Intercontinental Press
September 7, 1970
Fidel Castro's July 26th Speech
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All quotes in this article are from the English translation of Castro's July 26
speech in the August 2 issue of
Granma Weekly Review, the official organ of the
Central Committee of the Communist party of Cuba.
How Can Strain on Cuba's Economy be Relieved?
by Les Evans
HARVESTING SUGARCANE: One of Cuba's
200 Henderson cane harvesters, most promising of several machines. The Cubans
hope to have 600 of these machines in time for 1971 harvest. But Cuba's giant
1970 sugar crop was cut almost entirely by hand.
Fidel
Castro's July 26 speech in Havana on the economic difficulties currently faced
by the Cuban revolution has been met with smug satisfaction by the revolution's
enemies and with consternation by some of its friends. How severe are the
problems? To what extent can they be remedied or to what extent are they caused
by factors beyond the control of the Cuban leadership? What course of action
does Castro propose to take?
The problems include low productivity, growing
absenteeism, shortages of parts and machinery, inadequate transportation
facilities, and in some cases a drop in the quality of finished goods.
Production in many important industries has declined in the last year or failed
to keep pace with population growth-in part as a result of the labor
mobilizations for the 1970 sugar harvest.
Castro declared frankly: "Our enemies say we have
problems, and in this our enemies are right. . . . They say there is discontent,
and in reality our enemies are right. They say there is irritation, and in
reality our enemies are right." *
The Cuban premier revealed for the first time
detailed statistics from "a highly secret economic report" giving a picture of
those areas of the economy that have experienced the most serious difficulties.
He did not dwell at length on the many real and important economic successes
such as those in the fishing industry, improvements in beef and dairy cattle
stock, and substantial increases in some agricultural sectors such as rice
production.
The difficulties are of two general kinds: (1)
those flowing from objective conditions such as the U. S. economic blockade,
lack of natural resources, the smallness of the island, and the limited size of
the available labor force; and (2) those caused by poor planning, lack of
morale, administrative failure, etc.
Cuba today has a population of 8,256,000-slightly
more than New York City. This small island does not have the resources to
duplicate the industry and technology of a country like the United States. As
Castro pointed out, "Let us not forget that we must import more than five
million tons of fuel, a product we must import be- cause oil exploration and
discovery and putting oil wells into operation requires detailed study which
can't be carried out from one day to the next. We are a country without coal,
and practically without hydraulic energy. . . .
"We import all the energy for the lights we use,
for every lathe that moves, for every machine and motor of every kind."
Cuba has sought to escape the one-crop economy
imposed on it during the period of imperialist rule. The aim has been to make
the island agriculturally self-sufficient by stepping up production of a variety
of crops while developing light industry to satisfy local needs without having
to pay the cost of importing goods that could just as well be made in Cuba.
The American trade embargo has distorted this
process, however, making it necessary to either produce many goods that could
be much more cheaply imported from the United States, or else use the limited
amount of foreign exchange available to im- port consumer goods-mainly from the
Soviet Union, halfway around the world.
Even to build a substantial light industry
requires large outlays of convertible foreign exchange, which for Cuba at this
time can only be secured by the sale of sugar on the world market.
Moreover, the very agricultural di- versification
and beginnings of industrialization make the production of sugar more difficult.
An immense labor force is required during the three- month harvest season to cut
and process the cane. Under Batista a cheap supply of labor was
guaranteed by keeping the workers unemployed the other nine months of the year.
In 1958, for example, unemployment hit 686,000 persons.
The Cuban revolution has succeeded in eliminating
unemployment. There is, in fact, a severe labor shortage. This becomes
excruciating during the sugar harvest because tens of thou- sands of workers
must be freed from their regular jobs in order to cut cane. Other sectors of the
economy are disrupted and disorganized. So long as sugar remains the main cash
crop of the economy, which will be the case for some years to come, this state
of affairs will remain. The 1970 harvest was more dislocating than any previous one because of the sheer size of the crop and the extended time spent in
cutting and processing it.
Opponents of the regime have made much of the
fact that the projected 10,000,000-ton goal was not realized despite a nearly
six-month mobilization of the entire work force. This is in reality more a
failure of expectations than of achieved results. This year's harvest, at
8,500,000 tons, was the largest in Cuban history. The original quota was set
five years ago and could only be tentative. It should be plain that if it had
been set at eight million rather than ten million tons, the harvest would have
been regarded by everyone as a great victory.
A Relative Labor Shortage
A serious short-range problem is the high
percentage of the Cuban population composed of either youth or people over sixty
years old. According to Castro, ". . . only 32 percent of the population is
engaged in activities related to our economy. That is, less than a third of the
population is engaged in furnishing goods or services. And that third
includes those who are furnishing services that constitute investments for the future, such as public health
services and education, and those engaged in services that are absolutely
necessary to the defense of the Revolution and the homeland."
In the industrially advanced countries of
Europe, which already have the advantage of immensely higher labor productivity,
about 45 percent of the total population is employed directly in the work force.
The very advances of the revolution in the fields
of health, education, and social security, ensure that this situation will
continue for at least five more years. By providing scholarships and free
education, essential to producing a literate and technically capable generation of workers, youths spend years in school that previously would have been
spent on jobs or looking for jobs.
Before the revolution the old were left to starve
when they could no longer work. Now a substantial part of the social product
is used to provide pensions for the elderly. Castro gave a few figures:
"The outlay for social security services
increased from 114.7 million pesos [1 peso equals US$1] in 1958 to 320 million
in 1970.
"Public health services: In 1958 there were 8,209
workers in public health services. In 1969 the number increased to
87,646-87,646! Outlay for public health services, which in 1958 was 22.7 million
pesos, increased to 236.1 million in 1969.
"Outlay in education or in general services in
education: In 1958 there were 936,723 people enrolled in schools throughout the
country. A to- tal of 2,289,464 enrolled in the 1969- 70 school year-1,560,193
of them in primary education. . . .
"The number of scholarships- 15,- 698 in 1958-is
now 277,505. This figure does not include the children in day-care centers and
semiboarding schools.
"In 1958 the outlay for public education was 77
million pesos. This figure rose to 290.6 million in 1969. . . .
"Outlay for social security, public health and
education-three sectors -which was 213.8 million pesos in 1958, amounts to no
less than 850 million for 1970. If we add the outlay for defense to these three
sectors, the total comes close to 1,200 million pesos a year."
These outlays, which must and should be continued
for the welfare of the Cuban people and for the future
development of the Cuban workers state, are extremely costly in the short run.
To these objective demands on the economy, Castro added "one more reality- one
that weighs rather heavily-which is our own inefficiency, our inefficiency in
the general work of the Revolution."
Some Statistics on the Economy A great deal of
production for immediate consumption was sacrificed during the 1970 sugar
harvest in order to accumulate the desperately needed foreign exchange that
the sugar would bring, to finance the next stage of industrialization. This
was made worse by administrative mal- functions. Castro cited some of the
figures:
"Fresh milk output from January through May is
71.3 million quarts, 25 percent decrease compared to the same period in 1969,
which was 95.1 million quarts. . . .
"Cement. The amount of available cement as of
July is slightly over that for 1969, and 23 percent less than the figure for the
same period in 1968 due to difficulties in the transportation of sand and
movement of the finished product.
"Steel bars. Deliveries as of June were 38
percent under the figure for 1969 due to lack of transportation....
"Fertilizers. This refers to the fertilizer
that is mixed here. The production plan shows a 32 percent delay, that is,
130,000 tons, originated mainly by limitations in transportation of the
finished product. . . .
"Electric power. Electric power out- put as of
May was approximately 11 percent above that for the same period last year; at
the same time, there was a high increase of roughly 17 percent in maximum
demand. . . .
"Rayon. In view of the critical manpower
situation it has been necessary to cut down production plans, a measure which
has principally affected the manufacture of tires. . . .
"Tires and batteries. The tire production plan
will fall short by 216,000 units, that is 50 percent of the plan."
Many of the setbacks were directly or indirectly
related to transportation difficulties. Much of the available truck fleet was
mobilized to transport sugar- cane. Factories would fill all storage facilities
and when their products were not picked up, would be forced to shut down.
Shutdowns in one sector would lead to shortages of raw materials or semifinished
products elsewhere, result ing in further shutdowns. The uncertainty of
production, combined with sharp reductions in many consumer goods and even some
types of food and beverages, led to an increase in absenteeism, although Castro
said that on the whole morale was good.
The manpower shortage has meant that the existing
work force is spread very thin. There are not the necessary squads of repairmen
to keep equipment running; breakdowns hence have a more crippling effect on
production, often shutting down a plant for hours or days.
Under the circumstances, administrative errors
are more difficult to correct and any loss of morale directly affects labor
productivity.
Fixing the Responsibility
Castro did not attempt to blame objective
conditions for mistakes of the leadership. "There are objective difficulties,"
he said. "Some of them have been pointed out. But we aren't here to discuss the
objective difficulties. We must discuss the concrete problem, an - man must
contribute what nature da our means and resources have not been able to provide.
. . .
"We are going to begin, in the first place, by
pointing out the responsibility which all of us, and I in particular, have for
these problems. I am in no way trying to pin the blame on anyone not in the
revolutionary leadership and myself. (APPLAUSE) Unfortunately, this
self-criticism cannot be accompanied by other logical solutions. It would be
better to tell the people to look for somebody else. (SHOUTS OF: 'NO!') It would
be better, but it would be hypocritical on our part.
"I believe that we, the leaders of this
Revolution, have cost the people too much in our process of learning. . . . the
people can replace us whenever they wish-right now if you so desire!"
The gigantic crowd in Havana's Plaza de la
Revolucion shouted its support for Fidel. But it was plain to everyone that this
kind of yes or no plebiscite was a wholly inadequate expression for differences
of opinion among the Cuban masses. Castro is advancing proposals to restructure
the economy made it clear that the Cuban leadership was seriously grappling with
the question of workers' participation in making the decisions that 'feet their
lives. At this stage, how the leadership's proposals remain tentative and have
yet to be fully spelled out.
What Castro Proposed
Castro said that major changes would be
made in a number of areas. These ranged from purely administrative shifts in
personnel to important innovations in the factories pointing toward the
formation of some kind of workers committees that would have a say in the
operation of the plants.
On the administrative side, Castro criticized
"our lack of cadres, of men with a high enough level of training and
intelligence who are capable of carrying out the complex tasks of production."
He said that "it has been necessary to remove
some ministers and that it will be necessary to make some other changes." These
were people, he said, who had "burned themselves out." He made no attempt to
represent these personnel replacements as adequate in themselves to deal with
the problem.
Castro suggested two forms: (1) workers
committees to regulate distribution of goods and services outside of the
factories, and (2) workers representation in the management of production
itself.
Some of the proposals in the sphere of social
distribution were aimed at alleviating the labor shortage. These would allow
groups of workers as individuals or through community meetings to requisition
building materials for the construction of homes or schools by volunteer labor.
This system would have the merit of giving workers an alternative to the
ordinary administrative channels if regular construction were delayed too long.
Castro proposed that buses be made available
to factories to be used by the workers for outings or to take workers home after
the night shift when regular transportation was unreliable. More significant:
"The problem of housing distribution can be handled through the factories, as
well. And the workers should be the ones to make the decisions. They, better
than anyone else, know which worker needs a home most, or if
he has a home. . . . He would speak about it. This problem should never be
solved through administrative channels."
Directly on the question of workers control
of production Castro had this to say:
"Take the problem of plant management. Last
time we spoke of the work of the Party, of how we had to revive the work of the
mass organizations and give them a broader field. But that is not enough. New
problems come up, and we must delve deeper into the matter. We don't believe
that the problems of managing a plant should fall exclusively to the manager. It
would really be worthwhile to begin introducing a number of new ideas. There
should be a manager, naturally -for there must always be someone accountable-but
we must begin to establish a collective body in the management of each plant. A
collective body! It should be headed by one man, but it should also be made up
of representatives of the advance workers' movement, the Young Communist League,
the Party and the women's front- if such a front can be organized within the
plant."
Castro suggested a separation between the
Communist party and the plant management. "We must remember that, in a factory,
we cannot appoint the Party Secretary to the post of manager . . . nor can we
appoint
the manager as Party Secretary." It
remains to be seen in practice the effect of such a separation. The freeing of
plant management from party control could have serious consequences in the
strengthening of a new technocratic layer of specialists unless control is
transferred to rank-and-file workers' bodies. Castro made comments that left
open both possibilities although he appeared to lean toward workers control.
The party, he said, ". . . should not be
held responsible for the management of the plan. The Party's responsibility
should be an indirect rather than a direct one. It is the Party that must
immediately call the attention of the superior administrative body to any
deficiency, any error of an administrative nature, but the Party should never
tell the manager what to do."
He added, however, a series of rhetorical
questions:
"Why should a manager have to be
absolutely in charge? Why shouldn't we begin to introduce representatives of the
factory's workers into its management? Why not have confidence? Why not put our
trust in that tremendous proletarian spirit of men who, at times in torn shoes
and clothes, nevertheless keep up production?"
The creation of real institutions of workers'
self-management would bean important step forward for the Cuban revolution.
The Cuban leaders have yet to announce any final plans for
the reorga- nization of the economy, but some preliminary observations can be
made on the basis of what Fidel Castro said and did not say.
It appears that the Cubans are moving toward a concept of
workers' self- management similar in some ways to that presently in use in
Yugoslavia, without some of the more glaring deficiencies of the Yugoslav
system. Castro pointedly made no reference to the use of material incentives for
more productive workers, or "profit sharing" among the workers of particular
plants-practices that in Yugoslavia (and in the Soviet Union) have created a
privileged technocratic crust within the working class. Nor did he propose the
kind of economic autonomy that permits Yugoslav plants to jeopardize the planned
economy and even to enter into private agreements with foreign capitalist
corporations to the detriment of the monopoly of foreign trade.
Castro's proposals emphasize steps toward equalizing
incomes and benefits rather than toward the growth of special privilege.
It is still unclear how much power the Cuban factory
committees will have. Will they be allowed to meet on a regional and national
level as well as on a factory level? Will the dele- gates be selected by
election and be subject to recall? Will such committees deal with questions of
economic and political policy as well as administrative detail?
Castro did not propose such functions for the
rank-and-file workers' bodies he envisages, although he did not exclude them
either.
Many questions need to be resolved. How will information
and experience be shared between workers in one factory and another? A logical
way would be the publication of reports and discussion articles by the workers'
bodies in the Cuban press. This should include public discussion and debate,
with the right to seek support for all viewpoints that stand within the frame-work of unconditional defense of the revolution.
The outcome of such a process would be the creation of
permanent institutions of proletarian democracy that would forge deep bonds
between the masses and the revolutionary leadership while at the same time
providing for constant correction of the leadership by the masses.
As long as the workers cannot effectively participate in
making decisions, the risk remains that they will not feel responsible for
carrying them out either. This raises the very real danger of isolation of the
revolutionary leadership and its degeneration under the pressure of special
interest groups - of privileged or would-be privileged layers within the workers
state.
The Cuban leaders take these dangers seriously. In the
context of the very complex Cuban reality, living under the guns of American
imperialism, they are struggling to find a workable solution to the problems.
We must agree with Fidel Castro's assessment of the period ahead: "We really
believe the Revolution is faced by a challenge greater than any it has ever
faced before, one of its most diffcult tasks."