cuba, Al Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba, Havana, October 5, 1932, AIH Salvador Vilaseca, D284, October, 1932. 11.Ladislao González Carbajal, ob. cit., p. 78. Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba, "Resolución..., ob. cit. 12.Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party Resolución..., pg. 8-12. Letter of the Bolshevik-Leninist Party, ob. cit.; author's interviews of Manuel Tur Lambert, José Antonio Portuondo, Sergio Mateo, Julio Le Riverand, Abelardo Ramas Antúnez, Idalberto Ferrer Acosta (Havana); Manuel García Suárez, Berta García López (Matanzas); Pedro Verdecie Pérez, Luis Galano Torres (Las Tunas); Luis Miyares, Roberto García Ibáñez, Antonio Ferrer Cabello (Santiago de Cuba); Roberto Mineto y Luciano García (Guantánamo); interview by Robert Alexander of Charles Simeón (New Jersey); interview by Maricela Vázquez Rodríguez to Ángel Murillo Granjel (Havana); letter of Carlos Padrón Ferrer to the author, ob. cit. 13.Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party El Partido Comunista..., pg. 43. 14.See A los obreros y campesinos. Al pueblo trabajador", Manifiesto del Buró Provincial de Oriente de Defensa Obrera Internacional (Oposición), Santiago de Cuba, July 3 1933, Defensa Obrera, Órgano de la Oposición de Defensa Obrera Internacional, a. I, Puerto Padre, August 27 1933; interviews of Manuel García, Luis Miyares and Pedro Verdecie. 15....was limited to a few small unions, survivors of the anti-labor crusade of the Machado regime. [limited to a few small unions of the anti-labor crusade of the Machado regime]. Letter from the Bolshevik-Leninist Party, ob. cit. 16.In several documents not only from the CP but also from the Trotskyists that demonstrates the majority bourgeoisie social composition of the Cuban Communist Opposition. See Letter of the Bolshevik-Leninist Party, ob. cit.; and On the movement of the Fourth International in Latin America [March, 1940]. Report to Emergency Conference of the FI by the Latin American Department. Cuba, in Documents of the Fourth International. The Formative Years (1933-1940), Pathfinder Press, Nueva York, 1973. 17.Letter from the Bolshevik-Leninist Party, ob. cit., p. 8. 18.Ibídem, pg. 9; Comunismo, órgano teórico mensual de la izquierda comunista española, Madrid, May, 1933; The Militant, New York, June 10, 1933. 19.Comunismo, ob. cit.; interview of Luis Miyares and Pedro Verdecie. In the archives of Luis Miyares, there are copies of the journal Comunismo for the years of 1932 and 1933, and in the archives of Pedro Verdecie there is Trotskyist literature published in Spain that he assures were received since 1932. 20.Pelai Pagés, El movimiento trotskista en España. (1930-1935), pg. 83. Pagés sources the letter he received from I. Iglesias on May 2, 1975. 21.Henry Lacroix, Comité Ejecutivo de la Izquierda Comunista Española, A los grupos de América Latina de la oposición comunista de izquierda, in Bernardo Claraval, Cuando fui comunista, pg. 62-63; Pelai Pagés, ob. cit., pf. 100-21. 22.Carta de Juan López a Andrés Nin, Havana, March 31, 1933. International Institute of Social History, (IIHS), Amsterdam. 23.Carta de Opposition de Gauche Internationale [Bolcheviques-leninistas] aux camarades de Habana, s/f., IIHS. 24.Comunismo, ob. cit., p.234. 25.The Militant, New York, June 10, 1933. 26.Opposition Comuniste de Cuba. Secretariat General, "A la Section francaise de l'Opposition de Gauche Internationale" (Havana, s/f.), IIHS. 27.Opposition de Gauche Internationale, "A l'Opposition Com. de Gauche Cuba" (París, June 29, 1933), IIHS. 28.According to Pelai Pagés, the disagreements between Trotsky and Nin began with the separation of Alfred Rosmer from the leadership of the French Communist League who was supported by the former but objected to by Nin; furthermore, Trotsky supported the group headed by Lacroix, who were a minority of the Spanish Communist Left from which he had been separated. Nin and the Spanish Trotskyist leadership criticized Trotsky and the International Secretariat for applying incorrect methods; for his part Trotsky accused Nin of holding up the formation of the Spanish Opposition and doing everything possible to isolate it from the International Opposition. 29.Leon Trotsky, Oeuvres, March-July, 1933, pg. 161. [Translated by Dr. Hebert Pérez Concepción.] 30.Interview by Robert Alexander of Charles Simeón, ob. cit.; Letter of the Bolshevik-Leninist Party, ob. cit., pp. 7-9. 31.Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Pary, ob. cit., pg. 8-10. Lionel Soto, ob. cit., p. 169. 32.Archivo Nacional de Cuba (ANC), Especial, Leg. l, Exp. 194. 33.Ibídem, Exp. 193. 34.Central Committee of the Communist Opposition, En el camino de la Revolución.. Cuba. 1933, May 10, 1933, Havana, ANC, Especial, Leg. 14, Exp. 141. 35.Archivo Histórico Provincial de Santiago de Cuba (AHPSC), Tribunal de Defensa Nacional, Leg. 3, Exp. 30. 36.Cuban Communist Party, Manifiesto Programático del Buró de Oposición Comunista, p. 1. 37.Ibídem. 38.Ibídem, pg. 8. 39.Ibídem, pg. 6-7. 40.Central Committee of the Communist Opposition, ob. cit., p. 6. 41.Ibídem, pg. 3. 42.See Rubén Martínez Villena: Las contradicciones internas del imperialismo yanqui en Cuba y el alza del movimiento revolucionario, in Josefina Meza Paz, Rubén: antología del pensamiento político, pg. 437-49. 43.Central Committee of the Communist Opposition, ob. cit., pg. 3-4. 44.Ibídem, p. 7. 45.Ibídem, p. 3. 46.Ibídem, p. 4. 47.Ibídem, p. 11. 48.Cuban Communist Opposition, Statues, pg. 1. 49.Ibídem. 50.Ibídem. 51.The basic organization was the cell that could be constituted according to a labor or territorial criteria; for example, in factories, workshops, sugar mills or other work centers; or in towns or neighborhoods. The higher instance was the cell junta. The intermediate instances were the sections and locals; the section grouped a certain number of cells and the local grouped several sections in a given territory. The highest instance in both levels were the sectional conferences that counted on delegates from the cells, and the local conferences, with the participation of delegates from the sections; between one conference and another, the leadership organs were the sectional committee and the local committee, respectively. The National Congress was the highest instance of the O.C. formed by delegates from the cells and in charge of electing the Central Committee, highest instance of the O.C. between congresses. At the same time it was charged with electing the Politburo that was in charge of the organization between meetings of the C.C. If the National Congress could not be held national conferences were held with delegates of all the sections of the O.C. The National Conference was authorized to elect the Central Committee. Departments were created in the Central Committee, local and section committee levels subordinated to their respective instances in charge of carrying out specific tasks and each headed by a secretary; the following departments would be y would be set up: organization and treasury; propaganda and agitation; union, agrarian and anti-imperialist. The work of the department secretaries would be controlled by the Secretary General. 52.Ibídem, pg. 2. 53.Central Committee of the Communist Opposition, ob. cit., pg. 2-3. 54.¡Al pueblo de Cuba! ¡A todos los estudiantes!, Havana, June 28, 1933 [Manifiesto del AIE], Pensamiento Crítico, no. 39, Havana, April, 1970. 55.Ala Izquierda Estudiantil de Cuba. Comité Central, A todos los estudiantes de Cuba. A las masas trabajadoras, Havana, November 27, 1932, in Hortensia Pichardo, Documentos para la Historia de Cuba, Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, t. III, 1973, p. 540. 56.Raúl Roa, La Revolución del 30 se fue a bolina, Instituto del Libro, 1969, pg. 276. 57.See Mario Riera Hernández: Historial Obrero Cubano, pg. 80-84; Jorge García Montes and Antonio Alonso Ávila, ob. cit., pp. 123-7. 58.Raúl Roa, El fuego de la semilla en el surco, ob. cit., pg. 484. 59.The so-called "August error" was mainly the result of applying a sectarian line of class against class, active at the time in the international communist movement. For further information see Lionel Soto, ob. cit., pg. 376-95; Raúl Roa, El fuego de la semilla en el surco, ob. cit., pg. 482-92; Central Committee of the Communist Party, El papel del Partido en la lucha contra Machado en agosto, in AIHC, Primer Partido Marxista Leninista, 1/2:1/1.2/52-59. 60.Federación
Obrera de La Habana. Comité de Huelga, Trabajadores. Continuad el paro por
vuestras demandas. Atrás los traidores que ordenan la vuelta al trabajo,
Havana, August 12, 1933, in Archives of Evelio Tellería Toca.
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