09/14/06
Cuba-L Essay

RAUL CASTRO: WHO HE IS, WHERE IS HE GOING?
By Domingo Amuchastegui

Raul Castro will be the Cuban leader who pulls Cuba out from stagnation and cuts through the red tape on the policies, reforms, and changes aimed at transforming the Cuban economy into a more socialist-market oriented system where capitalist methods of organization, management, and financial operations will tend to become dominant. Thus, left behind will be "the other blockade" imposed on Cuba's economic and social dynamics by Fidel Castro when, after the discussion of the new investment law in September 1995, he announced that "no more reforms and changes were needed."

In 1997, after the V Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba (CPC) adopted an economic program to rescue and expand the pace of reforms, Fidel Castro became the one and only opponent of such a program, known as perfeccionamiento epresarial, a set of ideas and actions that represented precisely the course of action that his brother Raul had been advocating since the growing deterioration of the alliance with the Soviet Union after 1979. As a high-ranking official admitted to French researcher Janette Habel in 2004, "Everybody wants economic changes, except Fidel." [Cuba entre pressions externes et blocages internes, Le Monde Diplomatique, June 2004]

This course of action, inspired and represented by Raúl, is not a secret or a hidden tendency within Cuba's military and political power structure and political class. It has considerable echo among vast sections of the populace as well. It is something that ensures ample recognition and support by the people for the new leader. Fidel is not ignorant of these circumstances and is very much aware of the expectations surrounding this "provisional" substitution.
 

Second Fiddle or Equal Footing

Fidel has been at the helm of the Cuban Revolution since the beginning; he is charismatic, extremely brilliant, an excellent orator, and has other significant attributes as a leader. These things made Fidel Castro what he was and still is. At the same time, they overshadowed the role of his brother Raul until today when many people are wondering who Raul really is and what role he might now play.

These lines are not meant to be a biography (See for this purpose Brian Latell´s controversial book After Fidel), but rather to bring into a different perspective Raul Castro's political role within the Cuban Revolution and his potential as an alternative of change in the current situation.

* Raul is an excellent guerrilla leader and organizer, something that has been fully acknowledged even by some of his worst enemies.

* Not having the personal traits of his brother, Raul excels as a team person, not a caudillo; he is systematic and a brilliant organizer; he asks for advise and listens to other views; he is highly consistent, down to earth, and pragmatic.

* When we look at some of the most solid and influential institutions in Cuban society like the FAR (armed forces), the CPC, the parliamentary body known as Poder Popular, these were all key initiatives coming from Raul, fostered, supported, and protected by him until this day. And the majority of average people are very much aware of this.

* He has been for decades the "godfather" of most of the Union of Young Communists (UJC) leaders promoted to party and government positions. He has been a consistent advocate for younger leaders. Many leaders today feel themselves closely attached to him, military and civilian alike.

* He has been, and continues to be, an ardent and very vocal advocate for the promotion of blacks to leadership positions everywhere.

* Promotion of younger generations and blacks is enormously important in a country where two thirds of its populace is young and black.

* He is the architect of recurrent attempts and efforts in the field of economic reforms and changes.

This short summary should serve the purpose of stressing, beyond any doubt, the fact that Raul has not been a second fiddle but a first-class leader on an equal footing with his brother, each with different characteristics. But this is not all.

Much has been said about his lack of involvement in international affairs. This is an inaccurate assessment of the man. Not one single issue connected to Cuba's foreign policy escapes Raul´s attention. He was a key negotiator and player during the Cuban Missile Crisis; he is involved in every approach to the U.S.; he has maintained close control over intelligence operations since the 1960s and even more today; he has played major roles in Angola and Ethiopia; he was a key organizer and player in the Southern Africa negotiations and agreements; he is host and interlocutor to every retired U.S. admiral and general visiting Cuba; he is mentor, coach, and supervisor in much of Cuba's rapprochement with China, and has a well-known admiration for the Chinese experience.

Moreover, during the 1990s (until the end of the Clinton administration), he said in public several times that the dangers of a U.S. aggression against Cuba had calmed down and were less threatening than ever before, while cooperation and normality along border with Gitmo were prevailing, as well as with U.S. D.E.A. and the U.S. Coast Guard, followed by closer cooperation with INTERPOL and a number of EU and Caribbean police agencies in matters concerning drug trafficking. Even before 9/11, he encouraged the Bush administration publicly to engage in negotiations with Cuba while Fidel was still alive.

Furthermore, in the course of the critical circumstances of the early 1990s, his actions and words showed a considerable degree of self-criticism and restraint vis-à-vis the temptations of all out repression when discontent and defiance emerged in Cojímar and Regla (1993) and in the streets of Havana, in 1994. He criticized the degree of violence displayed by MININT´s forces in Cojímar, sponsored a meeting where these matters were discussed and criticized, something that prevented any sort of violent reaction from police forces in Regla, in late 1993. When discussing the events in the streets of Havana, he is known for having stressed that beans and not guns or violence would keep things under control. But the one thing that is less known - and it becomes more important now - is that he stressed that in view of such demonstrations of social unrest and discontent, "he was not going to be held responsible for bringing the tanks into the streets," clearly reflecting the understanding and lessons drawn by the Cub an military from events at Tiennamen Square.
 

Where he is going

Fidel Castro might very well come out alive at this juncture, but his age works against him. But very different from the recent past, he will have to recognize that his time is running out fast, that his leadership style and commanding powers cannot be passed on. What he will probably do then is to support his brother to the best of his abilities and remaining influence. If this should be the case, then Raul´s course of action, control, and influence will be benefited. Most scenarios until recently thought of Fidel passing away and Raul taking over entirely on his own, but now the Raul scenario will come into play but with Fidel playing along.

Under these circumstances, Raul will have to move rather fast for one pressing reason: he is 75. His background and credentials, tend to suggest that he will move ahead in reshaping completely the whole of the existing power structure according to the lines of his political project from the early 1990s (complete redistribution of the four powers concentrated in the hands of Fidel, effective collective leadership, greater participation of younger figures) coupled with a greater role for institutions and a greater role for reforms, similar to China in some ways but on the scale of Cuban economics and geopolitics.

There is another special dimension that needs to be highlighted: the economic situation. Raul Castro comes into full power at a time when the CIA's latest analysis acknowledges an eight-percent growth in its GDP compared to 2004, meaning a $3 billion increase in its output. From a political standpoint, Porter Goss, former CIA director, stated in 2005 that, "Castro's hold on power remains firm." State and foreign direct investment have multiplied over the last two years. And there is more to come, and not only from Venezuela and China. International prices of key Cuban exports like nickel, cobalt, and sugar have been extremely favorable. Nickel exports were more than $800 million, more than remittances (this according to the Council on Foreign Relations). Very well-known experts on Latin American and Cuban affairs like Phil Peters (Lexington Institute), John Kirk (leading Canadian academic), and Daniel Erickson (Inter-American Dialogue), have recently stressed how the Cuban economy is "humming along." Finally, an eye-witness, Mark Frank, Reuters senior correspondent in Havana for many years, recently concluded that, "Despite uncertainty swirling around ill leader Fidel Castro, Cuba's long-ailing economy has recently begun to get healthier, helped by deals with allies China and oil-rich Venezuela." Foreign businesspeople in Havana, have said, "There has been no run on deposits or their financial paper, no change in currency, our business has been absolutely secure. They are obviously very well prepared for any political changes." At the same, similar sources stated, "This is the best thing and exactly what foreign businesses want: a succession plan is underway and there is stability. The message is clear: there is one government, and they are in control."

Such numbers, analyses, and statements, are irrefutable proof that the economic environment in which Raul Castro is taking over could not be better; it clearly favors his plans and projects.

One unavoidable comparison comes to mind. Raul Castro might very well be the interim figure leading to broader changes within the Cuban system, playing a similar role to that of Den Siao ping after the passing away of Chairman Mao Zedong. In any case, his contribution in reshaping and articulating a new continuity will be decisive.

 

09/14/06

Cuba-L Essay

CUBA IS NOT CHINA: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES
By Domingo Amuchastegui

As we approach the end of Fidel Castro's era, especially after his failing health, much has been discussed about the kind of changes or reforms that Raul Castro and the younger leadership might make. It has been a common assumption - for the sake of simplicity - to assert the thesis that such changes or reforms would follow in the footsteps of the Chinese experience. Obviously, there is some truth in that assumption, but there are also numerous differences and conditions that should be considered in comparing China and Cuba.

The works of Edward Gonzalez, Frank Mora, William Ratliff, and more recently of Cuban dissident Oscar Espinosa Chepe (The Miami Herald, 08/11/06), have highlighted some relevant issues when comparing both countries. Still, there are several areas of disagreement and others issues that have not been explored. The purpose of this essay is to examine various reasons for the current alliance between both nations and to discuss their similarities and differences.
 

REASONS FOR AN ALLIANCE

What can China find in the small island of Cuba that makes it so interesting for some members of China's Military Commission and Politburo to visit the Caribbean nation and to persuade President Hu to declare China's support of Cuba's stand in unusually strong terms? First, there is what can be described as "the mirror effect." In the eyes of Chinese foreign policy makers, Cuba is to the U.S. what Taiwan is to China [tit-for-tat]. As the issue of Taiwan has become more tense and aggravating for Chinese policies, Beijing has increased its relations with Cuba. This has been a dominant trend since the early 1990s, but especially in recent years following Taiwan's increased hostility toward China backed by the Bush administration.

A second important dimension in Beijing's current alliance with Cuba is that Cuba is located in the heart of the Caribbean where Taiwan has been able to retain diplomatic recognition from a considerable number of the region's states. Cuba's political influence throughout the region is extremely valuable to China's long-term policy of eroding Taiwan's standing. First, Cuba is an important political actor with strong ties to influential political forces and governments from which China benefits; second, Cuba has throughout the region the most positive and constructive image derived from its alliance with China, an image aimed at undermining Taiwan's fading regional leverage. These two factors today are increasingly reinforced by the alliance between Venezuela and Cuba, which is a third factor that has augmented China's interest in Cuba.

Economic considerations are no less important. Nickel, cobalt, and oil are vital to China's economy. Because Cuba is a source for all three commodities, China is willing to grant Cuba exceptional privileges in terms of financial arrangements, insurance backing, rescheduling of Cuba's debt, and long-term investments in mining, oil, biotechnology, and tourism. China is also prepared to engage in an undisclosed range of military cooperation that has included scores of high-level military delegations visiting their respective nations.

There is also another special advantage to China: to prove how great their experience is in saving a collapsing socialist economy as was the case with Cuba in the early 1990s. This is not only relevant to the past, present, and future of socialist economies - and China's views and experiences on the matter- but also in sending a clear message to Third World economies, where Beijing exerts considerable influence. If China's "recipe" works in the Cuban case, then its relevance will be even greater.

The reasons for Cuba's rapprochement with China since the early 1990s were, of course, those of an economic and military nature as stated above. However, there are very explicit limits in both areas as to what Cuba may get from its Chinese ally. But there is a much more sophisticated reasoning behind Cuba's alliance with China and that is the value to Cuba of China's position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. This is considered to be crucial to Havana's conflict with the United States. There is also China's role as one of the most advanced world powers. An alliance with such a power is valuable beyond what the former Soviet Union had to offer Cuba. The Soviet alliance was fruitless in terms of financing and investments and technologically speaking it was largely a disaster. The USSR could not be compared to the United States and it was a collapsing economy. China is precisely the opposite and offers Cuba a host of opportunities that were never there in its relationship with Moscow. The USSR wa s a losing horse. According to every prediction, China is the fastest growing power in the world and the Cuban leadership is ready to make the most of it.
 

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

The two countries represent radical revolutions based on the peasantry but with overwhelming support among a wider range of social groupings (working class, lower middle class, intellectuals), with strong leaders experimenting with very different and traumatic programs from Flourishing 100 Flowers and A Thousand Schools of Competing Thought to Palabras a Los Intelectuales, Great Leap, Ofensiva Revolucionaria, Crear Dos, Tres, Muchos Viet Nams, Cultural Revolution, and a host of failed economic projects. More recently, we could draw some parallels between the Four Modernizations from the late 1970s in China to Perfeccionamiento Empresarial in Cuba since the early 1980s, opening different avenues to what the Chinese have called a "market socialist economy." The Chinese Revolution exerted a significant influence throughout the world and the Cuban Revolution has also had a similar influence. Indeed, many will agree that in some ways Cuba has had the greater influence. The two countries were also allies of the for mer Soviet Union and at times openly defied and clashed with Moscow's leaders.

But the list of differences between China and Cuba is enormous:

1. China is an economy of unprecedented scale with an ever growing market. Cuba is a small island economy of very limited scale.

2. China lies thousands of miles away from the United States while Cuba is just 90 miles away from U.S. shores.

3. Chinese society, values, traditions, demographics, and its ethnic and religious minorities, is very different from that of the more homogenous Cuban society with its own values and traditions.

4. The levels of interdependence and conflict between China and the United States are entirely different from those existing between Cuba and the United States. China is a big power on the path to become a superpower. Cuba is not.

5. Chinese overseas are closely intertwined with their motherland. Levels of conflict and hostility are minimal while cooperation is enormous, even among many of those in Taiwan. The Chinese KMT in Taiwan is no longer a dominant force. Its influence on overseas Chinese is minimal compared to that of Beijing. The amount of capital, markets, and technologies in the hands of overseas Chinese is huge and highly connected with that of the PRCH and plays a very big role in its extraordinary economic development. Chinese in the United States are not a belligerent lobby against relations and cooperation with the PRCH.

6. None of the characteristics stated above can be found among the Cuban political and economic elites who control the Cuban exile community with a disproportionate overrepresentation in Congress (two senators and three representatives), in the State of Florida, and within the political machines of the Republican Party. Although the Cuban community has been changing in its composition and attitudes since the 1980s and 1990s due to the changing nature of recent Cuban immigrants, one can still find a majority who are absolutely hostile and - as shown in the various studies conducted by Florida International University's Cuban Research Institute - close to 50% of Cubans in Miami would welcome an American military invasion of Cuba as the ideal outcome. Policy makers in Havana pay careful attention to the conflict with the United States and its local Cuban allies in Miami.

7. China's Communist Party and armed forces were very different from their counterparts in Cuba. Factionalism prevailed for many years among a strong pro-Soviet faction (Wang Ming), the more nationalist led by Mao and Chu Teh, and the more sophisticated influenced by the French Communist Party symbolized by Zhou, Chen Yi, and Deng. Such factional episodes affecting the CPCh as those in the 1920s, Sunyi, the struggle led by Marshal Peng Te-huai, the open civil war that took place in the course of the Cultural Revolution, and the internal clashes as to how to deal with Tiananmen Square incident, are not found in Cuba, where Fidel Castro's leadership role was, is, and will remain essentially unquestioned and overwhelmingly dominant.

8. Many times, Castro has stressed in private many of the differences mentioned here as a fundamental reason not to embark on a blind imitation of the Chinese experience. He may be right in some respects, but basically the argument has had the effect of freezing movement along the path of reform. There is also a fear of losing control and power as a result of such changes or of following the Chinese path to market socialism.

9. Nevertheless, the Chinese experience, together with the current alliance between the two countries, will be the most inspiring source for redesigning the Cuban system for the simple reason that it is the best way to avoid a Tiananmen Square. Upon this assumption lies much of the cohesiveness and consensus of the Cuban leadership. For Cuba, taking the Chinese path to market socialism will be different than the Chinese experience and will proceed at a different pace - a very much adjusted version in Cuban terms. It will not take place overnight, before or after Castro passes away.