NEO-BOLÍVARIANISM AND CUBA’S
EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP WITH VENEZUELA
by H. Michael Erisman
Political Science Department
Indiana State University
Prepared for
presentation at the 26th International Congress of the Latin
American Studies Association held in San Juan, Puerto Rico (March 15-18,
2006)
Introduction:
Havana’s increasingly close ties with Hugo Chávez’s government in
Venezuela has become a key pillar within both its network of international
relations in general and the Latin American dimension of its foreign policy
agenda in particular. This evolving relationship is important not only in a
bilateral sense (i.e., its significance to Cuba and Venezuela), but it also
has larger implications with respect to the dynamics of integration politics
in Latin America (especially with respect to the efforts of Latin America
countries to develop an effective collective response to Washington’s
efforts to promote its neo-liberal projects in the hemisphere) and U.S.
attitudes/policies toward the two governments.
The key analytical tool that will be used to tie together the main
components of the study is the growing confrontation between two very
different and ultimately incompatible grand models of hemispheric
integration--NeoPanAmericanism and NeoBolívarianism.
• NeoPanAmericanism, which
Washington champions, revolves around the notion that a process should be
implemented which in effect would represent a contemporary economic
manifestation of the classical PanAmerican ideal of hemispheric cooperation
with respect to political/security questions. The OAS (Organization of
American States) was the institutional vehicle created in 1948 to facilitate
and orchestrate this more traditional view of collaboration. Like its
predecessor, NeoPanAmericanism implies participation by and, at least from
Washington's perspective, a leadership role for United States.
Inextricably linked to this vision is
Washington's desire to convert the entire hemisphere to a neoliberal
economic system. Many Latin Americans and certainly the Cubans are rather
skeptical about this scenario, doubting that their individual countries will
be able to fare very well in what would basically be a no-holds-barred
competition with the one of the world's greatest centers of economic power.
The most vociferous critics, with the Havana at the forefront, see this
blueprint as little more than a formula for the United States to
re-establish tight economic hegemony over the region and thereby drive the
hemispheric nations back into counterdevelopmental dependency relationships
with Washington.
In the context of the early 21st century, the
NAFTA/FTAA project embraced by both Bush administrations as well President
Clinton has been widely seen throughout the hemisphere as the organizational
framework within which the United States hopes to put into place its
reformulated neoliberal version of Pan-Americanism.
• NeoBolívarianism represents the
Hispanic (and Anglophone Caribbean) alternative to a landscape such as that
outlined above that would be dominated by the United States. The key idea
here is that any contemporary developmental cooperation schemes launched by
hemispheric states should be modeled along the lines of Simón Bolívar's
vision of a politically unified Latin America that would be clearly separate
from and independent of the Colossus to its north. As such, this approach
rejects, at least for the time being, any significant involvement in the
process on Washington's part. Instead it sees the whole enterprise unfolding
under Latin American (rather than U.S.) leadership, the ultimate goal being
to achieve a level of integration that would put the hemispheric community
(defined as South America and the Caribbean Basin countries) in a position
where its pooled economic power would to a great extent be sufficient to
counterbalance that of the United States. Only at this point, when the
hemispheric nations could bargain effectively from a position of collective
strength, would NAFTA/FTAA affiliation be seriously considered.
Not surprisingly given its desire to inject a strong South-South dimension
into its international/hemispheric relations and its penchant for playing
the Latin American David to the U.S. Goliath, Havana has long been an
advocate of NeoBolívarianism in one form or another. What has, of course,
changed this policy equation rather dramatically over the past few years has
been the emergence of Hugo Chávez’s government in Caracas not only as an
increasingly important economic ally of the Cuban Revolution, but also as a
major player in NeoBolívarian politics.
Utilizing NeoBolívarianism as the overarching conceptual framework for
chronicling Cuba’s evolving relationship with the Chávez government, the key
analytical questions to be addressed here are:
•[]
What impact has the concept of NeoBolívarianism had on Cuba’s evolving
relationship with Venezuela?
•[]
What impact has the Havana/Caracas team had (or may potentially have) in
promoting the concept of NeoBolívarianism in the larger hemispheric
community?
An Overview of Evolving Cuban/Venezuelan Relations:
Prior to Hugo Chavez’s election as Venezuela’s president in December
1998, there was for the most part nothing particularly exceptional with
regard to Havana’s relations with Caracas. This situation can to a great
extent be attributed to the fact that throughout much of the Cold War,
Havana’s foreign relations agenda, especially in the economic realm (see
Figures 1 and 2, which illustrate the regional distribution of Cuban trade
in the latter years of the Cold War), tended to be dominated by its ties to
the USSR and the socialist bloc. Indeed The Fidelists’ sophistication in
capitalizing upon this Soviet connection constituted a key
factor in
their Cold War ability both to frustrate Washington’s efforts to destroy the
Revolution and to pursue an extremely ambitious agenda in Third World
affairs1,
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa where Cuban military forces played a decisive role in both
the Angolan (1975-1976) and Ethiopian ((1977-1978) conflicts. Such audacity
led Jorge Domínguez to his widely-quoted observation in 1978 that “Cuba is a
small country, but has a big country’s foreign policy.”2
Sources: Compiled from data provided in
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Cuba: Handbook of Trade Statistics–1992
(Springfield, VA: National Technical Information Service, 1992)
Looking specifically at the Western Hemisphere, Cuba’s early relations
with many Latin American states were complicated by two factors: A)the
generally successful U.S. effort in the 1960s to isolate Cuba by pressuring
hemispheric governments to sever their diplomatic and economic relations
with Havana–-almost all, including Venezuela, did so, the lone exceptions
being Canada and Mexico; and B) Cuba’s policy during the Revolution’s early
years of providing moral support (and in some cases limited material
support) to radical left-wing revolutionary groups and guerrilla movements
that were seeking to overthrow various Latin American regimes. Among the
main targets of such activity was President Rómulo Betancourt’s government
(1959-1964) in Venezuela, which the Fidelistas perceived as one of the
Revolution’s most ardent hemispheric enemies and therefore a regime whose
radical left-wing opponents merited Cuban support.3
Cuba’s hemispheric policy shifted in the late 1960's and early 1970s
from an emphasis on supporting the armed struggles of left-wing guerrillas
to one that stressed efforts to normalize relations with all but the most
reactionary or the most pro-U.S. Latin American governments. The first
breakthrough came in late 1970 when Chile, under its recently-elected
Marxist president Salvadore Allende, restored the relations that had been
broken in 1962, followed shortly thereafter by Peru (June 1972) and a group
of Caribbean nations–-Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad/Tobago
(December 1972).
In Venezuela’s case, normalization occurred in December 1974.
Subsequently, relations between the two countries could be characterized as
“correct”, but not terribly close or cordial. Trade, especially Cuban
imports from Venezuela, increased during the pre-Chávez period (see Figure
3), although Havana’s export performance was rather uneven and ultimately
not that impressive. In any case, these Caracas connections did not (as was
likewise true with respect to Cuba’s relations with many other Latin
American countries)represent top-priority items within the overall
framework of Havana’s Cold War foreign policies. This situation would,
however, change dramatically when, within the radically different context of
a post-Cold War world, Hugo Chávez came to power in Venezuela
Source: Anuario Estadístico de
Cuba 2004. Available at
www.cubagob.cu/otras_info/sitioone/index.htm
Hugo Chávez, then in his late 30s and a lieutenant colonel in a
paratroop regiment, first burst onto the Venezuelan political scene in
February 1992 when he and fellow officers/conspirators attempted to take
over the government by launching a military coup. Although the plot failed,
Chávez came to national prominence as a result of a short speech made
shortly following his arrest. He continued to develop his ideas while in
prison (1992-1994), concluding among other things that it would be more
productive to pursue his political ambitions through the electoral process.
As his vehicle, he organized a new political party called the Fifth Republic
Movement (Movimiento Quinta República, or MVR).
During 1996 and 1997 his support in opinion polls gradually increased
as Venezuelans became increasingly disillusioned with the dynamics that had
characterized the country’s political landscape for the last 40 years. At
the core of this situation was a cozy arrangement, known as the Punto Fijo
system, that facilitated the alternation in power of the two traditional
political parties--the center-left Acción Democrática (Democratic Action, or
AD) and the center-right Social Christian Party (COPEI)-–that had long
dominated Venezuelan politics. This growing alienation came to a head on
December 6, 1998, when the Venezuelan electorate in effect dismantled the
old Punto Fijo system by choosing Hugo Chávez Frias as their new president.
Chavez received a solid 56 percent of the vote and officially took office in
February 1999.4
As might be expected given Chávez’s flamboyant charismatic style and
his penchant for radical left-wing populism, the political currents swirling
around his presidency with regard to both domestic and foreign policies have
often been tumultuous. In the realm of international affairs, the most
dramatic and in some quarters (e.g., the Bush administration) the most
controversial development has been the de facto and multifaceted alliance
that has emerged between Caracas and Havana, with the ALBA (Alternativa
Bolivariana para las Américas--Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas) pact
constituting its most visible and most ambitious (NeoBolívarian)
manifestation.
Havana quickly embraced the new regime in Caracas, with Fidel making
the first of what would become a series of state visits in
October 2000. During the trip, the first major step was taken in developing
what would become a complex and extremely cordial economic relationship when
an agreement between the two nations was finalized which committed Venezuela
to supply the island with 53,000 barrels of oil per day (bpd), worth about
$580 million per year, and finance up to a quarter of the cost with
long-term credits at extremely attractive low rates.5
Making the deal even more beneficial to Havana were its barter stipulations
that allowed at least some of the debt incurred be repaid in kind--e.g., via
medical or educational services. Pursuant to these provisions, there soon
were hundreds of Venezuelan medical patients being treated in Cuba and more
than 200 Cuban doctors and nurses dispatched to work in Venezuela.6
Castro returned to Venezuela for another visit with Chávez in August
2001, with the agenda often seeming to be dominated more by social events
(e.g., parties and celebrations to celebrate his 75th birthday)
than by official state business. But beyond the festivities, a subtle shift
in emphasis from bilateral to broader international concerns could be
detected in the two leaders’ political dialogue, the main topic being the
need for greater Latin American cooperation/integration to counter
Washington’s proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). In short, the
concept of NeoBolívarianism as an antidote to the FTAA’s NeoPanAmericanism
began to receive growing attention within the context of evolving
Cuba/Venezuelan relations.
As such, both leaders became increasingly visible in a campaign to
promote their anti-FTAA, NeoBolívarian agenda within the larger hemispheric
community. For example, when the 3rd Summit of the Association
of Caribbean States (ACS) convened in December 2001 on Venezuela’s Margarita
island, both Fidel and Chàvez made strong appeals for support of the
proposition that "those of us from Latin America and the Caribbean should
think of an alternative [to the FTAA because it] is not what is going to
unite us."7 Similar
appeals for a truly serious commitment to ALBA were also made to South
American governments.8
Finally, a watershed event occurred on December 14, 2004 in Havana when
Cuba and Venezuela signed the ALBA Pact, thereby transforming
NeoBolívarianism from what had heretofore been a broad (philosophical)
concept into a formal international treaty with specific
institutionalization provisions. The agreement, in its entirely, is as
follows:
Agreement between the
president of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the President of the
Council of State of the Republic of Cuba for the implementation of the
Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas9
For one party, President Hugo Chávez Frías, in the name of
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and, for the other, the President of
the Council of State of the Republic of Cuba, Fidel Castro Ruz, in the name
of the Republic of Cuba, meeting in Havana on December 14, 2004 on the
occasion of the 180th anniversary of the glorious victory at
Ayacucho and of the Convening of the Panama Amphyctionic Congress, have
examined the possibility of extending and modifying the Comprehensive
Cooperation Convention between Cuba and Venezuela signed on October 30,
2000. This being the aim, they have decided to sign this agreement on the
tenth anniversary of the meeting between President Hugo Chávez and the Cuban
people.
Article1: The governments of Venezuela and Cuba have decided
to take concrete steps towards the process of integration based on the
principles contained in the Joint Declaration signed this day between the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Republic of Cuba.
Article 2: Given that the Bolivarian process has placed
itself on a much firmer footing after the decisive victories in the
revocatory referendum of 15 August 2004 and the regional elections of
October 31, 2004 and since Cuba is in a position to guarantee its own
sustainable development, cooperation between the Republic of Cuba and the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela will be based from this date forward not
only on principles of solidarity, which will always be present, but also,
and to the highest possible degree, on the exchange of goods and services
which best correspond to the social and economic necessities of both
countries.
Article 3: Both countries will draw up a strategic plan to
secure the most advantageous productive complementarity on the bases of
rationality, using the comparative advantages that already exist in both
countries, saving resources, expanding useful employment, promoting access
to markets and other considerations based on true solidarity which adds
force to the strengths of both countries.
Article 4: In areas of common interest and based on
principles of mutual benefit, the two countries will exchange comprehensive
technological packets developed by the parties, which will be made available
for use and implementation.
Article 5: Both parties will work together and in
coordination with other Latin American countries to eradicate illiteracy in
third countries using methods that can be applied on a large scale, are
proven to be effective, to give swift results and have been successfully
applied in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. They will likewise
cooperate on healthcare programs for third countries.
Article 6: Both parties agree to make investments in which
they are both interested under the same conditions as those executed by
domestic institutions. These investments can take the form of joint
ventures, joint production agreements, joint management projects and any
other forms of association that they decide to create.
Article 7: Both parties can agree to open subsidiaries of
each country’s state- owned banks in the national territory of the other
country.
Article 8: In order to facilitate payments and encashment
arising from trade and financial transactions between the two countries, it
is agreed to sign a Reciprocal Credit Convention between the banking
institutions assigned to this task by their respective governments.
Article 9: Both governments are open to the possibility of
practicing compensated trade to the extent that this is mutually convenient
as a way of expanding and increasing trade.
Article 10: Both governments will promote the development of
joint cultural plans which take into account the specific characteristics of
the various regions and the cultural identity of the two peoples.
Article 11: When this agreement was drawn up, account was
taken of the political, social, economic and legal asymmetries between the
two countries. Cuba, over the course of more than four decades, has created
mechanisms to withstand the blockade and continued economic aggression; this
gives it great flexibility in its economic and trading relations with the
rest of the world. Venezuela, for its part, is a member of international
institutions Cuba does not belong to, all of which must be taken into
consideration when applying the principle of reciprocity in any trade and
financial agreements made between the two countries.
Article 12: As a result, Cuba proposed the adoption of a
number of measures aimed at expanding the integration between the two
countries and as an expression of the spirit of the joint declaration on the
Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas signed on this day. Considering the
solid arguments put forward by the Cuban party and their relevance as an
example of the integration and economic union to which we aspire, this
proposal was understood and accepted in a fraternal and friendly manner by
the Venezuelan party as a constructive gesture which demonstrates the great
reciprocal trust which exists between the two countries.
The measures proposed by the Cuban party are as follows:
1st: The Republic of Cuba will immediately remove
tariffs or any kind of non tariff barrier on all goods made in the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela imported by Cuba.
2nd: All state investments, investments by
Venezuelan joint ventures and even investments by private Venezuelan capital
in Cuba shall be exempt from all taxes on profits during the period of
recovery of the investment.
3rd: As part of the trade and cooperation
relations existing between the two countries or between Cuba and other
countries, Cuba grants the same treatment to ships sailing under the
Venezuelan flag as it gives to ships sailing under the Cuban flag in all
transactions carried out in Cuban ports and offers the opportunity to take
part in cabotage services between Cuban ports under the same conditions as
ships sailing under the Cuban flag.
4th Cuba offers Venezuela airlines the same
treatment accorded to Cuban airlines in matters of transporting passengers
and cargo to and from Cuba and offers the use of airport services, buildings
and any other facilities. These terms also apply to the transportation of
passengers and cargo in Cuban territory.
5th The price of oil exported by Venezuela to Cuba
will be fixed on the basis of prices in the international market as per the
provisions in the current Caracas Agreement that is in effect between the
two countries. Nevertheless, considering the traditional volatility of oil
prices which on occasions have made the price of Venezuelan oil fall below
$12 per barrel, Cuba offers Venezuela a guaranteed price of no less than $27
per barrel, always respecting the commitments assumed by Venezuela in the
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
6th: Concerning investments by Venezuela state
bodies in Cuba, the Cuban party shall remove any restrictions that might
prevent such investments from being 100% owned by the Venezuelan state
investor.
7th: Cuba offers 2,000 scholarships per year to
young Venezuelans so they can pursue their post secondary education in any
area that may be of interest to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,
including that of scientific research.
8th: Goods and services originating in Cuba
imported into Venezuela can be paid for with Venezuelan products, in
Venezuelan domestic currency or in any other mutually acceptable currency.
9th: With regard to sporting activities which are
having such a boom in Venezuela as a result of the Bolivarian process, Cuba
offers the use of its installations and teams for anti-doping control under
the same conditions as those accorded to Cuban athletes.
10th: Cooperation in the educational sector will
be expanded to offer assistance in those methods, programs and techniques
used in the educational process which are of interest to Venezuela.
11th : Cuba places at the disposal of the
Bolivarian University the support of more than 15,000 medical professionals
involved in the "Into the Neighbourhoods Mission" so that they may train as
many general practitioners and healthcare specialists as Venezuela may
require, including Venezuelans aspiring to university degrees in scientific
subjects, and support for as many students of the "Sucre Mission" as wish to
study medicine and then graduate as general practitioners; the combined
total of these two groups could reach tens of thousands in a period of no
more than ten years.
12th The comprehensive healthcare services offered
by Cuba to the Venezuelan people treated under the "Into the Neighbourhood
Mission", and whose numbers total more than 15 million people, shall be
offered under highly preferential economic terms and conditions, which must
be mutually agreed upon.
13th: Cuba shall facilitate the advancement of
multi-destination tourist products originating in Venezuela without imposing
surcharges or other kinds of restrictions.
Article 13: The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, for its
part, proposed the following measures which seek to achieve the same
objectives as were set forth in Article 12 of this agreement.
1st: Transference of its own technology in the
energy sector.
2nd: The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela shall
immediately remove any kind of tariff barrier on the importation into
Venezuela of all goods originating in Cuba.
3rd: All state investments and investments by
Cuban joint ventures in Venezuela shall be exempt from all taxes on profits
during the period of recovery of the investment.
4th Venezuela offers the scholarships that Cuba
may require for Cubans to study in the energy sector or in other sectors in
which the Republic of Cuba may have an interest, including the areas of
science and research.
5th Financing for productive and infrastructure
projects: these may include, the energy sector, the electricity industry,
asphalting roads and other highway projects, development of ports, aqueducts
and sewage systems, the agro- industrial and the service sectors.
6th: Fiscal incentives for projects of strategic
importance to the economy.
7th: Preferential treatment for ships and aircraft
flying the Cuban flag in Venezuelan territory, within the limits permitted
by Venezuela’s laws.
8th The promotion of multi-destination tourist
products originating in Cuba without imposing surcharges or other kinds of
restrictions.
9th Venezuela shall place at Cuba’s disposal its
air and maritime transportation infrastructure and equipment on a
preferential basis in order to support the social and economic development
plans of the Republic of Cuba.
10th Facilities so that joint ventures with Cuban
capital can be set up to process raw materials, down river.
11th Collaboration with Cuba on bio-diversity
research.
12th Cuba’s involvement in the strengthening of
endogenous bi-national groups.
13th Venezuela shall develop agreements with Cuba
in the area of telecommunications, including those requiring the use of
satellites.
Fidel Castro Ruz Hugo
Chávez Frías
President of the Council
President of the Bolivarian
Of State of the Republic of Cuba Republic of
Venezuela
Although Latin America has a long history
of such economic cooperation/integration agreements never really moving much
beyond often grandiose paper proclamations of commitment and intent, such
has not been the case with the ALBA Pact. Instead, Cuba and Venezuela soon
moved decisively to transform its principles into substantive policy. The
first of these initiatives occurred on April 28, 2005 when the two
governments agreed on specific, detailed plans for programs designed to
begin (or in some cases to expand) the institutionalization of the goals set
in the initial December 2004 accord, some key examples being:10
•[]Cuba
will provide total scholarships for the training of 10,000 Venezuelan
doctors and nurses. During their studies, the students will live with Cuban
families.
•[]Cuba
will provide up to 30,000 Cuban doctors and other medical personnel offering
services throughout Venezuela by the second half of 2005. Another 100,000
Venezuelans will undergo free eye surgery in Cuba.
•[]Venezuela
agreed to grant preferential tariffs for 104 new export lines from Cuba,
plus a progressive tariff exemption schedule that will benefit current and
new exports.
•[]Havana
will exempt Venezuelan exports to Cuba from paying customs tariffs.
•[]Cuba
will acquire 412 million dollars in Venezuelan industrial goods and
manufactured products for direct public consumption, which is expected to
aid in the creation of some 100,000 jobs in Venezuela.
Such specific agreements as well as the general impetus toward more
extensive ties and cooperation inherent in the commitment of the two
countries to NeoBolívarianism soon produced dramatic results, especially in
the realm of trade relations. Indeed, as indicated in Figure 4, Cuban
imports from Venezuela exploded in 2000 following the Chávez
administration’s assumption of power the previous year and would continue
their generally upward trend in the following years as the NeoBolívarian
partnership between the two countries matured and deepened. On the export
side of the trade equation, the overall figures in terms of Havana’s sales
to Chávez’s Venezuela have not been anywhere near as robust (as might be
expected given the disparities involved in natural resources and productive
capacities). Nevertheless, the trend line in Cuban exports,
especially from 2002 onward, has improved dramatically, going from almost
nothing in the late 1990s to over 200 million pesos by 2004.
Source: Anuario Estadístico de Cuba
2004.
Available at
www.cubagob.cu/otras_info/sitioone/index.htm
The bottom line for Cuba with respect to this burgeoning NeoBolívarian
camaraderie has been the development of a collaborative relationship with a
fellow Latin American state which is in some key respects unprecedented in
the Revolution’s history. The unique nature of this Venezuelan connection is
particularly evident with regard to economic/developmental issues. For
example, traditionally Havana’s leading trade partner has come from outside
Latin America–-the USSR played this role during the Cold War, of course, and
then subsequently the mantle would fall on such Western countries as Spain
and Canada. But in 2000 this pattern was shattered when Venezuela, which
had previously displaced Mexico as Havana’s primary Latin American trading
partner, moved to the very top of the ranking (see Table 1). Morever, this
development was not some sort of temporary aberration; Caracas would
continue
--------------------------------------------
Table 1
Cuba’s Primary Trade Partners
1989 1995 1997
2000
Overall USSR Canada Spain Venezuela
W.
Hemisphere Mexico Canada Canada Venezuela
Latin America Mexico Mexico Venezuela Venezuela
Source: Anuario Estadístico de
Cuba 2004. Available at <www.cubagob.cu/otras_info/sitioone/index.htm>.
----------------------------------------------
to
hold this position in subsequent years (i.e., through 2005). Such
dramatically expanding commercial ties, while important in and of
themselves, take on even greater significance when considered within the
much larger framework of cooperation/collaboration that has developed
between the two countries; they are, in short, illustrative of the
development of momentum toward a NeoBolívarian alliance between two of
Latin America’s most politically assertive countries that may have important
implications for the larger hemispheric community and for Washington’s
relations with it.
NeoBolívarianism And Cuban International Affairs: A Preliminary
Assessment11
Bilateral Relations. Like most
partnerships, the NeoBolívarian alliance that Cuba has forged with the
Chàvez government represents a multidimensional relationship involving, on
the one hand, rather obvious high-profile benefits (as should be expected,
for otherwise there would be no compelling rationale for pursuing such a
course of action). But co-existing with these assets, often as subtle
possibilities rather than glaring realities, are problems and complications
which must also be factored into any assessment of the overall bilateral
equation.
In Havana’s case, the most conspicuous gains can be found in the
economic realm. Here the oil deliveries which Caracas has guaranteed at
preferential prices has attracted the most international attention
(especially from Washington). The significance is such assistance in terms
of helping Cuba (an island country with no major hydroelectric or nuclear
generating capacity) to satisfy its basic power needs should be apparent to
even the most casual observer. But also important, according to some
economists, are such “spill-over” effects as:12
•[]
enhancing the operational viability of the Cuban tourist industry, which has
become the leading sector of the economy (displacing sugar) and the island’s
most lucrative source of crucial foreign hard currencies; and
•[]
contributing to the ability of the Cuban government (in May 2005) to double the
minimum wage for 1.6 million workers and to raise pensions for the elderly.
Indeed
it may even be conceivable that by helping to stabilize/expand the Cuban
economy, Venezuela could play a key role in contributing to an environment which
would be conducive to assuring an orderly transition to post-Fidel leadership.
Certainly Washington is hoping that the economic warfare which it continues to
wage against the Cuban Revolution will generate such severe socio/political
strains that it will disintegrate when confronted with the challenge of
surviving without the legendary figure whose charisma, brilliance, and
resilience have become synonymous with the Revolution itself. Whether this
scenario can in any case be realized is open to debate, but the odds are
certainly diminished to the extent that Havana’s NeoBolívarian alliance with
Caracas can function as an antidote.
On the negative side of the ledger, the Cubans do seem to have some qualms
(which have not yet been stated officially) about Venezuela as a NeoBolívarian
ally. These concerns tend to fall into two broad categories involving: A) fears
that Havana may, whether deliberately or not, be relegated to junior partner
status in the alliance; and B) trepidation about Chávez’s perceived volatility.
Underlying the first (and most important) item are the resource asymmetries of
the two countries and the political/psychological implications thereof. Cubans
have, of course, long (and rightfully so) seen their revolution as the foremost
inspiration for the hemisphere’s radical left and as Latin America’s most
valiant David in the long struggle against the Yankee Goliath. Indeed, for many
Fidelistas these qualities are considered integral to the to the very soul and
essence of their Revolution. But now, for the first time, the Cubans find
themselves confronted by the emergence of a charismatic figure on the radical
left who has a strong power base in a major Latin American country. As such,
the potential exists for clashes of both personalities (i.e., Fidel Castro as
the established “Comandante” of the hemisphere’s revolutionary struggles versus
Hugo Chávez as the “Young Gun” looking to make a name for himself) and national
pride.
Central to these resource asymmetries are, of course, the vast Venezuelan oil
reserves upon which Chávez can and has drawn to support efforts to promote the
(neo)Bolívarian Alternative. The harsh reality is that the Fidelistas simply
cannot, despite their vast experience and their unparalleled prestige in
revolutionary circles, bring anything to the ALBA campaign comparable to
Caracas’ petropower. The question then becomes whether this advantage can, with
respect to neoBolívarian politics, translate into such greater influence for
Caracas that it assumes a clear leadership role. Certainly Venezuela’s
admission to MERCOSUR (discussed more fully later) could be seen as an
indication that key Latin American states are more inclined to respond
positively to integration initiatives coming from oil-rich Caracas than from
Havana.
The Cubans, of course, are not (and cannot reasonably be expected to be) unaware
of or unconcerned about the possibility of being overshadowed by their
Venezuelan allies. Such sentiment can be discerned in the following excerpts
from an article by Isaac Saney defending Havana’s NeoBolívarian leadership
prerogatives13:
It was Cuba - and Cuba alone - that launched a
series of initiatives in the middle 1990s challenging the present world economic
and political order. The Cuban government, various mass organizations and
professional associations have convened numerous international symposia to
discuss, debate and oppose the consequences of neoliberal globalization.
This is a continuation of the Cuban struggle for a
New International Economic Order that was carried out in the
1970s and 1980s.
Faced with very potent challenges to its hegemony in
Latin America, ... the U.S. ruling class understands that the Cuban Revolution
has been both the symbolic and concrete anchor for the development of this new
wave of Latin American struggles.
Most
Fidelistas would probably concede that it would be unrealistic for Havana to “go
it alone” in trying to promote ALBA’s viability as an option for its Latin
American neighbors, for while Cuba has the experience and prestige necessary to
attract support, Venezuela has material resources (i.e., oil and petrodollars)
that are obviously crucial in driving the whole endeavor forward. Whether
Havana will be overshadowed-–deliberately or fortuitously--by Caracas in the
process remains to be seen, but clearly the possibility interjects some
potential stains into their NeoBolívarian alliance.
Shifting the spotlight to Chávez himself, there are issues of personality and
style that concern some Cubans. For example, despite the fact that the
Fidelistas in general and Castro in particular have a tradition of audacity and
a penchant for bombastic rhetoric, Chávez is sometimes seen as a bit of a “loose
cannon” who says and does things–-in both the domestic and international
realms–that can generate unnecessary tensions. In other words, while
recognizing and indeed empathizing with the passions involved, these Cubans
would like to see more appreciation on Chávez’s part for the utility of
pragmatism in certain situations. To some extent, this sentiment may be rooted
in Havana’s sensitivity to any development that could serve to isolate it, for
the Fidelistas have learned through bitter experience that the Revolution’s
independence and security can be inversely related to its degree of isolation on
the international stage. Consequently Havana has increasingly tended to stress
diversification in its foreign affairs, which simply means that it needs
to develop and maintain multiple pillars of close, collaborative international
ties.14 This emphasis
leads logically to the conclusion that anything which might threaten to
undermine one of these key relationships–-with the NeoBolívarian alliance
constituting one of the mainstays of Cuba’s current diversification profile–can
be seen as endangering a vital Fidelista interest. In Chávez’s case, he clearly
has powerful external and internal enemies, as evidenced by such (unsuccessful)
attempts to drive him from power as the abortive April 2002 military coup and
the August 2004 recall referendum (which Chávez won handily) that was encouraged
and supported by Washington. Given these realities, Chávez’s predilection for
rash behavior that can function to energize his opponents is a trait which has
the potential to seriously erode the Cubans’ confidence in him as a reliable
ally.
Promoting Hemispheric Integration. When assessing trends and
prospects with regard to promoting NeoBolívarianism in the hemisphere, a
distinction can and for various reasons probably should be made between the
Caribbean Basin region and the rest of the continent. On the conceptual level,
for instance, it should be noted that while both of ALBA’s co-founders are
Caribbean Basin countries that have a history of trying to exert influence in
the region, the main orientation of classical Bolívarianism as well as
contemporary NeoBolívarianism is decidedly South American. Also, from a more
practical perspective, it must be remembered that NeoBolívarianism’s primary
goal is to create a pool of economic power sufficient to rival and indeed to
counterbalance that of the United States. Unfortunately, the simple truth is
that the Caribbean/Central American countries do not, especially when compared
to their larger South American neighbors, have much to contribute to such an
undertaking.
Given the above considerations, the tendency has been to give the Caribbean
Basin secondary status with respect to promoting NeoBolívarianism. Here Cuba’s
shifting priorities are especially illustrative of this trend. Havana has in
the past devoted substantial attention to expanding and deepening its ties with
the Basin’s two foremost regional organizations–the Caribbean Community (CARICOM15)
and the Association of Caribbean States (ACS16).
Indeed Cuba was one of the ACS’s founding members and seemed at the time to be
rather optimistic about its integrative potential. In CARICOM’s case, Havana
courtship was even more enthusiastic. Despite the fact that Cuba never gained
admission to the group, it launched (in the early 1990s) a vigorous and
generally successful campaign to establish close, cordial relations with CARICOM
and various member states on a wide range of developmental issues.17
But this enthusiasm has waned somewhat as promoting ALBA/NeoBolívarianism has
assumed increased prominence on Havana’s foreign policy agenda. Such skepticism
about the prospects of the Caribbean Basin and its regional organizations to
assume a significant role in the overall ALBA/NeoBolívarian scenario is
reflected in the following comments by some Cuban observers-–
•[]Both
CARICOM and the ACS, particularly the latter, are too fragmented to serve as
effective vehicles for or facilitators of (NeoBolívarian) integration.
•[]CARICOM
may function well within its own bailiwick (i.e., essentially the island
Caribbean), but it has little potential to work effectively with the larger
South American community.
•[]The
ACS has demonstrated very little capability to make any serious progress with
respect to developmental cooperation–-it more a “paper” than a substantive
organization.
There
is, moreover, an element of reciprocity here in the sense that ALBA has
engendered a somewhat mixed response in the Basin. The CARICOM states have
often been attracted by the aid prospects involved, particularly the PetroCaribe
initiative(launched in July 2005) whereby Venezuela has offered to sell them oil
on highly preferential terms.18
All of CARICOM’s members except Barbados and Trinidad/Tobago (which is also an
oil-producing state) have become parties to the PetroCaribe agreement. The
Central American countries (and the Dominican Republic), on the other hand,
appear to be more sympathetic to NeoPanAmericanism, as indicated by their
participation the Washington-sponsored Central American Free Trade Agreement
which went into effect in July 2005 after finally being ratified by the U.S.
Senate.
Turning to South America, there have been various developments there which can
be seen as functioning to help produce an environment that is quite conducive to
Cuban/Venezuelan efforts to promote NeoBolívarianism. Among the most prominent
is the recent emergence via democratic elections of center-left governments
throughout the continent, some key examples being Luiz Inacio "Lula" da Silva in
Brazil (2002), Nestor Kirchner in Argentina (2003), Tabare Vazquez in Uruguay
(2004), and Evo Morales in Bolivia (2006).19
In short, much of South America is, for the first time in the modern period,
aligned along a common (left-leaning) political axis that is compatible with and
sympathetic to the ideological orientation of ALBA and the Cuban/Venezuelan
alliance. It should not, therefore, be surprising that all of the above leaders
have indicated an interest in exploring the integrative potential of the
NeoBolívarian agenda.
These pro-Bolívarian sentiments have found their most direct and assertive
outlet in the growing South American opposition to the centerpiece of
Washington’s NeoPanAmerican vision–-the FTAA. Basically, says the Council on
Hemispheric Affairs, the situation can be summarized as follows:
As the most concrete manifestation of the vaunted
“Washington Consensus” of the early 1990s, the FTAA is viewed by proponents and
detractors alike as the extension of NAFTA to the rest of the hemisphere. To
Washington’s dismay, however, most of South America has become extremely wary of
the FTAA and has been probing the path of intrahemispheric trade as an
alternative to Washington’s preferred plans for bilateral trade agreements, with
Chile being the notable exception. The region’s center-left governments
typically view the FTAA as a possible threat to their fragile economies,
environments and workers’ rights.20
This
disillusionment has gone beyond the rhetoric and posturing in which disgruntled
governments often engage, as evidenced by the decision in late 2004 of such
governments as Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, and Uruguay to suspend their
participation in FTAA negotiations with the United States. Washington had hoped
that it would be able at the November 2005 Summit of the Americas in Buenos
Aires to bring pressure on the South American recalcitrants to set a firm date
to resume the FTAA talks. But these efforts failed miserably, with Chávez and
the Mercosur countries (i.e., host Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay)
leading the successful opposition.21
Such reluctance to embrace NeoPanAmericanism combined with the desire/need to
create mechanisms that will allow South American countries to go beyond mere
survival to effective competition in an increasingly globalized international
economy has interjected new urgency into their search for a viable integration
strategy. Add to this equation the fact that many of their other experiments
have experienced only limited success in terms of the breadth of their
geographic appeal and/or depth of the economic cooperation achieved and it is
not unreasonable to conclude that conditions are favorable for the promotion of
a new, ambitious option such as NeoBolívarianism/ALBA.
Finally, although the prospects for promoting ALBA rest primarily on dynamics
occurring within the Western Hemisphere, the EU’s (European Union) potential
impact on this process merits some consideration. In a very general sense, the
EU could be seen as a possible developmental counterpoint–-in terms of trade
preferences and aid programs–-to the NeoPanAmerican FTAA. This is particularly
true with respect to the CARICOM countries, who traditionally have enjoyed a
special and economically lucrative relationship with Europe via the Lomé (now
called the Contonou) Accords. The roots of this process can be traced to
England’s decision in the late 1960s to join the European Community (EC), a move
that very much alarmed developing countries (including the CARICOM nations) who
were part of the British Commonwealth because they feared that it would cost
them their privileged access to English markets. Consequently, when given the
opportunity in 1972 to establish an institutionalized relationship with the
entire European Community, they formed the APC (Africa/Caribbean/Pacific)
Group to serve as their bargaining unit and proceeded to negotiate a
comprehensive new relationship with the EC which became known as the Lomé I
(1975) Convention. The key benefits for the ACP Group provided by Lomé I and
its successors22 were
duty-free EC access for almost all their exports, a system which assured that
trade would transpire on the basis of stable and reasonable prices, and various
developmental aid programs. In short, then, what the CARICOM nations had
acquired via Lomé was the ability to exercise collective bargaining power
to establish and periodically revise the exact terms of at least some important
aspects of its trading and related relationships with one of the world’s great
centers of economic power.
Indeed Lomé’s advantages were so attractive that Havana made some serious
attempts in the 1990s to develop a formal institutional link with CARICOM upon
which it hoped to capitalize as a means to become a full party to the Lomé
Accords. Due mainly to growing tensions over human rights issues between Cuba
and some European governments, these initiatives were never fully successful.
Nevertheless, they were indicative of the EU’s lure at that point as an
alternative to a Washington connection.
In recent years, however, CARICOM’s status with the EU has eroded somewhat as
the Europeans have increasingly given top priority to helping developing
countries in other regions (especially sub-Saharan Africa) which they view as
more needy. This reorientation of the Union’s geographic interest could also
have negative implications for any other hemispheric states who might be
harboring aspirations of strengthening their FTAA bargaining positions by
“playing the European card”. In any case, to the extent that there is no
radical change in this situation, “self-help” projects such as ALBA are likely
to find a more receptive audience not only in the Caribbean, but also in the
larger hemispheric community.
Probably the most intriguing recent development with respect to the future
viability of the Cuban/Venezuelan NeoBolívarian alliance and its prospects for
promoting ALBA involves MERCOSUR’s decision to admit Caracas as a full
member. Considered by many to have the potential to be a regional integrative
powerhouse due to the already considerable economic strength of some of the
countries involved, MERCOSUR (Southern Cone Common Market) was founded in 1991
with Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay as its full-fledged participants.23
Although initially viewed as limited in its scope and integrative aspirations to
the lower reaches of the continent (a perception reinforced by its name),
MERCOSUR moved to spread its net more widely by granting associate member status
to the northern tier countries of Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela in July 2004.24
For Caracas, the journey into MERCOSUR’s outer circle was long and arduous,
involving, according to one observer, “... eight years, five protocols, and a
decade of applications and frustrated attempts ... .”25
But such was not the case with regard to its transition into the inner circle of
full membership–-Venezuela achieved this goal barely a year later in December
2005.
Havana’s public reaction to this development was, as might be expected, quite
positive. For example, Granma, the country’s leading official newspaper,
declared that:
Venezuela's recent admission as the fifth full
member of the Southern Common Market, (MERCOSUR), is a step of enormous
political importance for Latin American integration, bridging gaps in
cooperation that have kept Latin nations divided for decades.26
The recent entry of Venezuela ... constitutes a
tremendously significant political factor in terms of integration in Latin
America, which is steadily closing the breaches that separated it for decades by
creating new forms of cooperation, at a far remove from the traditional
capitalist mechanisms existing in the region.27
But
notwithstanding such apparent euphoria, the picture can be seen as somewhat
clouded with respect to the possible impact of Venezuela’s admission on the
NeoBolívarian alliance. The potential assets in terms of promoting the ALBA
agenda are fairly obvious–-for instance, MERCOSUR could serve as a ready-made
institutional mechanism to facilitate broad multilateral negotiations within the
ALBA framework and to provide crucial logistical support via its secretariat
(and related operations) in implementing any agreements thereby reached. But
there is always the chance that the strongest currents may ultimately flow in
other directions.
Consider, for example, the suggestion of one Cuban observer that questions can
be raised about the extent to which there is a “clean” or “comfortable” fit
between the key priorities of MERCOSUR and ALBA. MERCOSUR, it could be argued,
is mainly oriented toward trade and related economic issues as the avenue to be
traveled in pursuit of integration while ALBA places equal (and, in some cases,
more) emphasis on cooperation in social fields such as health and education.
Or, with regard to foreign relations, it could be contended that MERCOSUR’s
charter members (especially Argentina) are more convinced than are ALBA’s
leaders about the wisdom of expending time and energy in seeking support from
the European Union. If indeed such dissonance exists in these or other important
areas, then MERCOSUR (and membership therein) may have little to offer in terms
of generating a synergism that will function to advance the NeoBolívarian
alliance’s integrative paradigm.
It is difficult to determine with any great certainty the degree to which such
concerns may factor into Cuba’s calculations about seeking MERCOSUR
membership. What is obvious, however, is that Havana’s position has been
somewhat ambiguous, as illustrated by news reports in March 2005 that Cuban
Foreign Minister Felipe Pérez Roque had, while attending the inauguration of
Uruguay’s new president, clearly reiterated Havana’s interest in joining
MERCOSUR. Yet by year’s end high Cuban officials were sending a very different
message when Deputy Foreign Minister Rafael Dausá Céspedes stated during a news
conference in Asunción, Paraguay that Havana does not want to be a member of
MERCOSUR.28 Some of
this wavering is probably attributable to instrumental concerns rooted in the
realization that the Cuban economy is so structurally different from the
MERCOSUR norm that Havana would have difficulty in conforming to the
organization’s technical rules, regulations, and guidelines. In a larger sense,
however, it is likely that Cuba’s hesitancy represents a response to its doubts
about MERCOSUR’s capacity to contribute significantly to NeoBolívarianism’s more
grandiose political goals-–e.g., mobilizing the hemisphere into a
left-wing front against what Havana sees as Washington’s ongoing hegemonic
pretensions.
Qualms like these on Cuba’s part about MERCOSUR could translate into strains
within the NeoBolívarian alliance, especially if they give rise to feelings that
Venezuela has somehow undermined its commitment to the NeoBolívarian cause by
joining MERCOSUR. Such sentiments, perhaps intensified by the concerns
mentioned previously that Chávez may be tempted to try to overshadow Havana in
Latin American affairs by capitalizing on his MERCOSUR connection, would not
bode well for the NeoBolívarian alliance in general and the more specific goal
of generating support in the hemisphere for ALBA.
CONCLUSION
For the most part, the NeoBolívarian alliance that Havana has forged with Hugo
Chávez’s Venezuela has not attracted a great deal of attention from the
international community at large. Nevertheless, this partnership and the
NeoBolívarian vision that drives it represents probably the most fascinating
phenomenon that has so far emerged in Latin America during the post-Cold War
era. There are, of course, as has been noted and examined here, various
potential strains and problems confronting the alliance as it seeks to pursue
its NeoBolívarian agenda. On the whole, however, it appears that the
Cuban/Venezuelan coalition has not only managed to sustain its enthusiasm and
vigor, but also has succeeded in building momentum toward becoming a
well-entrenched, significant actor in hemispheric affairs. In particular, South
America seems to constitute an area of considerable opportunity for
NeoBolívarian politics.
Perhaps the best, or at least a certainly dramatic indication that the
NeoBolívarian alliance has “arrived” as a major factor on the Latin American
scene is the alarm that Washington is increasingly expressing about it. This
growing hostility is driven at its most elemental level by Cuba-centric concerns
related to the Bush administration’s desire to isolate and marginalize Castro’s
government--especially within the hemispheric community-- to the point where it
would disintegrate under the pressure. Accordingly Washington has, for example,
taken various steps to disrupt the flow of U.S. dollars into the country (e.g.,
by reducing the number of times Cuban-Americans can visit their relatives on the
island and by practically eliminating educational travel/exchanges) in order to
try to generate serious economic instability hopefully would serve to undermine
Castro’s political support and energize efforts by domestic dissidents to remove
him from power. But the aid that Cuba has received from Chávez’s Venezuela has
helped Havana to stabilize its economic situation and even to increase various
social benefits29 in an
effort to enhance living conditions for the average Cuban. In short, one
important dimension of the NeoBolívarian alliance has been its contribution to
neutralizing U.S. efforts to strangle the island’s economy in order to remove
Castro and his Revolution from the scene, a fact that has not escaped
Washington’s attention and has, to state it mildly, aroused its displeasure.
Specifically,
In a report published May 6, 2004 by the US State
Department’s Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, the stated mission of
which is to identify additional means by which the United States can help the
Cuban people bring about an expeditious end to the Castro dictatorship, access
to Venezuelan oil is specifically listed as one of the four economic lifelines
to the Castro Regime that must be severed in order to overthrow the government.
The first chapter of this 500-page document,
Hastening Cuba's Transition, lists six inter-related tasks considered central to
hastening change: ...
Deny Revenues To The Castro Regime by severing
Cuba’s economic lifelines – tourism, remittances, commodities, and access to
subsidized Venezuelan oil.30
But
while important, these fears about the challenge that the NeoBolívarian alliance
poses to the U.S. anti-Cuban crusade are but one manifestation of a much deeper
foreboding that strikes at the very heart of cherished beliefs that Washington
has long held about its hemispheric prerogatives as the Colossus of the North.
Such sentiment (or, if one prefers a more clinical term, this psychology) is
illustrated in the position taken by Daniel Fisk, the Bush administration’s
National Security Adviser for the Western Hemisphere, when he
... clearly articulated the nature of the perceived
[NeoBolívarian] threat at a congressional hearing in October 2005. Identifying
the “strategically located Caribbean basin” as a “high priority for this
Administration,” he warned of the growing influence of Cuba and Venezuela in the
region:
Ultimately the threat is political, Fisk explains,
because of “Cuban and Venezuelan attempts to drive a wedge between the U.S. and
its Caribbean partners.” In effect, he is saying both endanger traditional U.S.
dominance in the Western Hemisphere and are viewed as acting in tandem.31
There
is considerable irony here for anyone familiar with the shifts in nuance that
have occasionally occurred in U.S./Cuban relations. Specifically, having spent
several decades and considerable resources in trying to eradicate what was often
characterized as the Fidelista virus in the hemisphere’s body politic,
Washington and others (e.g., in the media and in Miami)were in the early 1990s
denigrating the Cuban Revolution as an irrelevant anachronism that was on its
last legs. Yet now Havana (along with its NeoBolívarian ally Chávez) is once
again being demonized as a major obstacle to U.S. aspirations and even U.S.
vital interests in the region. Thus in the final analysis with regard to the
Revolution’s ability to play the Latin American David to the U.S. Goliath, the
French phrase seems to say it all--Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose (the
more things change, the more they remain the same).
1For a detailed analysis of this strategy, characterized as
“dual tracking”, see H. Michael Erisman, Cuba’s Foreign relations in
a Post-Soviet World (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida,
2000).
2Jorge Domínguez, “Cuban Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 57 (Fall 1978), p. 83.
3James Blight and Phillip Brenner, Sad and Luminous Days:
Cuba’s Struggle with the Superpowers after the Missile Crisis
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), p. 18 note that in 1992
Fidel publically acknowledged that such support had been extended to
various Venezuelan guerrilla groups and revolutionary movements
struggling against Betancourt. For an excellent overview of the
Venezuelan situation, see Richard Gott, Guerrilla Movements In Latin
America (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1970), Part II. Cuban
support continued into the administration of Raúl Leoni (who succeeded
Betancourt in 1964) and then was essentially phased out by the end of
the decade.
4For more detailed analyses of Chávez’s political ideas and
career, see Jennifer L. McCoy, “Chavez and the End of ‘Partyarchy’ in
Venezuela,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 10, No.3 (1999), pp.
64-77; Richard Lapper, “Venezuela and the Rise of Chavez: A Background
Discussion Paper,” available at
<www.cfr.org/publication/9269/venezuela_and_the_rise_of_chavez.html> ;
and Richard Gott, In the shadow of the liberator : Hugo
Chávez and the Transformation of Venezuela (London : Verso Press,
2000).
5By late 2005/early 2006, most observers agreed that these
Venezuelan shipments had increased to about 90,000 barrels per day.
6For details, see
Fabiola Sanchez, “Cuba, Venezuela Increasing Ties,” an August 4, 2001
Associated Press news dispatch available at
<www.ciponline.org/cuba/cubainthenews/
newsarchives/august2001/ap080401sanchez.htm>.
7Chàvez quoted in
“Chàvez Proposes a 'Bolivarian Alternative' to FTAA,” Granma
International Digital (December 12, 2001), available at
<www.blythe.org/nytransfer-subs/Labor/
Chavez_Proposes_a_'Bolivarian_Alternative'_to_FTAA>.
8See, for example,
a summary of Chàvez’s efforts at an August 2003 meeting of ALDI (the
Latin American Integration Association) members in “President Hugo
Chàvez Frias Proposes ALBA as an Alternative to the FTAA,”
Vheadline.com (April 20, 2004), available at
<www.vheadline.com/printer_news> .
asp?id=17942>.
10For the full
text of the agreement, see Final Declaration from the First
Cuba-Venezuela Meeting for the Application of the ALBA, available at
<www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno= 1433>. Forf an overview,
see also “Cuba and Venezuela Sign Wide-Ranging Cooperation Pact,” an
AIN news dispatch (April 30, 2005) available at
www.groups.yahoo.com/group/CubaNews/message/37501 .
11Attempts by the author to arrange interviews with
Cuban government and Party officials to discuss evolving
Cuban/Venezuelan relations during a December 2005 research visit to
Havana were unsuccessful, the explanation being that this subject was at
this point “highly sensitive” and hence not open for discussion. Thus
any conversations in Havana relevant to this assessment section with
persons not holding official government or Party positions were
conducted on an “off the record” basis.
13Isaac Saney, “Brief Reflections on Teo Ballvé’s ‘Is
Venezuela The New Cuba?’”, NACLA Report on the Americas, Vol. 39,
No. 1 (July/August 2005).
14This line of analysis, which is conceptualized in terms
of “counterdependency politics”, constitutes the main theme in Erisman,
op. cit. See especially Chapter 2 on “Cuban Foreign Policy and
Counterdependency Politics”.
15Founded in 1973, CARICOM's current 15 members are
Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada,
Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis,
St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.
16Founded in 1994, the ACS's current 25 members are
Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala,
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, St Kitts
and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad
and Tobago, Venezuela.
17For a detailed examination of Cuba’s evolving relations
with CARICOM, see John Walton Cotman, “Caribbean Convergence:
Contemporary Cuba-CARICOM Relations” in H. Michael Erisman and John M.
Kirk (eds.), Redefining Cuban Foreign Policy: The Impact of the
Special Period (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2006),
Chapter 6.
18Under the
plan, Caribbean governments would pay market price for Venezuelan oil,
but they would only be required to pay a portion of the cost up front
and could finance the rest over 25 years at 1 percent interest. For
more details and commentary on PetroCaribe, see “Cuba, Venezuela
Dominate Caribbean Unity Summit Despite Leaders' Absence,” Jamaica
Gleaner (July 30, 2005), available at <www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/html/20050729T190000-0500_85065_OBS_CUBA__VENEZUELA_DOMINATE_CARIBBEAN_UNITY_SUMMIT_DESPITE_LEADERS__ABSENCE.asp> ;
and Christopher Toothaker, “Chávez, Caribbean Leaders Meet on Oil,”
Associated Press dispatch dated September 6, 2005 which is available
at <www.groups.yahoo.com/group/CubaNews/message/41925> .
20Council on Hemispheric Affairs, op. Cit.
21For more
information and analyses of the Summit’s developments, see Michael
Lettieri, “The Summit that Lost Its Way,” COHA (Council on
Hemispheric Affairs) Memorandum To The Press (November 3, 2005); and
Deborah James, “Summit of the Americas, Argentina: Tomb of the FTAA”
(November 23, 2005), available at <www.globalexchange.org/countries/americas/>
argentina/3607.html.pf>.
22Normally the Lomé Accords were renegotiated every five
years--Lomé II (1980), Lomé III (1985), and Lomé IV (1990). The 1990
version differed from its predecessors in that it was in force for 10
years.
23MERCOSUR’s initial associate members were Bolivia and
Chile.
24Peru also became an associate member at this time.
26Mariela Pérez Valenzuela, “Venezuela's Membership in
MERCOSUR Boosts Integration,” GRANMA (December 12, 2005).
27Mariela Pérez Valenzuela, “MERCOSUR--Venezuela's Entry,
Significant Integrationalist Move,” GRANMA (December 12, 2005).
29For instance, as was noted previously, in May 2005 the
Cuban government announced that it was doubling the minimum wage for 1.5
million worker and increasing pensions for the elderly.
31This material comes from Philip Brenner and Marguerite
Jimenez, “U.S. Policy On Cuba Beyond The Last Gasp,” NACLA Report On
The Americas, Vol. 39, No. 4 (January/February 2006).