Also: Cuba in the Twentieth Year of the Revolution
http://www.walterlippmann.com/jgperez-cuba-20th-year-1979.html ================================================================

Meaning of the Dialogue
Cubans in the United States and the Cuban Revolution
By José G. Pérez
Intercontinental Press, September 24, 1979 pp.907-912.

[The following article appeared in the August issue of the International Socialist Review, monthly magazine supplement to the Militant.

[José G. Pérez was born in Cuba and came to the United States with his parents at the end of 1960. Pérez is editor of Perspectiva Mundial, a Spanish-language revolutionary-socialist news magazine published in New York. He recently traveled in Cuba with the Antonio Maceo Brigade.)
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I believe—sincerely—that what we have done and are doing is revolutionary, If we'd let ourselves be carried along by routine, by what's easiest to do, we wouldn't have taken on what we have. I firmly believe we wouldn't be doing it if we weren't revolutionaries. I believe we're doing it because we are revolutionaries.

To our way of thinking, being a revolutionary means defying routine, turning off the easy road, and many times it means taking the difficult road. But we don't doubt for a moment that what we're doing is highly positive, highly constructive, highly moral, and that it wilt benefit all Cubans: the Cuban community at home and the Cuban community abroad.

... men must not act in order to write pages in history, There's no point to that, But always history will record the things that have some human, social, political value; and we believe that this has value, a high human, social and political value.

We must bear in mind that if this emigration reached such a height and the counterrevolution achieved a certain strength in Cuba. if that division took place, it was largely due to the power and influence of the United States.

I believe that above all this means defeat for the enemies of our people.
—Fidel Castro on the Dialogue
December 9, 1978
Granma, December 17, I9781

Almost a year ago, the revolutionary government of Cuba ditched its twenty-year policy of undifferentiated hostility to the Cuban emigrés and initiated a rapprochement—known as "the dialogue"—with the Cuban communities abroad. As part of this change, tens of thousands of Cubans living in the United States have visited Cuba since the beginning of the year; mechanisms have been set up for reunifying divided families; and, as a gesture to the community abroad, the overwhelming majority of people who were imprisoned in Cuba for crimes against the security of the workers state are being released.

Whereas in the past the Castro leadership had not paid attention to the political life of the advanced capitalist countries, this initiative represents a groundbreaking policy shift that could transform the impact of the Cuban revolution on American politics. It has brought to the surface the growing political differentiation and polarization among the 700,000 Cubans in the United States.

Myths About Cubans in the U.S.

The image that most people have about the Cubans in the United States is composed of three interrelated myths.

The first myth concerns "la anorada Cuba de ayer" (the longed-for Cuba of yesteryear ). This supposes that the exiles were all capitalists and other very well-off people, as well as the politicians and assassins associated with the old Batista dictatorship.

It is true that the overwhelming majority of those people left the country after the revolution. But many of the people who left were urban middle class or relatively privileged workers who had not necessarily loot much economically. Many of these people came for economic reasons—not that things were so bad in Cuba, but simply because they had the opportunity and sought to obtain the standard of living they thought was possible in the most advanced capitalist country in the world.

The second myth is that Cubans here have done exceptionally well in "el exilio de oro" (the golden exile). In fact, Cubans do not do as well as the average Anglo. Many former businessmen and professionals are washing dishes. Many formerly well-off women now work in sweatshops, Cubans suffer higher unemployment than Anglos. The average wages of Cuban workers are substantially lower than those of their Anglo counterparts. The rate of participation of Cuban women in the work force is the highest of any sector of the American population, showing the degree to which Cuban working-class families find it impossible to meet their expectations with only one income. This is especially significant given the qualitatively lower rate of participation by women in the labor force in pre-revolutionary Cuba, and the continuing strong influence among many Cubans of the backward idea that a woman's place is in the home. ,

All the socio-economic indexes show Cubans to be worse off than Anglos in areas such as wages, family income, unemployment, and percentage of persons employed as professional, technical, or managerial personnel.

Cubans suffer from the same racist and language discrimination as all Latinos. Most Anglo bosses who discriminate against Latinos don't care whether you're Puerto Rican, Chicano, or Cuban: to them, a "spic" is a "spic." Like Blacks, Chicanos, and Puerto Ricans, Cubans are vastly underrepresented in all levels of government, elected or appointed.

The third myth is that virtually all Cubans are hostile to the Cuban revolution. This myth is promoted by the U.S. capitalist media and was accepted, for a time by the Castro leadership and by radicals in the United States, who labeled them all as gusanos (worms), the term used to describe active counterrevolutionaries.

A Changing Mood

The truth is that most Cubans in the United States were never active supporters of the militant right-wing groups, and of those who were, the vast majority have by now given up hopes of overthrowing the revolution. If the right-wingers still seem stronger today than they really are, that is mainly due to the image projected in the media by the American ruling class. The handful of ultra-right terrorists enjoy complete immunity from the cops and FBI, and probably count with their active cooperation on some projects.

Most Cubans who were initially hostile to the revolution have changed their minds. The majority of Cubans in the United States favor lifting the U.S, economic blockade of the island, and they support the normalization of diplomatic relations. Even many deeply held anticommunist prejudices are breaking down, and this process has been accelerating as thousands of Cubans visit the island every month and come back telling their friends of their favorable impressions.

A growing differentiation among the Cubans has been developing since the late 1960s, beginning with the campuses and spreading throughout the communities. One of the most prominent groups is the Christian Evangelical Reformed Church in Miami, headed by Rev. Manuel Espinosa, which has several thousand members. The Cuban-American Committee for Normalization of Relations is composed primarily of college professors, and the Antonio Maceo Brigade is a group of young Cubans who had been brought out of the country by their parents after the revolution. The left-wing magazine Areito, which is generally favorable to the revolution, has a circulation of several thousand.  

The political differentiation in the Cuban communities is rooted in several interrelated factors, most of all the class differentiation within the communities and the national oppression suffered by Cubans in the United States. These interact with the fact of the revolution, which is by far the most important event that ever happened to the overwhelming majority of Cubans, totally transforming their lives.

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The majority of U.S. Cubans want an end to the blockade…
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The political move by the revolutionary government in initiating the dialogue is more complicated and far-reaching than it might seem at first.

Beginning in the mid-1970s a few selected Cubans, most of them friendly to the revolution, started to visit the island, usually with no publicity. These visits led to a proposal to the Cuban government that young Cubans who had been taken out by their parents before the age of eighteen be allowed to visit openly, in a group similar to the Venceremos Brigade.  

The first such group, called the Antonio Maceo Brigade, visited the island at the end of 1977 and early 1978. Their trip coincided with the publication in Cuba of the book Contra Viento y Marea (Against the Wind and the Tide), which depicts the experiences of this layer of younger exiles, describing how they had eventually come to reconcile themselves to the Cuban revolution and then in many cases to become enthusiastic supporters of it. This book was awarded a prize by the Cuban literary institution, Casa de las Americas, in the special category (created for the occasion) of “Testimony: Youth in Our America.”

The book is basically a collection of interviews with fifty young exiles and includes a section devoted to critical evaluation of some weaknesses in Cuba today, including the attitude toward homosexuals, the poor quality of Granma and other printed media, the treatment of artists and intellectuals, bureaucratism and privilege, and the strides still to be made in advancing equality of women. This is another piece of evidence to show that the image of. Cuba as a totalitarian society painted by the imperialist press is a slander.  

In his initial press conference on the dialogue last September, Fidel Castro explained the impact of the brigade’s visit:

“For example, I’d say that something that helped make us conscious of this, and which made a great impact on Cuban public opinion, was the visit of the Antonio Maceo Brigade. Those young people, who had nothing to do with these problems and who are not to be blamed for these problems, who visited Cuba with an attitude of peace, with friendly attitude, made a great impact in our country. That is one example.”

A Stirring Visit

Later on at the September news conference, Fidel Castro returned to the visit of the first contingent of the brigade, explaining that it had provoked quite a discussion in the Cuban leadership:

“How and when the idea first came up, I couldn’t tell you because I don’t remember. I recall that one day some comrades told us that there was the possibility that a brigade of children of emigrés might come. We might say it was a strange thing. And we even wondered whether such a thing would be understood—that was the first thing we asked ourselves. Some comrades felt they should come. But, would the people understand? How would the people react?...

“Well, it proved to be a test. We might say it was a test. Later, they went everywhere and met with everyone from the very first moment they arrived. And they met with many leaders as well. I also met with them near the end of their visit. But I had noticed that all the people, the political cadres and leaders who had met with them, were all very favorably impressed and deeply touched. The meetings were very moving.

“They also helped us become aware of the problems of the community. Because there is something which we have started to realize, the fact that, as I see it, the Cuban community, like all other communities in another environment, in another country, tries to maintain its national identity. . . . Actually, we view this sympathetically. Regardless of what they might be, whether a Cuban millionaire or a worker in the emigré community. Because there are many workers who have emigrated; many Cubans abroad work hard at earning a living in factories….

“This, logically, arouses our solidarity. I mean just that: it arouses our solidarity and appreciation. . . . I repeat, this arouses our solidarity and appreciation, even if they don’t support the Revolution.

“Because we support all communities which try to maintain their identity. We support the Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, Latin Americans, blacks and Indians as well—in short, all the minorities who struggle for their interests. We support them. Why not view the Cubans in the same light?.

"In our contacts we were able to this angle of the problem. But our contacts have been made primarily with these young people, because it had a great impact on us. There is even a documentary film about the Brigade, and I know that many people cry when they see it. There is no doubt that national feeling is very strong. . . .

"We had thought there might be criticism of the government and the Party result of the Brigade's visit, but there was no criticism. The reaction was just the opposite. . . .

"You shouldn't think this is easy. need the understanding of the people because we don't do anything behind the backs of the people nor contrary to their feelings. Everything we do must always be in accordance with this. If it is not understood it can't be done." (Granma, September 17, 1978).

In his news conference Fidel explained a series of problems that concerned both Cubans abroad and in Cuba. These included reunification of divided families return trips to Cuba by exiles to visit, and the freeing of political prisoners. There was also the broader question of ongoing relations between Cuba and the community abroad; the possibility was raised of forming a special government agency handle this question and of publishing magazine, and so forth.

Fidel said these questions should discussed between the Cuban government and representative individuals from the community abroad. Only active counter revolutionaries would be excluded.


Release of Prisoners

A group of Cubans (the "Commission of 75") went to Havana and met with leaders of the Cuban government in late November. A few weeks later the commission returned, having by this time almost doubled in size. Further discussions were held, and a joint declaration was signed by all parties to the talks.

The Cuban government agreed to release some 3,000 political prisoners, that is, the overwhelming majority of the people imprisoned for counterrevolutionary acts, as well as all 600 people imprisoned for trying to leave Cuba illegally. Return visits by the emigrés would be permitted and organized, and a mechanism was set up to facilitate the reunification of divided families.

For its part, the Commission of 75 promised to do the necessary paperwork and take other steps to encourage the U.S. government to permit those prisoners and ex-prisoners who wanted to do so to emigrate to the United States. The joint declaration also included further ideas it strengthening the links between Cuba the Cuban community abroad, presenting these as items for further study and discussion.

The document also reported that it had been decided to "maintain the contacts and communication channels that have been established."

U.S. Campaign Against Cuba

The Cuban government made the proposal for the dialogue at a time when, from its point of view, relations with the U.S. government were—as Castro put it recently—"perfectly bad."

For the past four or five years, the U.S. government has been on a stepped-up anti-Cuban campaign in response to the aid Cuba has given national liberation struggles against imperialism in Africa. President Ford branded the Cubans "international outlaws" for daring to drive back the South African invasion of Angola.

At the beginning of his administration, Carter made some gestures that appeared to be conciliatory toward Cuba, such as lifting the travel ban (long ago declared constitutionally unenforceable by the Supreme Court). But these were followed by renewed imperialist propaganda and military threats against Cuba in response to Cuba's aid to Ethiopia against the imperialist-inspired Somali invasion. Following these, Carter publicly accused Cuba of backing the Katanganese rebellion in Zaire; the charge was hotly denied by Cuba, and the United States was eventually forced to withdraw it. The CIA mounted a "disinformation" campaign trying to link Cuba to the Ethiopian junta's military drive against the Eritrean rebels, despite Cuba's publicly stated differences with the junta on this question.

In a report to Congress drafted in December 1978, Carter told his fellow ruling-class politicians: "We will continue to express our concern to the Cubans over their military activities in Africa and emphasize that these will condition the pace at which normalization [of relations] moves forward, or, indeed, whether it moves forward at all. .

"While we cannot reimpose the multilateral sanctions [i.e. the Organization of American States economic blockade], we will continue to indicate to the Cubans that we cannot consider a total lifting of the US embargo on direct trade until 1) there is some dramatic improvement in their African posture and 2) we reach agreement on a formula for payment of compensation for expropriated US properties. We should also continue to make it clear to them that we cannot consider reestablishing diplomatic relations until these major problems are resolved."

Reactions to the Dialogue: Carter

The reaction of the U.S. government and capitalist news media to the dialogue was one of feigned indifference, but in reality of hostility.

Shortly before the first session of the dialogue, the U.S. government leaked to the news media the "news" that Cuba had obtained MIG-23 jet fighters from the Soviet Union, and suggested that they might be carrying nuclear weapons. At the same time, a flotilla of thirty-six U.S. warships, an aircraft carrier, and nuclear submarines moved toward Cuba, in what was later officially described as training "maneuvers." Carter ordered the resumption of U.S. spy flights over Cuba, a transparent provocation and" outrageous violation of Cuba's national territory.

This warmed-over "Cuban missile crisis" was soon shown to be a hoax. The planes had, in fact, been in Cuba for months; the U.S. government was forced to admit they were defensive tactical fighters and were not nuclear-armed.

Another indication of the Carter administration's real posture was its attitude on admitting the counterrevolutionary prisoners to the United States. Attorney General Griffin Bell said the United States would have to check every single one to screen out "spies, terrorists, and common criminals." Although shortly after Bell's statement the United States government claimed it would be willing to admit up to 400 ex-prisoners a month, it didn't do so. In fact, it tried to sabotage the release program by imposing interminable delays in processing visa applications. That policy continues.

Washington was clearly trying to delay the amnesty program. But in May the Cuban government decided to continue releasing prisoners independently of whether the U.S. government granted visas, and to increase the number released so that all would be freed by September. As of the end of May, some 1,900 prisoners had been freed.[2]

The reaction to the dialogue by the Cuban communities was very different from Washington's. Members of the Antonio Maceo Brigade, Rev. Espinosa's church, and others set up travel agencies to organize tours to Cuba by Cubans in the United States. Despite the high cost—about $800 for one week—the special tourist offices have been 'swamped since the day they opened their doors. For example, Cubatravel in New York has itself been organizing trips by nearly 3,000 people a month, and is constantly turning people away because flights are booked far in advance. Overall, of the roughly 1 million Cubans living abroad, some 100,000 will visit the island this year, with the overwhelming majority coming from the United States.

The trips are having a tremendous impact. Some people have gone to Cuba two or three times in the past few months and are saving money to go back again. For many, it is simply an opportunity to visit their loved ones or see their hometown. But seeing revolutionary Cuba today, and comparing it with what it was twenty years ago, is an experience that leaves few unchanged.

According to tour organizers, the overwhelming number of visitors are working class, primarily emigrés from lower social-economic strata in Cuba who still have many or most of their relatives and friends there.

The dialogue shows the continuing capacity of the Cuban leadership to see an opportunity and figure out how to take advantage of it.

• Fidel Castro took Jimmy Carter's human rights rhetoric and crammed it down his throat. All of a sudden, in the eyes of masses of Cubans in the United States, it is the U.S. government that is the obstacle to freeing the prisoners.

• Washington has lost what it thought was a stable base of support and a demagogic debating point for its anti-Cuba policy. It is clear the majority of U.S. Cubans want the U.S. economic blockade lifted and diplomatic relations normalized.

• By affirming the Cuban national identity of Cubans abroad, Havana has stimulated the awareness of Cubans in the United Stites that as a group they suffer national oppression, and that in fighting it they have the complete support of. Cuba. This was succinctly expressed in Fidel's parting statement to the first contingent of the brigade: "La patria ha crecido" (The homeland has grown). In a country where "Patria o Muerte! Venceremos"' (Land or Death! We will win!) has been the battle cry of the revolution for twenty years, such a statement implies a far-reaching political commitment.

Advance tor Cuban Revolution

• The Cuban' government is for the first time trying to directly influence U.S. politics, seeking to find support among a mostly working-class layer of the population for lifting the blockade and normalization of relations. If only by exposing Cubans in the United States to the reality of revolutionary Cuba, the dialogue means a tremendous step forward.

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The dialogue has polarized the Cuban exile communities...
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• The dialogue has 'strengthened the prestige and popularity of the revolutionary government among the masses in Cuba. Like the Cubans in the United States, many in Cuba have also suffered from, being cut off from family members and friends for close to twenty years.

• At a time when the world market price of sugar is less than what it costs Cuba to produce it, the income generated from the visits by Cubans abroad are a welcome source of sorely needed foreign exchange with which to advance Cuba's economic development.

• The dialogue is helping to break down the imperialist information blockade and slander campaign against revolutionary Cuba. Tens of thousands of U.S. workers are seeing with their own eyes and hearing from their own relatives and friends that Cuba is not a totalitarian police state and that the Cuban people are not starving to death.

• The dialogue has helped to shift the relationship of forces within the Cuban communities in the United States. The ultra-rightists are becoming increasingly isolated. For example, in Miami recently they were only able to mobilize a few hundred (as opposed to many thousands a few years ago) in an all-out effort to show opposition to the revolution. In other areas, their situation is worse. On the other side, groups such as the Committee for Normalization of Relations, Rev. Espinosa's church, and the Antonio Maceo Brigade are growing rapidly. The brigade's second contingent will consist of 250 people, compared to 55 on the first one, and there were mote applications than available slots.

• The dialogue and everything associated with it has tremendously raised the prestige of the revolution and its central leaders among the Cubans in the U.S., even among those who remain ideologically opposed to the revolution.

• Finally, it is useful to single out what the dialogue is not, since it has been misreported in the U.S. capitalist press. It is not an approach by the Cuban government to the U.S. government through exile intermediaries: In his first news conference on the dialogue, Castro stressed that:

"None of these problems has been discussed with the Government of the United States. The U.S. Government has absolutely nothing to do with this, absolutely nothing! . . .

"'These problems are internal problems which we are not willing to discuss with the government of the United States, because they are internal to Cuba, and we do not discuss nor will we ever discuss with the government of the United States questions referring to Cuba's internal affairs or to Cuba's sovereignty.

"However, we're willing to discuss these' particular problems with the Cubans abroad. In other words, we're willing to discuss, to talk over these questions that concern the Cuban community—but not with the government of the United States." (Granma, September 17, 1978).

Fidel went to great lengths to communicate to the Cubans abroad that they should look to Havana, not to Washington, for real solutions to questions such: as the release of prisoners and restoration of the right to: visit relatives in Cuba. It was a political move to take away from. Washington several issues it had used to keep many U.S. Cubans tied to its counterrevolutionary line.

Role of Antonio Maceo Brigade

As can be noted from Castro's news conference, the Antonio Maceo Brigade has played a special role in the dialogue.

The brigade's central core consists of several circles of longtime friends and political associates that emerged from student movement milieus in the United States and Puerto. Rico. Some came out of the left wing (the so-called tercerista faction) of the Puerto Rican Independence Party. Others were associated with a group known as Cuban Socialist Youth that functioned on a few Florida campuses in 1970 and 1971. Still others had been active in struggles by Latino communities, in-eluding the District 1 struggle for community control of the schools in New York City. Over time, they tended to group around the magazine Arelto, whose editorial board made the original proposal for the brigade to the Cuban government and put together the book Contra Viento y Marea.

To be in the brigade, it is not necessary to be a supporter of the revolution or a fidelista. The requirements are that a person be of Cuban birth or parentage, he between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five, have left Cuba due to parental decision before the age of eighteen (in the case of those who are Cuban-born), not be a member of a counterrevolutionary organization, and support lifting the blockade and normalizing relations. However, many members of the brigade are sympathetic to the revolution, and many of the leaders identify politically with the Cuban leadership, although not uncritically. They consider themselves revolutionaries and, more specifically, Cuban revolutionaries.

In April, Carlos a central leader of the brigade in Puerto Rico and a member of its U.S.-Puerto Rico National Committee, was assassinated by right-wing terrorists. A eulogy published in Granma explains how the Cuban government views this layer:

"Carlos Muñiz was 26 years old when he died, and he had reached what Che called `the highest condition of the human species': the condition of being a revolutionary. . . .

"You had to have seen his eyes that night when Fidel told them: 'Let there be no doubt in your minds that we consider you part of our family.' He was one of the first—always one of the first—to understand when Fidel said that their duty did not necessarily lie in Cuba but there, where they were most useful. . . .

"He died in battle, as teacher Conrado Benitez did, as literacy campaigner Manuel Ascunce did, as young Puerto Ricans Soto and Rosado did, as the internationalist soldier that he was. Over his body we'll say the words of Jose Marti: 'Death gives us leaders, death teaches us lessons and leaves us examples. Thus, these invisible threads are woven steadily together to form the soul of the homeland.' With his leadership, his lesson and his example, ever present in our people's memories, we say with Carlos Me& the irrevocable watchword of Patria o Muerte, Venceremos." (Granma, May 13, 1979).

A Permanent Dialogue

An editorial in the first issue of the brigade's paper, Baraguá, explains the position of the brigade leadership on the dialogue:

"We are concerned with the freedom of the prisoners and the reunification of the family. But we—at least those of us in the Antonio Maceo Brigade—are also concerned with developing a permanent dialogue with Cuba. This is why we have raised in both sessions of the. Dialogue, the possibility that the Cuban government give those of us abroad our constitutional rights. Those rights might include voting in elections to the Assembly of People's Power,' joining Cuban mass organizations, studying in Cuban universities and sending our children to Cuban camps and schools.

"The Antonio Maceo Brigade is, therefore, not a travel agency. We went to Cuba not only moved by nostalgia, for the past, but moved, above all, by the revolutionary course of the Cuban people begun on October 10, 1868, continued by Jose Marti and the Cuban Revolutionary Party and culminated on January 1, 1959.

"In 1977, we were opposed to the blockade and defended our right to experience the achievements and shortcomings of the revolutionary process. Today we also want to insure an ongoing Dialogue with Cuba. The second contingent of the Brigade and all those that follow will be made up of young people who, while not necessarily. socialist in orientation, want to experience Cuba more deeply than they might in a tourist trip. It is important to emphasize, however, that many young people will first travel to Cuba as tourists and then become interested in a different experience of Cuban society. That different experience is what the Brigade has to offer.

"The current situation allows us to think that the process of losing our nationality, a process that in one or two generations would have prostituted the Cuban national identity, has largely been stopped. Although many young people speak Spanish. haltingly and do not know Cuban history, the doors are now open for them to know their roots. Although many Cubans of our parents' generation may retain their conservative positions, knowing the Revolution's reality will weaken these positions, at any rate with respect to the normalization of relations between Cuba and the US. The fact that contact with Cuba slows down the loss of nationality may well result in changes in political attitude among Cubans abroad. After all, in today's Cuba, national identity is much more than a cultural definition; being a Cuban also involves a world view formed by the revolution."

The favorable reaction of the Cuban government to the idea of a "permanent dialogue" is reflected in the joint declaration on the dialogue signed by the Cuban government and the Cubans from the United States who participated in it.

"There were a number of issues brought up during the talks by representatives of the Cuban community abroad, among them:

"—The setting up of a Cuban state institute to attend to matters concerning the community abroad; the right to repatriation; the possibility of scholarships for young Cubans and participation by children living abroad in the Pioneer vacation camp program; and exchanges between Cuban artists, intellectuals and professionals. These ideas were listened to with interest by the Cuban government.

"—Also raised by a number of persons representing the community were issues of Cuban citizenship and the legal status of emigrants; possible connections between persons residing abroad and national, social and mass organizations; the suitability of putting out a publication for the Cuban community abroad; and other matters related to facilitating visits to Cuba.

"The Government of the Republic of Cuba will study all these matters very carefully in order to find the most just and reasonable solutions to them." (Granma, December 17, 1978).

One of the ideas raised in the brigade's platform for the dialogue and in the "Final Act" has already been adopted, that of sending Cuban children abroad to summer camps in Cuba where they will stay for several weeks with the pioneros. Several dozen maceitos (little Maceos) will go on the first such trip this summer, under the auspices of the Antonio Maceo Brigade and the Cuban government.

A New Cuban Nationalism in the U.S.

Nationalist sentiment 'is evident in the Antonio Maceo Brigade editorial and in other writings on the younger pro-revolution exiles (such as the book Contra Viento y Marea).

This nationalism has nothing to do with—or rather, is precisely the opposite of—the phony, proimperialist prattle of the right-wing exiles about how much they love (the old) Cuba.

At root, the nationalism of these younger, pro-Cuba Cubans is no different from the nationalism of Chicanos, Blacks, or Puerto Ricans. It reflects their perception that Cubans in the United States aren't getting a fair shake, face common problems, and are predominantly working class in composition. It is a nationalism that is directed against a real national oppression; as such, it is progressive. Moreover, this nationalist sentiment is also directed against; tthe, imperialist attacks on Cuba. It is directed against the right-wing puppets with their huge Cuban flags—which they used to try to hide the strings through which the U.S. government manipulates them.: The radicalizing young Cubans tend to be anti-imperialist from the outset.

Twenty years of living in the United States has changed the Cuban exiles. But the greatest effect has been on those who were brought out as. children. The U.S.- born or -raised Cuban is very different from those in Cuba or even their parents who came here as adults. Nevertheless, the national identity that the younger radicals identify with is Cuban, not. Cuban-American, although that term is occasionally used. And the Cuban government considers them Cuban too. In fact, all Cubans who travel to Cuba have to get Cuban passports and are considered to be Cuban citizens, even if they are also naturalized U.S. citizens. Those of Cuban parentage born abroad are encouraged to register as. Cuban citizens if they wish, since Cuba recognizes dual citizenship.

As a result of the dialogue, the polarization within the. Cuban communities has sharpened. The ultra-rightists oppose the dialogue, and as they became progressively more isolated, they have resorted to increasingly desperate action In addition to murdering Muñiz there have been many bombings (sometimes not publicized even in the local capitalist press or the radical press). There has also been a systematic campaign to silence Cuban journalists who report favorably on the dialogue and to intimidate those who took part in the Commission of 75, including assassination threats and attempts against the Rev. Manuel Espinosa, one of the best-known figures among them.

The U.S. government is in complicity with these attacks. Police have been totally uncooperative in' responding to threats made against prodialogue Cubans.

The Antonio Maceo Brigade has had an increasingly difficult time finding places to hold public forums or film showings in New York. Even before any publicity is given to an event, the right-wing terrorists seem to know who has agreed to rent them a meeting hall, and pressure is mounted on the owners to cancel th,e event.

Employees of Cubatravel agency, who are mostly members of the Antonio Maceo Brigade, have faced extraordinary delays in obtaining the necessary U.S. papers to travel outside the United States, although the U.S. government now claims it does not restrict travel to Cuba. -

There have been repeated public charges that the main terrorist group is the Cuban Nationalist Movement, with public headquarters in Union City, New Jersey. Its central leader is currently imprisoned for the assassination of Chilean Orlando Letelier. In addition to functioning in its own name, it also acts in concert with other. right-wing Cuban groups, such as Abdala, Alpha 66, and the 2506 Brigade, through a front group known as the Bloc of Revolutionary Organizations.

When carrying out their actions, the terrorists use several, different names. Domestic Cuba-related assassinations are signed by "Comando 0." The , name "Omega 7" is used to take credit for bombings. In international operations against the Cuban revolution, their actions are signed "CORU." The acknowledged head of CORU, Orlando Bosch, is in prison in Venezuela for having blown up in midair a plane of Cubana de Aviacion with more than seventy people on board. Fidel Castro—whose track record in surviving countless assassination attempts indicates he has substantial sources of information—publicly accused the American CIA of having engineered the airplane bombing.

U.S. Government Backs Rightists

Communiques from the terrorists and interviews with their "military chief," one "Commander Z," are published in the right-wing periodiquitos, weeklies distributed free in the exile communities. These kinds of papers have been publicly accused of extorting advertising revenue from local Cuban businessmen. Similar fund-raising techniques are used to get money to defend arrested terrorists, etc.

The American government claims it stopped supporting the right-wing terrorists at the end of the 1960s. Fidel Castro has stated several times that the policy of direct U.S. government backing of the terrorist groups ended only in 1977. Nevertheless, U.S. government complicity with the terrorists continues. As Fidel pointed out in one of his news conferences on the dialogue, "If it [the U.S. government] wanted to it could eliminate the terrorists immediately. The U.S. Government knows who they are, what weapons they have, where they live and what they do." Castro added that one explanation of why the government doesn't eliminate the terrorists "is because it doesn't want to." (Granma, December 17, 1978).

In addition to attacking prodialogue forces, the terrorists continue their attacks against Cuban diplomatic missions, cultural and sporting events that involve participants, from Cuba, and similar targets. Anti-Cuban statements by Carter, whether pegged around Nicaragua, Puerto Rico, or Africa, reinspire the terrorists and encourage the cops to wink at their crimes. The way the terrorists see it, they are only carrying out U.S. foreign policy through other means.

The Antonio Maceo Brigade and other prodialogue groups launched a campaign in response to the terrorist attacks, and especially the assassination of Muñiz. They held: simultaneous news conferences in half a dozen cities demanding that the government crack down on the terrorists, and calling on all Cubans and all supporters of democratic rights to send messages to President Carter and. Attorney Griffin Bell along this line. They also held highly visible, public events in the Cuban communities—including those where the terrorists are strongest—to show them that the supporters of the dialogue would not be driven underground. These usually took the form of religious memorials for Muñiz followed by car caravans. Several hundred cars participated in Miami, about 150 people participated in Union City, New Jersey, and similar numbers in other cities.

Defending the Cuban Revolution

In carrying out the dialogue, American revolutionists can do well to follow the example of the Cuban leaders in spotting an opening to advance the revolution and moving to take advantage of it.

Cuba's demand that the U.S. government lift the economic blockade and normalize diplomatic relations deserves support. "The economic blockade," as Fidel Castro has explained, "is like a knife at Cuba's throat." (Granma, December 3, 1978). The blockade prevents Cuba from buying anything from the United States or exporting to the United States. This is a great burden on the small, underdeveloped country. The Cubans are forced to deal through expensive third-party intermediaries for essential parts for U.S.-made machinery. They must do without many common items, or order them from as far away as the Soviet Union. And Washington then has the hypocrisy to attack the Castro government for inflicting privations on the Cuban people, and for turning Cuba into a "Soviet satellite."

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The U.S. government could stop terrorist attacks if it wanted to
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At the same time, Washington hopes to use its detente relationship on the Cubans to moderate or abandon their internationalist foreign policy. In his June 18 speech to Congress reporting on his summit meeting with Brezhnev, Carter said, "I made it clear to President Brezhnev that Cuban military activities in Africa . . . and also the growing Cuban involvement in the problems a Central America and the Caribbean, can only have a negative impact on U.S.-Soviet relations?' (New York Times, June 19, 1979).

Fortunately, the Cuban revolutionists have stood up to this kind of pressure; and in this too, they deserve our support and that of working people throughout the world.

We should also vigorously campaign against every U.S. military threat or hint of military threat against Cuba. The revolutionary upsurge in Nicaragua, coming on the heels of the Angolan and Ethiopian events, demonstrates again that defense of struggles in semicolonial countries is inseparable from defense of the Cuban revolution.

The example of what the Cuban workers and peasants have accomplished in the past twenty years can help show workers and farmers in the United States how well we could do here without bosses, especially because we could begin with greater material advantages. Socialists should publicize the revolution and its accomplishments, and should become known as those who favor American workers and farmers solving their problems by taking the Cuban road.

American socialists should work with prodialogue Cuban groups as the Cuban-American Committee for Normalization of Relations, around projects such as the petition campaign that group is sponsoring demanding that Carter lift the blockade and normalize diplomatic relations with Cuba.

One of the most successful activities sponsored by brigade units in variousareas are showings of documentaries and other films from Cuba, especially highly political films that don't usually make it into any theaters in the United States. We socialists can publicize and attend brigade film showings, or do the same thing ourselves.

The second contingent of the Antonio Maceo Brigade—named "Contingente Carlos Muñiz Varela" in memory of the murdered brigade leader—will return in mid-August from a month-long visit to Cuba. The firsthand account of the brigadistas on what they did and what they saw should make exceptionally interesting public meetings.

Support the Dialogue

Supporting the dialogue is part of defending and extending the Cuban revolution. By releasing the prisoners, for example, the Cuban leadership has dealt a powerful blow to the anti-Cuban propaganda and shown that it understands that defense of the revolution is above all political. The Cuban government is correct in saying that the U.S. government has a moral responsibility to admit to the United States those prisoners who wish to come here. And the Carter administration deserves denunciation for preaching about human rights while trying to sabotage the humanitarian gesture of the Cuban government.

Supporters of the dialogue must punch through the blackout of news on this development by the imperialist news media.

Socialists should also support the idea of the "permanent dialogue," the idea that Cubans in the U.S. should maintain an ongoing relationship with the revolution. The relationship with the revolution—not simply support for one or another measure—is what's really at the heart of the dialogue. That's why it has become the dividing line within the Cuban communities, and why the terrorists and the U.S. government are making their target all those who support the dialogue or are associated with it.

The dialogue is more than the two meetings held in Havana last fall, it is an ongoing process. It will not only affect the Cuban layer of the U.S. working class, but will tend to have a growing impact on all working people. It won't just mean increased attention by the Castro leadership to the politics and problems of the Cuban communities m the United States, but also to U.S. politics as a whole The dialogue shows that far from being weighed down with an entrenched bureaucratic caste, the Cuban revolution still counts with' a leadership capable of seeing a possibility for advancing the revolution and making good use of it—in short, that Cuba still has a revolutionary leadership. The dialogue means a new stage in the interrelationship between the Cuban revolution and the coming American revolution.

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I. This and all other references to Granma are to the English•language weekly review, which is different from the daily. I have used Granma's translations. Simultaneous weekly review editions of Granma are also published in Spanish and French. and their content are identical to the English edition,

2. The day I was putting finishing touches on this article, the New York Times reported a decision by the revolutionary government to free the remaining 610 political prisoners not covered by the dialogue accord. This group is composed mostly of former members of Batista's armed forces convicted of war crimes. The decision was announced July 9 by members of the Cuban community abroad who had traveled to La Habana to discuss the release of these prisoners with the government,

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Scanned by Walter Lippmann.
August 13, 2007.