The Pacific according to Washington
By Manuel E. Yepe

With his declarations the past weeks that Washington remains a Pacific power, and will be even more so in the future, US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta reiterated an old doctrine in search of a new strategy to find a justification for the vast sums the Pentagon will spend over the coming years after the defeats -euphemistically called “stalemates” - in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This is the view of American historian of modern warfare, Gabriel Kolko, as discussed in his article “Panetta’s Pacific Vision” published in Counterpunch June 8-10, 2012.

According to Kolko, the anti-Chinese aim of Panetta’s recent visits to the Philippines, India, and Vietnam, was clear.  “Considering the difficulties found so these countries would allow the US to build new permanent bases, the U.S. will want rights to use those that exist already to counter the growing Chinese navy.”

But China is already far too strong militarily and economically. It holds over a trillion dollars — $1.15 trillion to be exact —  in longer-term U. S. Treasury notes, and were it to dump them it might hurt itself it in the short-run. In the long-run they would be free of dependency on the American debt. But the U. S. that has relied on China to finance its immediate trade deficits and its budget deficits will not find a substitute for China given the highly fragile condition of the European economy. Moreover, China can no longer be treated by Western powers as it was during the 19th century.

Kolko believes that the USA plans to bank on the fact that the Philippines, China, Malaysia, Brunei and Vietnam claim portions or all of the South China Sea while China claims they own the entire South China Sea and has a superior military power to enforce their claim.

But Panetta’s Pacific strategy is based on mere illusion and optimistic hypotheses about the future with an indefinite time span of up to 10 years for its implementation. It's as if he expects the rest of the world will remain stable and no crippling world economic crisis can create an obstacle to lavish American military expenses, says Kolko.

The U.S. claims it is not trying to build some sort of alliance to contain Chinese power, but the Chinese do not believe it because “it on its face is simply not true.” 

This is obvious from the fact that Panetta only visited three countries: India, the Philippines, and Vietnam, -two of whom have had armed conflicts with China and all of whom have territorial disputes with the Asian giant- and Washington hoped to find a sympathetic response to what are very vague American plans for the future. Leon Panetta himself admits they are vague.

But the question is whether this vagueness -that causes concern in nations like India and Vietnam that would be taking immense risks- is deliberate or not, says Kolko. 

“In any case, the American Government looks pathetically stupid, because wherever Panetta has gone he gives the impression he is thinking out loud and making decisions without previous thought. This will not reassure the Indians and Vietnamese or other Asian powers.”

It could indeed distract any American regime, whether Republican or Democratic-led, over the next 10 years.  And the U.S. is likely to get bogged down elsewhere over the next decade.

The Asian context is not encouraging for Panetta’s strategy. India does not want to get involved in unnecessary fights with China or Pakistan, which both have nuclear weapons, and China is too formidable even with conventional weapons.

Pakistan and U.S. relations are now at the lowest point they have ever been.  Russia and China are rushing into the vacuum that America’s policies on Pakistan  are creating, and the minimum interest Russia, China, and Pakistan have in common is that Afghanistan not be subjected to American-Indian influence in the future lest the U.S. has a springboard into Central Asia

Everything Kolko says indicates that the world’s diplomatic order is in great transition, save that the United States retains its traditional ambitions and still suffers from the illusions that it can make them come true. 

Were the U.S. interested only in the Pacific and Asia there might be a scintilla of hope for the Pentagon’s yet-vague strategy, but it is interested in every part of the world.

There is a pathetic air about Panetta’s efforts.  Were his goals not so dangerous one would almost feel sorry for him in his feeble attempts to find the means to attain them, concludes Kolko.

June 2012.