Axis of Evo

There was a time when Evo Morales deserved a chance to show his democratic bonafides as Bolivia's new head of state. But 96 hours into the presidency, time's up. Anyone still wondering what Evo has in mind for his country qualifies for permanent disability -- or a job at the Organization of American States -- on grounds of terminal naiveté.

In just a few short days, the great Aymara hope has built a cabinet of radical and Marxist militants, purged the Bolivian military and signed a pile of "agreements" with his Venezuelan mentor Hugo Chávez. There are reports that Cuban security agents are already working for the new president much as they do for Chávez. If imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, Evo is buttering Hugo up big time.

The most tragic aspect of Evo's decision to let Cuba and Venezuela annex his country is where this all leads for the majority Indian population in one of the region's poorest countries. Their hopes soared on Sunday as they watched one of their own, from humble beginnings, sworn into the highest office in the land. They no doubt think that Evo -- who rose to power by leading coca growers against crop eradication pushed by U.S. drug warriors -- will care for his own in ways that the white, upper-class leadership never did. But Fidel long ago destroyed underclass hopes for a better life and Hugo is doing the same.

After six years of Chávez, Venezuelans, once ecstatic about their Bolivarian Revolution, are sinking deeper into poverty. Fidel's largely Afro-Cuban population is destitute after almost 50 years of El Máximo Lider.

Most of the world has greeted the Morales presidency with romantic optimism. His lack of experience and formal education, his fiery rhetoric laced with old fashion Latin populism, his violent background and his hard-line friends abroad -- all have been played down in favor of a "give-him-a-chance" attitude. A Miami Herald editorial Wednesday noted a few of Mr. Morales' more moderate statements as "a sign of political maturity."

It's hard to find anyone not hoping that an Evo-led Bolivia, built on equality under the law, property rights and healthy competition will emerge. Sadly, though, white guilt is not likely to get off so easily. The reality is that the Cuban model of totalitarian "equality" is now the dominant force shaping the Morales government.

One reason this has been slow to dawn is that observers have been assigning far too much importance to the question of whether foreign investors will be allowed into Bolivia's rich natural gas industry, or if, instead, Bolivia will go forward with full blown nationalization. The answer is probably the former, but so what? As both Venezuela and Cuba illustrate, such a policy does nothing to ensure development and reveals very little about whether democracy and liberty will survive.

Spain's socialist prime minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, is already trying to elbow his way into Mr. Morales's Bolivia on behalf of Spanish energy interests, as is Brazil's Luiz Inácio "Lula" da Silva on behalf of Petrobras. Yet the presence of foreign business interests in a dictatorship does little for the locals. Both Castro and Chávez host foreign investors, recognizing them as perfect business partners because they are politically indifferent as long as they get their cut. The key to a dictator's control is ensuring that local interests do not have economic power to challenge the political status quo.

Mr. Morales has been riding an anti-foreigner wave of populism but is suddenly warming up to the old Bolivian nemesis, Chile. Undoubtedly, someone has explained to him that as long as Bolivia relies exclusively on Brazil and Argentina as markets for its natural gas, it has weak pricing power. It would not be surprising to see the angry Bolivian nationalist make a deal with Chile so he could reach the coast and tap into the rich market for liquefied natural gas up north.

If that happens it should not be understood as moderation. It would merely be a calculation about how to secure power. It explains the first-ever attendance of a Chilean president at a Bolivian inauguration and Evo's plans to travel to Chile for its inauguration of Michelle Bachelet.

Better relations between Chile and Bolivia are much to be desired. But as Venezuela and Iran have made clear, energy income in the hands of the state does not make citizens better off. We'd be more encouraged if Evo said something about changing Bolivian property laws to permit Indians to sell their rural land or if he promised to change the country's "capitalization" structure of privatized companies so that shares held in trust for Bolivians by the state would be distributed to the people.

The other facet of Bolivian reality that some observers expected as a counterbalance to a presidential power grab is the opposition. Yet, with a majority in the lower house and solid support in the senate, Evo may be able to consolidate power "legally" à la Chávez. A constituent assembly later this year will rewrite the constitution and if Venezuela is any guide, the concept of limited government will not be included in the document.

Finally, there is the matter of the military, an institution near and dear to the heart of an "elected" president who has no intention of leaving office when his term is up. Again, Chávez's Venezuela provides the template. To this day, a number of Venezuelan experts believe that the so-called "coup" of April 11, 2002 was a staged event, designed expressly for the purpose of identifying high-ranking Chávez opponents in uniform so they could be relieved of duty and replaced by less-qualified, loyal soldiers.

On Tuesday, Evo fired 28 Bolivian generals -- essentially the entire high command -- on charges of treason for allowing the U.S. to destroy some two dozen Chinese missiles held by the Bolivian military. He didn't mention that the missiles were obsolete and that both parties acted within OAS conventions. He then reportedly passed over the next generation of officers to replace the generals with a young group of soldiers. There can be little doubt that these new generals understand well that the president deserves credit for their accelerated career success.

There are of course differences between Bolivia and Venezuela, the biggest one being that Evo doesn't have the resources to purchase influence the way Hugo has done. But that may also explain why he's moving much faster to neutralize the military and protect his power against future challengers.