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IN A COMPREHENSIVE ESSAY on adoles‑
cence, George E. Gardner lists as a major and most difficult task
confronting the child as he enters adolescence, the giving up of the
security that is predicated upon the "all-knowingness" and the
"all-powerfulness" of his mother and father. In this connection Gardner
emphasizes
... the extreme vulnerability of all adolescents (or of adults who are
still essentially adolescent) to the cry and to the seductive voice of
the false leader or the leader with the false ideology or intent. That
adolescents (of whatever chronological age) are appealed to—and respond
to—such leaders, is accounted for by the fact that the latter always
promise, among other things, an omniscient who can do their thinking and
an omnipotent who will be their power.i°
There is a parallelism between these growing pains of adolescence and
the growing pains of a developing democratic society. In both
instances, there is the danger of regression to an earlier phase of
development, where security is sought by relying on an omniscient and
omnipotent authority. The success of the democratic process requires
citizens who arc psychologically ready and willing to think creatively,
to make choices, to make decisions as adults, not only in their family
and other interpersonal relations but also in matters affecting their
community and the nation. The democratic process, to be successful,
also requires elected representatives who are able to resist the
occupational hazards of their positions of leadership.—the temptation to
feel and act omniscient and omnipotent.
Too often there is a polarization, a division of labor, a division of
society into two castes: the leaders and the led. Too often the ordinary
citizen, beset by the cares and demands of everyday living, is relieved
and content to leave the business of governing to the leaders. And too
often the professional "governors" are men who arc attracted to this
profession by their need to wield power, the need to feel and be
omnipotent.
One of the situations that bring this division into sharp relief is the
state of war. The men who govern in time of war quite openly arrogate to
themselves special powers over the governed. The reason given for this
arrogation is the need to "maintain unity on the home front in time of
crisis." This phrase means simply that the government feels it can not
tolerate, in wartime, expres‑
4/
sions or actions that may turn public opinion against the war effort.
In past wars, our government, like other governments, has employed
forceful means and appeals to jingoism to achieve the required
suppression of dissent. For example, in 1917, during World War I, the
Congress enacted a Sedition Act under which more than 1,900 persons were
convicted for such crimes as
... making a movie of the American Revolution showing Britain and
America at war; saying that war drove men mad; urging people to vote
against Congressmen who had voted for conscription; and writing a
pamphlet which said that war is contrary to the teachings of Christ., 2
In an upsurge of superpatriotism, an interest in anything German was
considered unpatriotic. Sauerkraut became liberty cabbage; opera
companies stopped performing Wagner; and symphony orchestras eliminated
works by German composers from their repertories.
The current war in Vietnam has to date been relatively free of such
phenomena. In fact, high government officials, including the
President, Vice President, and Secretary of State, have made a point on
several occasions of defending the right of dissenters to protest. They
have even pointed with pride to these proofs of freedom of speech in an
America at war.
It may be that the government is not employing the gross techniques of
suppression of former wars because there has not been a declaration of
war by Congress. The government might therefore be on precarious legal
ground if it attempted to invoke wartime powers of suppression. A more
likely explanation, however, is that the gross suppressive techniques of
previous wars have been replaced by more subtle methods ,which are
effective without being offensive, methods whose effectiveness is
enhanced by the refinements of the new "science" of public relations and
by the all-pervasiveness of the mass media.
A major element in the new, "public relations" approach is the very
gradual escalation of the war effort. In this process of graduated
escalation, each new step toward greater involvement is in itself small
and seemingly insignificant. Each step appears to evolve as a logical
consequence of a previous small and seemingly insignificant step toward
greater involvement. And the new step equally logically prepares the
ground for the next small and seemingly insignificant step.
The smallness of each step, and its logical evolution out of previous
steps, make it acceptable. The gradualness of the process produces a
habituation to the involvement. The end result is that the people find
themselves deeply cornmitted to large-scale war, without being able to
tell how it came about, when and how it all began.
This point was dramatically illustrated at the hearings on the war in
Vietnam of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. On February 17, 1966
the following interchange took place:
Senator Hickenlooper: When was the commitment made for us to actively
participate in the military operations of the war with American
personnel?
General Maxwell Taylor: Insofar as the use of our combat ground forces
are concerned, that took place, of course, only in the spring of 1965.
In the air, we had been participating
5/
and now Special Consultant to the President, could only say vaguely,
"in the air we had been participating more actively over two or three
years" is characteristic of the confusion and uncertainty produced by
this kind of gradual escalation.
At this juncture, with the nation already deeply involved in actual
fighting, other seemingly cogent arguments take over; e.g.: The nation
is in danger. Our boys are fighting and dying. Now is not the time for
doubting, questioning, hesitating, debating. We must give full support
to our boys at the front. Those who refuse full support, or who
hesitate, give comfort to the enemy and are directly responsible for
unnecessary deaths at the front. All we can do now is to rally 'round
the flag, support our Commanderin-Chief. Etc.
Under these conditions, there is no longer any need for direct
suppressive measures to guarantee a pro-war consensus. Instead one can
employ appeals to "maturity," to concern for one's country, to concern
for our boys fighting and dying at the front.
A classic example of this technique appears in a New York Times report
of a speech delivered by President Johnson on May 17, 1966:
President Johnson, in his most outspoken attacks on the opponents of his
Vietnam policy so far, called on all Americans to unite behind him.
Mr. Johnson, gibing at "nervous Nellies," seemed almost to call for an
end to criticism of the Administration's actions in Vietnam and to
question his critics' patriotism.
Mr. Johnson said, "I ask you and I ask every American to put our country
first if we want
to keep it first. . Put at' ,+y all the childish
divisive things if you want the maturity and the unity chat is the
mortar of a nation's greatness. 1 do not think that those men who are
out there lighting. for us tonight think we should enjoy. the luxury of
lighting each other back home."'
Here the President skillfully appeals to the regressive wish of his
audience to he good little children and surrender their critical
faculties, but couches it as an appeal to maturity. He is lecturing his
audience as a benevolently despotic father might lecture a naughty
child. In the process, the democratic responsibility of the mature
citizen to question, to examine, to criticize, is stood on its head and
gibed at as the "childish divisive things" indulged in by "nervous
Nellics."
These latter-day techniques are far more difficult to counteract
psychologically than are techniques of direct suppression. The
individual no longer experiences the suppression as coming from outside
himself. The suppression seems rather to come from within, as a logical
response to the situation that the country is in. The individual citizen
himself, in response to the President's appeals for unity and
maturity, suppresses any wish he may have to think critically, to
evaluate objectively, to dissent. The suppressing forces are no longer
regarded as ego-alien.
This tendency to self-censorship is reinforced by another factor. Since
he does not understand how the country got so deeply involved in the
war, and feels quite confused about it, the average citizen concludes
that the problems of war and peace in general, and of the Vietnam war in
particular, are much too complicated for his average mind to encompass.
This self-depreciation facilitates a regressive process, where the
confused and helpless infant-citizen finds comfort in leaving all
decisions to the father-figures, the all-powerful President and his
all-knowing expert advisers.
Once the citizen has accepted the policy of war, psychological processes
come into play which induce him to
6/
distort reality by ignoring or minimizing those facts which contradict
the policy, while giving undue weight to facts which tend to validate
the policy. Charles E. Osgood has described these processes under his
"congruity hypothesis" as the strain toward consistency.20, 21 Leon
Festinger has described them as "the reduction of cognitive dissonance."
7-" These theories submit the proposition that when people know things
that are not psychologically consistent with one another, they will try
to make them consistent by various means. Osgood points out that the
individual is most likely to change that element in the incongruity to
which he has the least intense attachment and will maintain that
element about which he has the most intense conviction.
To illustrate: When Stephen Decatur made his famous toast "My country
right or wrong," he was in fact saying that he was capable of tolerating
the cognitive dissonance between the strong positive valence of "my
country," and the negative valence of "wrong." The average citizen
cannot tolerate the dissonance and must change the positive valence of
one of the elements to a negative one, or vice versa. He will find it
extremely difficult to go through the emotionally painful reevaluation
of values and the enormous intellectual efforts that would be involved
in admitting to consciousness the idea that his country is engaged in
policies and actions that are basically wrong. He will find it easier to
eliminate the dissonance by justifying, for example, the bombing and
napalming of enemy civilians on such grounds as: the enemy, even
civilians, are cruel, ruthless, cunning, fanatical, and none of them can
be trusted.
Having achieved this regressive reduc tion or elimination of
dissonance, the citizen experiences a sense of relief from anxiety and
from the pressure of having to think about these complex questions.
Henceforth, even if it may seem to him at times that his government's
policies are palpably wrong, he can fall back on the comforting thought
that there must be some top-secret information to which he has no
access, and to which he is not entitled to have access, which can
explain everything and make everything all right; and that the
father-figures surely know what they are doing.
It seems clear to the behavioral scientist that this situation of
habituation, confusion, self-devaluation, and regression to an
infantile state of helplessness is unhealthy and should be corrected.
Some behavioral scientists also feel that their life-long training and
professional skills should enable them to make a contribution toward
ameliorating or "curing" this state of sociopathological ill health.
Unfortunately, the situation becomes much less clear when the specific
questions are asked: What can behavioral scientists do? What
contribution can they make?
Jules Masserman concludes an essay on "Psychological Medicine and World
Affairs" (in which he writes prophetically as early as 1948 about "the
dread prodromata of war") with the question: "What, then, can we as
scientists, physicians and men of good will do?" After apologizing for
the fact that "as is usual in medical treatises, the section on therapy
must be regrettably brief," Masser-man answers his own question:
First, let us raise our voices to cry havoc and, since our puny
professional and academic
7/
securities" would in any case become meaningless should catastrophe
break, dare to use every means of communication at our command to rouse
the world to its danger. [And
second,] let us leave our crumbling ivory towers and use every podium
and influence we have to secure a voice on policy-making and governing
bodies.16
The writer agrees with Masserman's two proposals. He would suggest, in
addition, a third way that a contribution could be made by behavioral
scientists. In the case described tit this paper of the public
habituation to war, an effort could be made to counteract it by
confronting the public with the existence of habituation and helping
the average citizen gain insight into its genesis. The gaining of
intellectual and emotional insight is an important tool in dynamic
psychotherapy. It should be tried in sociotherapy, Perhaps the average
citizen can be helped to feel less bewildered, less helpless, if he is
helped to understand, step by step, how the present confused situation
came about. Perhaps he can gain confidence in his own ability to think
and to understand if he can be helped to perceive the subtle techniques
by which his ability to think has been undermined. Perhaps, as in
individual psychotherapy, a gaining of insight into the processes,
external and intrapsychic, which led to the citizen's regression, may be
the first step toward developing greater maturity and self-confidence.
What follows is offered as a sample of an attempt at such elucidation—an
effort at counteracting the habituation to war by retracing some of the
early steps in the gradual escalation by which the habituation was
established.
HABITUATION BY GRADUAL INVOLVEMENT—A CASE STUDY
It is not easy to determine just when, how, and why the United States
became committed to intervene in Vietnam. The involvement began quite
indirectly, and seemingly without premeditation or in tent. It began as
an indirect consequence of the efforts of the United States government,
under the Marshall Plan, to help the countries of Europe recover from
the devastation of World War IL
The French became recipients of Marshall Plan aid soon after World War
II ended. When, in 1946, the French began their war against the Viet
Minh in an effort to reestablish their colonial rule in Indochina,
Marshall Plan dollars enabled the French government to release francs
for expenditures in that war.1' This first indirect involvement, and the
sympathy of American government officials for the role of the French as
"the defenders of the cause of human freedom" in Southeast Asia,4 led
inexorably (although in steps barely visible to the unaided human eye)
to the present full-scale involvement with over 400,000 American ground
troops and all the latest paraphernalia of war.
The indirect involvement continued from 1946 until 1950. Then it became
direct. This next step was taken in May 1950, with the announcement that
the U.S. would give direct economic aid and military equipment to the
French in Vietnam and to the emperor Bao Dai, who had been appointed by
the French to rule Vietnam tinder their tutelage.' This step seemed
insignificant at the time (mcrely a shift from indirect aid to direct
aid), and logical (since the French were our NATO allies).
The sending of American military equipment to Indochina led logically to
another step—the sending of American experts to teach the French how to
use the equipment. This was another fateful step—the first commitment of
American manpower. President Eisenhower wrote in his memoirs:
It is true that certain legislators have ex‑
8/
pressed
uneasiness concerning any use of American maintenance personnel in
Indochina. They fear that his may be opening the door to increased and
unwise introduction of American troops into that area. (As indeed it
proved to be. /.Z.] The Administration nas given assurances to guard
against such development-5
By May 1954, when the French suffered their conclusive defeat at
Dienbienphu, there were 684 such American experts, maintenance
personnel, and advisers. The French left (in April 1956) but the
Americans stayed on, to build up the army of Bao Dai, later of Diem, and
still later of the succession of military juntas that followed the
overthrow and assassination of Diem.
These American advisers not only stayed on but multiplied, although very
slowly at first. At the end of the Eisenhower Administration in 1960,
there were about 750 American military personnel in South Vietnam."
Although they were military men, they wore civilian clothes, because
the Geneva Accords of 1954 forbade "the introduction into Vietnam of any
troop reinforcements and additional military personnel." 27
The next step was also a seemingly unimportant one, but it was perhaps
crucial. The American advisers began to appear on the streets of Saigon
in American military uniforms. This "surfacing" of the American
military in Vietnam was also very gradual. Here, for the first time, was
established a palpable, visible American military presence in South
Vietnam. Once this was established, all that followed seemed logical and
in-es itable.
The increase in American troop ins olvement was considerably
accelerated during the Kennedy Administration. By the end of 1961, the
newly elected President had more than quadrupled the numher if troops
to over 3,000. This number tripled in 1962; and by October 1963
there were about 17,000 American "advisers" in South Vietnam. Many of
them
accompanied their South Vietnamese "advisees" on combat missions, and
they were authorized "to fire when fired upon."
In retrospect it is clear that at this stage of the involvement,
Americans
were engaging in combat—killing and
being killed. But this was glossed over by public assurances that there
had been
"no change in the quality of our support,
but only an increase in the quantity of it," and that American military
person‑
nel were serving, and would continue to serve, in South Vietnam in a
purely advisory and training capacity."
Furthermore, on October 2, 1963 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
and General Maxwell Taylor made the
reassuring announcement that "the major part of the U.S. military task
can be
completed by the end of 1965, although
there may be a continuing requirement for a limited number of training
person‑
nel." This was backed up by a statement that 300 American troops would
leave Vietnam by December 3, while another 1,000 would depart before the
end of the year.28
Despite these assurances, American involvement continued to increase, in
numbers, in intensity, and in overtness.
But by this time, the habituation had taken hold. As late as November
1964,
with more than 20,000 American ground
troops in South Vietnam and with total American casualties close to
2,000, the
American people still believed they were voting for a President who had
kept us out of war.
A story in the Los Angeles Times in April 1965 described the
satisfaction of American airmen that "the wraps have
9/at
long last been taken off the Air Force." Previously, every American
helicopter pilot had to be accompanied by a South Vietnamese "even if
the South Vietnamese was a mail clerk," so that in case the helicopter
crashed or was shot down, it could be claimed that the Vietnamese mail
clerk was the pilot and the American pilot was only an adviser. All this
pretense could now finally be discarded, the report in the Los Angeles
Times continued with obvious satisfaction.
It took 19 years of very gradual escalation for our involvement to
reach the point where "the fight is now predominantly an American war,"
as Walter Lippman points out. But it should be noted that in the past
two years, since "the wraps have been off" and all pretense finally
discarded, the escalation has been accelerated precipitously. By
November 1965 there were more than 150,000 American soldiers in South
Vietnam. In November 1966 there were 360,000 American fighting men on
Vietnamese soil.
One might ask whether the gradual escalation was deliberately planned by
government leaders as a subtle and effective public relations
technique, or was the haphazard result of historical factors outside the
control of our government. Since both history and human motivation are
never a matter of black-or-white, the question can be posed more
meaningfully as follows: to what extent was the gradual habituation
deliberately planned and predetermined, and to what extent did it just
happen?
It is doubtful that anyone, including the leaders themselves, could
answer these questions categorically. However, the weight of the
historical evidence goes to show that the government of the
United States was determined, from the very beginning, to do everything
it could to keep Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh from coming to power in
Vietnam. For example, Chalmers W. Roberts, Chief of the National News
Bureau of the IVitshington Post and Times-Herald, reported that on
March 25, 1954 the National Security Council took a firm position that
the United States could not afford the loss of Indochina to the
Communists, and that if it were necessary to prevent the loss, the
United States would intervene in the war. This decision was approved by
President Eisenhower.22 On April 16, 1954 Vice President Nixon sent up a
public trial-balloon in a speech before the American Society of
Newspaper Editors, in which he said:
If to avoid further Communist expansion in Asia and Indochina, we must
take the risk now by putting our boys in, I think the Executive has to
take the politically unpopular decision and do it))
A few days previously, on April 3, 1954, Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles and Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the JOint Chiefs of
Staff, had urged upon a secret meeting of eight leaders of the Senate
and the House the necessity of a joint resolution by Congress to permit
President Eisenhower to use air and naval power in Indochina. Admiral
Radford's plan was to relieve the French at Dienbienphu by striking at
the Vietminh forces with hundreds of American planes from Navy carriers
and from the Philippines. Roberts writes:
Some of those at the meeting came away with the feeling that if they had
agreed that Saturday to the resolution, planes would have been winging
toward Dienbienphu without waiting for a vote of Congress—or without a
word in advance to the American people. lEm, phasis mine. /.2.]
Secretary Dulles tried to interest some of
10
America's allies in his plans. "In these talks Dulles ran Into one rock
of opposi‑
tion—Britain." The reaction of an‑
other ally is described by Roscoe Drummond. and Gaston Coblentz in
their book about Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Duel at the
Brink. They write;
The main with whom he [John Foster
Du!lel negotiited in Paris, shortly before tt$c R;encval e-rderence and
during its earls, lAeri.c. was (t•renchI Foreipn Minister Georgrs
As the collapse of Dienbicnphu approached. Dune, told ItidmIt that a
battle lost was not a war lost. The disconraged liidault replied that
,(fr 'Kral de Gaulle had said the same thing in
hut that it was something one says in ih•• first year of a war, not in
the eighth, as in Indochina.
Itidaidt's recollection of the talks, as recounted
these reporters, introduces into the Dulles' record a new element which,
at present, re-rows solely on the French statesman's testiMony. /Ward/
understood Dulles, (V, ril.n Sep1./rate OCCUSIOnS, to hare ofiered him
the tae qrf American, atomic bombs by French forces err the Indochina
war.
Ity Bidatin account both otters went made before the fall of
Dienhienphu; Prior, that is, to the Geneva Conference. According to
Bidault, both Wen went made to him personally by Dulles in Paris..
The first is recalled by Bidault as an offer of one or more atomic bombs
to be dropped on Communist Chinese territory near the Indochina border
in a countermove against the Chinese supply lines to the Vietminh
Communists.
The second is recalled as an offer of two atomic bombs against the
Vietminh forces at Dienhienpho.
Ilidauh. by his account,. declined both offers. Ile told Dulles that it
would be impossible to predict Where the use of nuclear weapons against
Bed China would end, that if could lead to Russian intervention and a
world-wick holocaust In the case of the seelmd offer, he considered the
French and Vietminh forces to he be Ilan too closely engaged at
Dicribienpho to .permit the use of atomic weapons.
heir is no doubt in Bidauh's mind that these offers were made to him
by mphasis
mine. /_474
These facts point to the conclusion
if
that the Administration would have plimeed the United States into the
Indochina war much more precipitousi_f if it could have. But it
encountered two obstacles: Our Allies, especially Britain and France
refused to go along. And Nixon's trial-balloon brought forth an
imilanclie of negative letters and telegrams to the President, and a
great deal of nepative reaction in the press. The time was not ripe for
total intervention. 1 he American people would have to undergo a
prolonged process of habituation before they would be ready for total
intervention.
It is, of course, quite likely that, having embarked on a course of
gradual escalation, the leaders themselves became conditioned and
habituated—they became the victims of their own techniques. The strain
toward consistency and elimination of cognitive dissonance described by
Osgood, Festinger, and others applies not only to ordinary citizens but
also to leaders. The leaders are constrained to find rationalizations
which will justify their decisions to themselves, as well as to their
followers. Former President Eisenhower recently exemplified one such
technique in high places, a technique to justify the killing of
civilians in underdeveloped nations. In a televised speech on September
18, 1966, he argued against "the fear of using a weapon [nuclear] that
the free world might need in some outlying place where people or life
seems to be cheap, and they want to have their way." 243
It is also probable that the original planners of our Southeast Asia
strategy did not anticipate in 1950-54 either the duration or the extent
of the ultimate in \ oftement. 1 hey grossly underestimated the
determination, stamina, and dedication of the guerrillas. The per‑
11/formance
of the Viet Minh against the French should have alerted our
decisionmaKers, but here another factor entered, which is operative to
this day. The American leaders felt vastly superior both to the French
and to their rag-tag 'uerrilla opponents. The leaders were the victims
of the parochial tendency to feel that "one American is as good as any
10 foreigners," (especially if the foreigners are non-white).
Since then, much habituation has taken place. In June 1954 a Gallup Poll
. lowed that 72% of the American people opposed sending American troops
to Indochina. By 1966, 60-70% were going along with Administration
policy. The process of habituation has been eminently successful. It has
achieved a 180 degree shift in American public opinion in the space of
12 years.
The habituation has been reinforced by techniques of news management and
manipulation of public opinion. The President's televised press
conference of July 28, 1965 is a classic example. It furnishes an
instructive case study of the i'sychological preparation and
manipulation of the American public:
Several weeks before the press confert.....re took place, Secretary of
Defense MLiqamara made a highly dramatized and thoroughly publicized
"fact-finding" tour of South Vietnam. Newspaper dispatches stressed the
dangerous nature of this mission. The Viet tong, it was reported,
spared no efforts to "get" McNamara. On one occasion, a mine was
discovered in the nick of time under a bridge that McNamara was to
cross. (No one asked why such a dangerous mission was given so much
advance publicity. Would it not have been safer for Mr. McNamara to slip
into Vietnam incognito and with no fanfare?)
11
Upon his return from Vietnam to Washington, Secretary McNamara and his
fact-finding mission continued to capture the headlines. For several
days, these front page stories in the news media reported that the
President was closeted with Mr. McNamara and several top-level advisers
in day-long, continuous top-secret consultations. The purpose of these
conferences was to determine, on the basis of Mr. McNamara's findings,
the future course of the war. Strangely enough, at the end of each day's
"secret" session information was "leaked" to the news media which
indicated that there would be a very rapid increase in U.S. combat
forces in Vietnam, a marked rise in draft quotas, mobilization of the
reserves, and a request that the Congress make a supplemental war
appropriation of 12 billion dollars. With each day, as preparations were
reported for a Presidential press conference, tension rose and public
apprehension mounted that the country would be placed on a total war
footing.
So well was the public prepared by the press "leaks" to expect the
worst, that there was a general expression of relief when, on July 28,
the President asked for "only" 1.7 billion dollars, a draft quota of
"only" 35,000 by November, an increase in troop strength to "only"
125,000, and greatest concession of all, did not call out the reserves.
However, the Walt Street Journal of August 4, 1965, reported that
. . . the President had announced one plan for public consumption, but
was pushing, behind the scenes, for a much larger involvement in the
war.
In connection with this concealed program, the Wall Street Journal
continued, Secretary of Defense McNamara appeared before a closed
session of the
12/
Senate Armed Services Committee to project a far mavier commitment of
manpower and funds.
By January 20, 1966, the Los Angeles Times was reporting that the
President "appeals to Congress to provide $12 billion more to support
expanded Vietnam action." (The precise figure mentioned in the press
leaks of July 1965.) By February 12, 1966, the President was stating
that the time may come when he will have to summon the reserves.
Several months after that, a bill was passed giving the President
authority to do so. And, of course, the number of combat troops rapidly
rose above the 125,000 figure projected in the July 28 press conference.
It is clear, in retrospect, that the skillfully stage-managed,
televised press conference of July 28, 1965 marked a new phase of open,
headlong escalation of the war—now that the "wraps were off." But an
adverse public reaction to this new development was averted by skillful
manipulation of information. The formula is simple, but effective: First
step: highly alarming rumors about escalation are "leaked." Second step:
the President officially and dramatically sets the anxieties to rest by
announcing a much more moderate rate of escalation, and accompanies this
announcement with assurances of the government's peaceful intentions.
Third step: after the general sigh of relief, the originally rumored
escalation is gradually put into effect, after all.
This technique of psychological backing and filling has two effects:
(1) By the time the originally leaked figure of, say, $12 billion, is
officially presented by the President in January 1966, the citizen has
the comfortable feeling of familiarity with it, of being knowledgeable
Va
about it. Somewhere, sometime he has seen and heard this figure before,
as indeed he had—in July 1965. It has been robbed of its shock effect.
The citizen has become habituated to it. (2) The succession of "leaks,"
denials of leaks, and denials of denials, thoroughly confuses the
individual. He is left bewildered, helpless, apathetic.
The habituation is further reinforced by what is politely called "news
management," but what some newsmen have referred to more frankly as the
withholding of information or the giving out of misinformation by the
government. In February 1965, U.N. Secretary General U Thant bluntly
stated that the American people were not getting the true facts about
the war in Vietnam, particularly about peace feelers from Hanoi."
Australian correspondents in Vietnam have charged American military
public relations men with misrepresenting casualty figures in order to
make them less stark for the American public." American newsmen have
similarly complained about misleading news and misinformation. In a
front page news article headed "U.S. Command Less Than Candid in
Reporting Vietnam Battle Action," Jack Foisie, Bureau Chief in Saigon
for the Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times, writes:
Even in a minor defeat, or a minor error in contrast to the bigness of
the war, spokesmen try to minimize the setback, distort the fact. They
do their best to sweep the dirt under the tent.1t
Professor Thomas A. Bailey writes in the New York Times about President
Johnson's "warping, sugar-coating or falsification of the news." 2
News management is not a new phenonemon. It is probably as old as
politics itself. In the United States, as Professor
13/
Bailey puts it, "news management dates back to George Washington's
Administration." 2 What is new, in our democracy, is the quantity, the
degree of news management. What is new is the fact that high government
officials openly admit it, and that the large majority of the American
people have accepted it as one of the facts of life. William Touhy, the
Los Angeles Times correspondent in Saigon, writes:
Sylvester [Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Arthur
Sylvester! has said he favors government news management, including
tying to the press in times of crisis. On a trip to Vietnam, he declared
the press ought to be the handmaiden of the government, as far as
reporting the war went.15
And Newsweek quoted the official spokesman for the United States mission
in Saigon as stating: "My directive says that our policy is one of
minimum candor." 17
The open advocacy by governmental leaders of policies of "minimum
candor" and lying to the people undermines "the right to know." The
restrictions on his right to know the truth mesh neatly with the
citizen's regressive wish to remain unknowing, and further facilitate
his regression to the preadolescent phase of seeking security in the
omniscience and omnipotence of the authority figures.
CONCLUSIONS
The techniques employed by government to reduce opposition to the war
in Vietnam rely heavily on psychological habituation by gradual
involvement. Each small new step in the escalation is presented as a
logical, unavoidable result of a commitment made by a previous small
step. The result is acquiescence by the individual, with no feeling That
his right to disagree is being suppressed. The acquiescence resulting
from psy‑
chological habituation to the war could prepare the ground for eventual
acceptance of the use of nuclear weapons, if such use developed as a
"logical" next step. Senator Richard B. Russell, Chairman of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, has advocated using small nuclear weapons in
Vietnam, increasing the size of the nuclear bombs when necessary. This
foreshadows a kind of nuclear escalation similar to the gradual
escalation described above.
The gradual habituation, the "management" of news and information, and
the manipulation of public opinion produce in the American people a
sense of confusion. They undermine the average American's confidence in
his own ability to think clearly and cope with important issues. They
foster in the average American a feeling of helplessness and
passivity. All this bodes ill for the democratic process: an
ill-informed and misinformed people may be unable to participate
intelligently in decision-making. It bodes ill for the prospects of
human survival: a habituated people may be unable to stop the drift
toward a third, thermonuclear, world war. It bodes ill for the
emotional health of the American people.
And all this is a matter of serious concern to behavioral scientists, as
citizens and as specialists.
REFERENCES
I. ACHESON, D. 1950, Statement at Ministerial Level Meeting in Paris.
Department of State Bulletin. May 22: 821.
2. BATLEY, T. A. 1966. Johnson and Kennedy—the two thousand days. New
York Times Magazine. November 6. 1966: 139.
3. DRUMMOND, R. AND G. CORLENTZ. 1960. Duel at the Brink—John Foster
Dulles' Command of American Power. Doubleday and Co., Garden City, New
York: 121 122.
14/
4. rim NtiowrR, D. D. 1965. Mandate for Change. Signet Books, New York:
430.
5. last nutowrn, D. D. 1965. Op. cit.: 416.
6. EisiNtiowt R. D. D. 1965. Op. cit.: 427.
7. FEST INGER, L. 1957. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Row,
Peterson, New York.
8. FI.STINGI R, L. AND D. BRAT trr . 1962. Cognitive dissonance. hi
Experimental Foundations of Clinical Psychology, A. J. Bachrach (Ed.).
Basic Books, New York.
9. FESTINGUR, L. 1964. Conflict, Decision and Dissonance. Stanford Uni
ve I sit), Press. Stanford, California.
10. GARDNI R, G. E. 1959. Psychiatric Problents of Adolescence. In
handbook of Psychiatry, Silvana Arieti (Ed.). Basic Books, New York. 1:
870-871.
11. OF.M.1ERIAN, M. E. (Ed.) 1965. Viet Nam-Ilistory, Documents, and
Opinions on a Major World Crisis. Fawcett Publications, New York: 78.
12. KASTENNITIER, R. W. 1963. Speech on floor of House of
Representatives. New York Times. July 17. 1963.
13. Los Angeles limes. Nov. 16, 1965.
14. Los Angeles Times. Oct. 3, 1965.
15. Los Angeles Times, Aug. 11, 1966.
16. MASSERMAN, J. H. 1948. Psychological medicine and world affairs. In
Modern
['rends in Psychological Medicine, Butter-%tuff' and Company, London.
17. No%ssveck. Aug. 2, 1965.
18. New You Times. May 18, 1966.
19. New York limes. Dec. 8 and 15, 1965. 20A/sooty', C. E., O. J. Sot-1,
AND P. 11.
TANN! NUM'Al. 1957. 1 he Measurement of University of Illinois Press,
Urbana. Illinois.
21. ()scoop. t'. E. 1960. Cognitive dynamics in the conduct of human
affairs. Public Opinion Quarterly. 24(2): 341-365.
22. KORERES, C. M. 1954. The day we didn't go to war. The Reporter.
Sept. 14, 1954.
23. RouinisoN, F. M., Atsin F. KEMP (Eds.). 1966. Report on the U.S.
Senate Hearings-The Truth About Vietnam. Greenleaf Classics, San
Diego, California: 268.
24.RoinNsoN, F. M., AND E. KEMP. 1966. Op. cit: 268.
25. ROBINSON-, F. M., AND E. KEMP. 1966. Op. ell: 265-266.
26. STONE, 1. F. 1966. Ike would use A. bombs. 1. F. Stone's Weekly.
Sept. 1966: 4.
27. The Geneva Agreements (complete text). 1965. Viet Report. Aug.-Sept.
1965: '18.
28. U.S. News and World Report. July 25, 1966: 36.
15
PSYCHOLOGICAL HABITUATION TO
WAR
HON. GEORGE E. BROWN, JR.
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, August 12, 1970
Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Speaker, on July 17, 1970, I included in
the RECORD a 1967 study written •by Dr. Isidore Ziferstein entitled
"Psychological Habituation to War: A Sociopsychological Case Study,"
originally published in the American Journal of Orthopsychiatry.
Dr. Ziferstein has recently updated that study in a paper entitled
"Epilogue-1970." I am inserting this psychological analysis of the
factors leading to and maIntainTng American intervention in Vietnam at
this point in the RECORD and recommend it highly to my colleagues:
EPILOGUE-1970
(By Isidore Ziferstein,
The techniques of psychological habituation to the acceptance of war
are being continued by the Nixon Administration, as it prepares and
implements new "Viet Nams" In Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos, even while
claiming that its policy is to get out of Vietnam and all of Indochina.
To illustrate this type of double-think: on July 27, 1969, a front-page
article in the Los Angeles Times reported: "(Nixon) the Hawk of
Yesteryeai, arrived in Manila Saturday on a Dove's wings. The man who,
as vice-president, talked about sending American infantry into
Indochina as long ago as 1954, now proclaims Asia for the Asians and no
more Vietnams."
Yet, two days later, in Bangkok, the same Nixon, shedding his Dove's
wings. pledged to the King of Thailand and a world-wide television
audience, that the United States would fight shoulder to shoulder with
the government of Thailand, to defend it against internal subversion
or external aggression.
These exchanges took place against a back ground of a controversy
between the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Administration,
in which the Administration engaged in some fancy foot-work. On July 7,
1969. Senator J. William Fulbright had revealed the existence of a
secret pact between the United States and Thailand which blueprinted
how U.S. troops would be used if needed to help the Thal government
"resist Communist aggression." At first the Pentagon refused either to
affirm or deny the existence of such a pact. Later the Pentagon denied
its existence. Still later, the Pentagon declared that what existed was
not a pact. but "only a military contingency plan" (such as generals are
wont to draw up on a rainy afternoon when they have nothing else to do.)
However, the Pentagon refused to let the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee see the plan or pact.
It then became known that the document (plan or pact?) had been signed
by General Stilwell and by the Thai Minister of Defenge. (It should be
noted the contingency plans are not signed by leaders of foreign
governments. They are drawn up secretly by military planners and held in
reserve. This was obviously not "only" a contingency plan, but an
international agreement signed by the representatives of two
governments.)
Then on July 25, 1969, at the start of his Southeast Asian tour,
Presiden Nixon entered the controversy. On July 26, 1969, the Los
Angeles Times headlined: "President Denies Secret Pact for Thailand
Defense."
On August 22, 1969, the newspapers re-parted that: "Secretary of Defenac
Melvin R. Laird said he did not agree with the controversial
U.S.-Thalland military contingency plan, adding that 'it does not have
the approval of this Administration.'" However, a day later, the
newspapers revrted that "the State Department sought to dispel the idea
that Laird's public disapproval of a military contingency agreement
(sic) with Thailand constituted Official repudiation of the bilateral
understanding." (Note how, for the first time, the term "military
contingency plan" is changed to "military contingency agreement", *thus
seemingly inadvertently blurring the distinction between a contingency
plan and an International agreement and further habituating the public
to ac‑
teptance of what-ever-it-is.) "Prat s' officer Robert J. McCloskey said
the plan continues in existence, and while he agreed with Laird that it
is on the shelf. he said also that It could he taken down at any time
necessary." (Apparently without the advice or consent of the Senate.)
Finally Gil November 8. 1969, the press reported that "Secretary of
Defense -Malvin R. Laird capitulated after nicritlui of pressure and
supplied a copy of the controversial U.S. defense agreement with
Thailand to the Senate Foreign Relations C 3mmi l tee. t3enator
Fulbright, after reading the text. de,cribecl it. as 'a blue-print for a
masLive U.S. Involvement' in Thatland, adding that 'we're pretty
heavily involved there already."' (And this involvement continues to
es?alare as American planes, and ground-"advisers" are engaged in
counter-guerilla activities in Thailand.)
Senator Stuart Symington has begun to reveal the results of his
subcommittee's investigation of several adinlnistratians' (including
the Nixon administrItichsi escalation of a clandestine war in Laos. He
states:
"As shown by the transcripts, finally released six months after the
hearings, the United States has been, and is, participating heavily in a
secret war that has cost many American lives and billions of dollars, It
is a war conducted far away from any Vietnain Interdiction effort along
the Ho Chi Minh trails of southern. Laos.
From a modest 1962 role as a supplier of equipment to the government, of
Prince Souvanna Phouma, the United States has now become involved in
lighting on a broad scale. Under the veil of what was officially termed
"armed reconnaissance," American fighter-bombers, as far back as 1964,
began to attack Communist ground targets and troops—and therefore
inevitably civilians—in northern Laos; and American air effort in- that
area has grown continuously since that time.
This air support took quantum leaps during the Various bombing pauses
over North Vietnam, reaching a peak after the 1968 executive order to
cease all raids over that country.
For over five years this secret American War has been going on in
northern LaOs: but until recently, the only reports on United States
activities in that distant livriti were from representatives of the
press who went to the scene in efforts to ascertain the facts.
During the years 1964 to 1969, as the clandestine American role grew
steadily, executive branch discussions and presentations to Congress
were extremely limited: in some eases they were actually misleading.
(Emphasis added—I.Z.)
The subcommittee finally heard testimony on all phases of Laos,
including U.S. support of this war; but the American people are still
being denied full information because of the continuing refusal of the
executive branch to declassify portions of the transcript which we
consider should be in the public domain,
Also of grave concern Is the fact that this secrecy permitted the
Administration to escalate heavily the fighting In that area while It
was cleesea1ating, with much public fanfare, the war in South Vietnam.
As a result, the American people Were misled as to the overall role of
the United States in Southeast Asia, whereas the enemy—fully aware of
the stepped-up United States bombing—received quite a different
impression with respect to the actual intentions of our government."
(Los Angeles Times Opinion Section, Sunday, August 9, 1970.)
Now let us analyze briefly the anatomy of public-relations techniques
employed in putting across the Cambodian venture. Here, too, as in the
case of our original involvement in the Vietnam war. the involvement was
at first seemingly indirect. Late in April, 1970, it became known that
our South Vietnamese "allies" were invading, in force, the sanctuaries
of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese just inside Cambodia. It was
announced that no American combat troops were involved. The next step
occurred on April 30, with the announcement by President Nixon of a
massive invasion of the sanctuaries by American troops. It was stressed
that the purpose of the incursion was solely to destroy the sanctuaries,
and that American troops would not venture deeper into Cambodia, nor
would they fight to defend or support the Lon Nol government of
Cambodia.
A few days later, this was modified to state that American forces would
not penetrate Cambodia beyond a line 21.7 miles from the border. This
was taken to apply not only to ground forces, but also to air and naval
17
forces. The President also pledged to pull all II S. troops and advisers
out of Cambodia by June 30.
At his May S news conference President Nixon was asked whether the South
Vietnamese subscribe to the American pullout deadline, and he answered:
"No, they do not. I would expect that the South Vietnamese would come
out at approximately the same time that we do, because when we come out,
our logistical support and air support will also come out." (Emphasis
added-1.Z.) However, by May 24, Secretary of State Rogers was
indicating to newsmen that South Vietnamese operations in Cambodia will
have U.S. support, including air support, after American troops pulled
out. (Los Angeles Times, May 25, 1970.)
And by June 24, it was announced that U.S. war-planes struck deep into
Cambodian territory to help the Lon Nol government troops break the
month-long siege of Kampong Thom. This air-strike was 140 miles inside
Cambodia, about 120 miles past the 21.7 limit set by President Nixon. At
the same time, a Defense Department spokesman maintained that President
Nixon and Secretary of Defense Laird had ruled out United States combat
air support for South Vietnamese forces operating more than 21.7 miles
inside Cambodia. (Los Angeles Times, June 24, 1970.)
Similar double-talk (or psychological backing and filling) was
demonstrated when Herbert Klein, the President's communications
director, said that U.S. troops would be pulled out of Cambodia by June
30, but that they would return to Cambodia if necessary. A
correspondent asked: "When might they return? Could they return July 1?"
Mr. Klein replied, "Could bet"
In his July 1 "conversation" with three TV commentators, President Nixon
stated unequivocally: "All Americans are out [of Cambodia I" and "We
have no plans to send any advisers into Cambodia." However, on the same
day, a dispatch by Jack Folsie in the Los Angeles Times reported:
"But there is evidence that some American military men continue to
participate in the Cambodian war. Some are In civilian clothes and most
of them commute daily from Vietnam bases and return before dark. They
thus may technically fulfill the White House declaration that no
American combatants other than aircraft crews remain involved in the
Cambodian struggle."
And Foisie reports further: "Although Pentagon spokesmen have denied
that U.S. ground crews are present to service these air craft I at the
Phnom Penh airport I, there Is evidence to the contrary reported by
correspondents on the scene."
A later report in LIFE (July 10. 1970) datelined Phnom Penh, states:
"The seed of U.S. involvement has taken and is burgeoning with all the
apparatus of military, political and economic aid. . . . At the Phnom
Penh airport six Westerners are loading an olive-green truck with a
large olive-green container. They wear civilian clothes, but U.S. combat
boots show beneath their trousers. Short haircuts and the nice moves of
the man trying to hide his walkie-talkie indicate the imminent surfacing
of more American presence in Cambodia. Fresh-sprayed paint shrouds every
official marking but one on the truck door. It reads, 'For Official Use
Only'. Embarrassed and closemouthed, two of the party concede they are
U.S. airmen. In Phnom Penh—way beyond the 21.7 mile limit—to install
'navigational equipment'. . . The war Is settling in for a long stay."
A report by Arthur J. Donunen, correspondent of the L. A. Times,
datelined Phnom Penh July 25. states that "the war in Cambodia takes on
some of the aspects of the war in Vietnam in late 1964 and early 1065."
Meanwhile, as more and more reports began to appear that American
Phantom jets were flying close support for Cambodian• government troops,
napalming, bombing, and strafing the anti-Lon Nol forces, American
military spokesmen resumed their psychological backing and filling. On
August 4, a U.S. spokesman in Saigon, when asked about these reports,
said, "We have no reports on that. The only missions we fly are
interdiction missions." The L. A. Times comments, "He was referring to
announced U.S. policy of confining American raids in Cambodia to
attacks on enemy supply lines and bases." However, the very next day,
the L. A. Times reported that "American officials in Saigon confirmed
that the U.S. Air Force is answering a Cambodian request for help by
sending up to fifty fighter-bombers on daily raids in Cambodia." The
paper added that "the President's stated policy of
18
limiting air missions to interdiction seemed to rule out direct air
support for Cambodian forces, but was ambiguous enough to allow a wide
latitude of interpretation by U.S. field commanders." Two days later,
August 7, the L. A. Times reported that "Secretary of Defense Melvin R.
Laird denied that American war-planes are flying close support for
Cambodian troops fighting North Vietnamese." The following day, August
8, the L. A. Times reported further on Laird's interpretation of "the
Administration's flexible definition of Interdiction." The report
states, "Laird, who makes a strong effort to pursue a policy of candor,
convinced no-one with his exercise in semantics. . . When pressed to
explain how bombing 300 yards in front of troops, under control of a
forward air-controller in a light plane, could be called interdiction,
Laird ventured somewhat lamely: 'It depends on what you refer to as
interdiction.' " (Shades of Humpty-Dumpty's advising Alice that "When I
use a word, It means Just what I choose it to mean. . . .")
The press-report continues, "In Saigon the U.S. command was more candid.
Military officials there, according to United Press International,
said the decision was to provide air support, but to call it
interdiction. That way, they said, they could comply with Mr. Nixon's
directives."
Senator Mike Mansfield commented prophetically, "If this continues, it
could mean that we will have a repetition of what happened in Vietnam;
namely, that first we will provide air-support, then send advisers, then
deploy troops, and thus get into a full-fledged war."
As one reads these reports, he gets a feeling deyt-vu. The same
news-management, the same manipulation and confusion of public opinion
by double-talk and psychological backing and filling, that took place
over the years in the Vietnam adventure, Is now being repeated in
Cambodia. And there is grave danger that at some point Mr. Nixon and his
military advisers will decide that American public opinion is
sufficiently confused, divided, polarized, and therefore helpless, to
warrant an all-out massive effort to achieve a military victory.
There is reason to fear that, just as the Eisenhower administration made
a firm decision, unbeknownst to the American people, as far back as
March, 1954, that the United
States would intervene in the war in Indochina, if that were considered
necessary to prevent the loss of Indochina to the communists, so the
Nixon administration may have decided to extend the war into Cambodia
and Thailand, and to score a knockout blow against "Communist
subversion" in all of Southeast Asia, using nuclear weapons if
necessary. While Nixon has officially withdrawn American ground forces
from Cambodia, he is encouraging Thailand to intervene. A dispatch from
Bangkok reports that "both Thai and U.S. officials here said last week
that the U.S. appears to have a clear obligation to come to the aid of
Thailand if Bangkok's efforts to support the Lon Nol government provoke
attack by North Vietnamese and Viet Gong forces. A high American
official said he believed the United States would act under such
circumstances." (L.A. Times, August 9, 1970.) (The Nixon administration
seems to be committed to a policy of provoking the North Vietnamese and
Viet Gong, and thus widening the war.)
The use of nuclear weapons by the U.S. Is a real, and fearsome,
possibility. We have already used these weapons in one war. Statements
over the years by various government figures, including former
President Eisenhower, show that we rely heavily on the nuclear weapons
as our chief "persuader." And recent disclosures by Senator Stuart
Symington are most disquieting. He reports that "the executive branch
refuses to disclose (even) to proper committees of the Senate, full
details about the vast proliferation of nuclear weapons that we have
distributed all over the globe." (Los Angeles Times Opinion Section,
August 9, 1970.)
All these techniques and all these events continue to take their toll of
the emotional health of the American people. It was this fact that moved
the American Psychoanalytic Association, which had always carefully
refrained from taking any political position, to protest the extension
of the war into Cambodia and to state:
"At a time when this country's leadership has stated a commitment to
disengagement from Vietnam, we are suddenly and without warning
confronted with an extension of military involvement. This has resulted
in a dramatic increase in anxiety, turbulence and conflict, Involving
crucial segments of our population."
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