Progressive Cuba-Bashing
by
Richard Levins
[Richard Levins is John Rock Professor of
Population Sciences,
Department of Population and International Health, Harvard University]
Published in Socialism and Democracy
www.sdonline.org
no. 37 (vol. 19, no. 1, March 2005): 49-66
Subscription details:
http://www.sdonline.org/subscribe.htm
The Current Debate
In the mid-1960s, when Che Guevara dropped out of sight to begin his
guerrilla campaign in Bolivia, some on the left were asking whether Fidel had
had him murdered. In the late 1980s, some were quick to assume that the trial of
the Cuban general Ochoa on charges of attempting to organize a drug ring in
collaboration with the Medellín cartel was really a political purge. What is
striking is that these accusations against Cuba were accepted by so many without
investigation, as if the abuses that were alleged were only to be expected and
therefore must be true.
Why are so many progressives and liberals taken in by even the most outrageous
falsehoods about Cuba? Why do they often accept uncritically the line of the
Miami and Washington reactionaries about Cuba when they doubt almost everything
else from these sources? Possibly some are tired of nay-saying all the
conventional wisdoms. They do not want to appear “hard-line” or “ideological,”
and rejecting Cuba is a cheap and easy way of being a little more mainstream.
Cuba may be relegated by some to the list of youthful enthusiasms from the time
when “we thought we could change the world.” This stance is reinforced by the
accumulated cynicism of many defeats that says that no place can be all that
good, that all dreams come to naught. Or, perhaps since Cuba’s socialism is one
of the few to have survived, it has become harder to romanticize it.
But, mostly, this vulnerability of the left to rightist propaganda is derived
from the discouraging experience of the Soviet Union and eastern Europe and the
unwarranted assumption that Cuba has a similar regime. As well, too many
progressives have accepted cold-war anti-communism assumptions: that all Reds
are the same and that any accusation against any of them is probably an
understatement, that they support good causes only to serve their own noxious
ends, that revolutionaries once in power are all cynical manipulators and
monopolizers of privilege, and that their public statements are merely
propaganda. The burdens of internalized cold war anti-communism and conventional
political science allow for careless judgments and casual denunciations.
Dismissal of Cuba is sometimes simply an off-handed remark in writings about
other subjects. For example Marc Cooper wrote a piece in The Nation,
“Remembering Allende” (9/29/03). It was a thoughtful commentary, reflecting real
experience, knowledge, and sympathy for the Chilean struggle. But in the course
of it he threw in a careless unsupported denunciation of Cuba, referring to “the
wholesale jailing of dissidents and summary executions by an ossified and
dictatorial Cuban state.” He is of course free to disapprove of the trials of
political de-stabilizers in April 2003. But by linking the execution of
hijackers to the trials of the “dissidents,” he makes it appear as if dissidents
were executed. In fact the hijackers were not political people. Two of them had
prior criminal records, and they were threatening to kill their hostages. Most
of us oppose capital punishment and support worldwide calls to eliminate it, but
this does not justify singling out this case as an example of Cuban depravity.
It is worth looking more closely at Cooper’s comments in The Nation, his
article in the L.A. Weekly (April 18-24, 2003), and the letter organized
by Leo Casey and signed by Cooper and by other progressives and liberals, many
of whom should know better and some of whom undoubtedly do. Anyone the least bit
familiar with Cuba knows that it is anything but “ossified.” Cuba has been
undergoing rapid changes since 1959, including the transformations of education
and healthcare, the adoption of the Family Code, two agrarian reforms, the
adoption of an ecological pathway of development, and the gradual invention of a
mixed participatory and representative political system. There was the struggle
against homophobia in the ‘70s, the encouragement of whistle blowing during the
“rectification” campaign of the ‘80s, the Special Period after the collapse of
foreign trade with the Soviet bloc and the tightening of the US blockade, and
the legalization of dollars in a dual system of currency with the Cuban peso. As
well, Cuba has experienced a tremendous increase in tourism, the phasing out of
dependence on sugar, widespread decentralization, and the current “Battle of
Ideas.” This last refers to the campaign to increase university enrollment, as
well as to raise the cultural, scientific, and political level of the whole
Cuban population. During the decade 1993-2003 the Cuban economy, even measured
by the misleading GDP, grew four times faster than the average for Latin
America. Musical and artistic styles, movie making, and theatre are also
constantly changing.
Cuba is not a dictatorial regime. There is a whole complex of elected assemblies
at all levels, mass organizations of labor, women, and farmers, and all sorts of
NGOs that make Cuban socialism what it is (more on this below). It is facile
and disingenuous to brand this profoundly participatory political system as
“dictatorial.”
As for the “the wholesale jailing of dissidents,” the trial of the 75 Cubans was
not for “thought crimes.” They were accused of being financed, supported,
guided, and even organized by the United States Interest Section in Havana in
its efforts to overthrow the Cuban government. The Casey letter refers to the
“dissidents” as “independent thinkers.” But given their close ties to the US
Interest Section and the Miami right wing (amply documented by the prosecution
at the trials and not challenged by the defense),[1]
this seems at best naïve. When one of the “dissidents,” Gustavo Arcos, suggested
that dialogue with Cuba might be productive, he was scolded by the head of the
Miami right wing, Jorge Mas Canosa, who warned that dissidents inside Cuba “have
no business making any proposals whatsoever without first consulting with the
leaders of the exile community.”[2]
The Casey letter repeats the claim made by the mainstream US media that the
trial was closed and “without adequate notice or counsel.” In fact, 44 of the
accused had lawyers of their own choice and the rest had court-appointed
lawyers. Their lawyers and family members were present at the trials. Several
weeks from arrest to trial may seem short to Cooper, coming as he does from a
country that guarantees a speedy trial but where prisoners are often held for
months or even years before trial.
The letter describes the trials as “reminiscent of the Moscow trials of the
Soviet Union under the rule of Stalin.” But the defendants in the Moscow trials
were falsely accused of conspiring with foreign intelligence services.
None of the Cuban defendants denied their links to the US Interest Section. The
Soviet defendants were tried after a long period of being held incommunicado.
The Cuban defendants were held for a few weeks and had free contact with their
families and lawyers. The major evidence in Moscow was confessions, extracted in
some cases by torture and intimidation. The evidence in the Cuban case included
eyewitness testimony, photographs, and physical evidence, including money. There
was never any claim by anyone involved that the accused were abused in any way.
The Moscow purges, aside from a few show trials, were conducted by special
administrative tribunals, set up outside the judicial system. The Cubans were
tried in regular courts. And, what is more important, the Moscow trials ended
in many death sentences. There were no death sentences in the “dissidents’”
trial. The death sentences were handed down in the non-political case of
hijacking, taking of hostages, and threatening to kill them. While many, if not
most of us, may oppose capital punishment in this or any case, nobody was
condemned to death for political charges. Cooper’s conflating of the two cases
is evidence of his anti-Cuba prejudice.
The letter ends by pronouncing that the Cuban state “is not a government of the
left, despite its claims of social progress in education and healthcare…”
Claims? The Cuban achievements in education have been verified by UNESCO surveys
showing that Cuban third and fourth graders perform so much better in language
and mathematics skills than the rest of Latin America that UNESCO returned to
test them again.[3]
The Pan American Health Organization and World Health Organization both
recognize the phenomenal health statistics.[4]
But perhaps the letter signatories know this and simply dismiss them as mere
social progress. Feeding the hungry, healing the sick, and educating the
illiterate are not very exciting to the well fed, healthy, and college-educated.
Cooper and Casey et al.’s letter-signers decide that the Cuban government really
loves the blockade. Cooper says that the trials “help confirm my longtime
suspicion that Castro lives in mortal fear that his most powerful tool of social
control, the US embargo, will one day be lifted.” And the letter argues that the
Cuban actions “amount to collaboration with the most reactionary elements of the
US administration in their efforts to maintain sanctions and impose even more
punitive measures against Cuba.”
It is a serious claim to assert that the Cuban government really loves the
blockade; it should at least be supported by serious argument. It is not. The
underlying assumption is that Havana blames the US for all its troubles. It
doesn’t. It’s too busy talking about the lack of resources, lax enforcement,
bureaucracy, and other homegrown failings. While the harm the US government
causes Cuba is certainly important in Cuban consciousness, the main “tool of
social control” is the shared sense of building a more just and equitable
society despite the aggression. The Cuban report to the Secretary General of the
UN specifies exactly how the blockade harms Cuba. The report details the
injuries field by field, in lives and in money, in higher prices paid for
medicines, in medicines they couldn’t get (for instance, the Pedro Kouri
Institute of Tropical Medicine could not obtain diagnostic kits for identifying
SARS), and in extra shipping fees for their imports. They offered estimates of
an economic impact of some 79 billion US dollars over the 44 years of siege, or
about $1.8 billion per year.[5]
The Cuban national budget in 2003 was some 11.5 billion pesos (26 pesos to the
dollar). Imagine what could have been done if that amount had been available for
investment in economic growth.
Finally, Cooper lapses into pop political science, writing that “the Cuban State
[is] concerned with maintaining its monopoly of power above all else.” Once
again it is given to us as wisdom without supporting evidence or argument. Yet
this claim is almost never true of any regime. Even George Bush, who rigs
elections and manipulates news in order to stay in office and who clearly enjoys
being “the War President,” wants the presidency in order to carry out a
particular program with messianic fervor. He would never protect the
environment, provide healthcare, guarantee universal free education, or separate
church and state, just to stay in office.
There are also more subtle instances of the US-based left-liberal community
dismissing Cuba. For example, Achy Obejas begins a review of Alma
Guillermoprieto’s book Dancing with Cuba as follows: “It’s been a while
since Cuba, that caiman-shaped Caribbean isle, ceased to be a place on the map.
At some point, it came unhinged and floated away.” And a bit later, “…if Cuba
inspires, it also provokes despair.” These comments reinforce the notion within
the US left that it’s over, that Cuba is no longer worthy of our support or even
interest. This thinking is no doubt influenced by the anti-communism and
cynicism so prevalent in this country.
More than 16,000 days have passed since President Eisenhower declared that
“Castro’s days are numbered.” A whole generation of progressives has grown up
with Cuba-bashing as a steady background. Antagonism to Cuba has been a constant
of US policy through all the changes of administration. Despite any differences
in style and strategy, they all aimed to destroy a revolutionary society that
almost alone in the world has resisted domination by the corporate empire. It is
clear that the Bush administration is escalating this war on Cuba. This is a
continuation of more than 40 years of aggression, during which the US government
has used military, terrorist, economic, diplomatic, and disinformation weapons
to weaken and isolate Cuba in the hopes of overthrowing Cuban socialism. There
have been guerrilla bands organized by the CIA in the 1960s and more than 50
attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro. A Cuban civilian airliner in flight from
Venezuela was downed in 1976, and Cuban diplomats have been murdered. A
“transition to democracy” is supposed to result from these aggressions by
increasing popular dissatisfaction until it becomes disaffection, by promoting
international isolation, and by the murder or natural death of Fidel Castro.
The history of United States propaganda warfare and dirty tricks in the Cold
War, against the Mossadegh government in Iran, against the Sandinistas in
Nicaragua and the Allende government in Chile shows that the US government
exercises no moral restraint on the stratagems used to justify its policies and
hide its interventions. The discussion in Judith Miller’s book Germs[6]
shows that the US government considered as a legitimate option even the blowing
up of a commercial airliner and blaming it on Cuba.
As the more violent interventions, such as military invasion and assassination
attempts, failed and then fell out of favor (although violence is certainly
still being employed), greater emphasis was placed on covert political
intervention and disinformation campaigns. Anti-Cuban propaganda is now focusing
on discrediting or discounting the most inspiring achievements of the
revolution. The recent Bush administration document on a “transition to
democracy in Cuba” has a complete program for capitalist restoration that
promises such things as a comprehensive immunization program for Cuban children,
universal education, and environmental protection, as if Cuba were not already
ahead of the United States in all three.
Given what we know, progressives should approach all fresh incidents and
accusations against Cuba in the light of this history of cynical disinformation
aimed at justifying escalated aggression. Our first reaction should be one of
skepticism. We should examine the evidence offered, check the Cuban response to
the accusations, and make sure we are not taken in. We must not automatically
assume that Cuba has all the faults of eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
Progressives need to place what they see and hear in the context of the siege of
Cuba. I will review the scope and impact of this siege in the next section. Then
we will be better placed to examine how Cuba really works and to refute Margaret
Thatcher’s depressing claim, “There is no alternative.”
The Siege of Cuba
Phillip Agee and others have shown that US funding of dissident activity in
Cuba adds up to more than $25 million since 1992.[7]
Directly appropriated funding is an underestimate. Some funds are channeled
through third countries such as Spain and even Norway.
The war against Cuba is directed from two major centers: Washington and Miami.
The Washington center is controlled by the White House and includes the National
Security Council, the CIA, the Pentagon, State Department, FBI, the Agency for
International Development (AID), ad hoc interagency working groups, and their
allies in Congress. They combine clandestine operations, largely CIA, with
diplomatic, legal, and propaganda activities. Further, they work through
non-governmental organizations. AID alone has distributed some $20 million to
groups such as Freedom House, the Center for Free Cuba, the Institute for
Democracy in Cuba, the Pan American Development Foundation, Partners of the
Americas, the American Center for International Labor Solidarity, the Sabre
Foundation, Florida International University, the International Republican
Institute and many others. Some are longstanding collaborators with the
government’s schemes, others were established for the Cuba operations, still
others have legitimate as well as noxious activities.
The Miami center is based in the right wing of the exile community. Its economic
base is the network of medium-sized and large businesses owned by Cuban
Americans and serving the emigré community and Miami as a whole, and the
professional counterrevolutionaries who can mobilize broader rightwing
resources. It serves US policy goals for Cuba and for the rest of Latin America.
In return it receives favorable publicity, training, funding, guidance, access
to government agencies and toleration of shady business practices.
Its core has been the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) until it split
recently after the death of its founder. It is a legal umbrella organization
organized by Jorge Mas Canosa at the instigation of CIA officer Richard Allen,
who called for the creation of an organization “that could speak with one
voice.” The CANF groups around itself a large number of smaller overlapping
organizations engaged in propaganda aimed at US policy makers, the general
public and Cuba. They also engage in propaganda and harassment aimed at Cubans
outside their country. Groups such as Brigade 2506 (veterans of Bay of Pigs),
Abdala, Alpha 66, Omega 7, Commando F-4 and CORU are openly military and
sabotage units. Some of their members have been trained by the CIA and used in
such operations as Iran-Contra, the civil war in El Salvador, and the invasion
of Grenada.
After the failure of Operation Mongoose (the Kennedy plan to overthrow the Cuban
government with armed and terrorist actions in the 1960s), many of the
terrorists branched out into more varied forms of struggle. José Basulto’s
career is illustrative. A veteran of Bay of Pigs, he served with CIA
infiltration teams, shelled a Havana theatre and a hotel from the sea, and then
began to present himself as a non-violent resister. He organized Brothers to the
Rescue supposedly to help rafters, but also to test Cuban communications and
provoke confrontations. A similar case is that of Carlos Alberto Montaner who
began by placing bombs within Cuba, went into exile, and was later trained in
clandestine skills at Fort Benning by the CIA. He is now a central figure in the
new “moderate” counterrevolution. He is based in Spain where in 1990 he founded
La Unión Liberal Cubana and in 1991 took the initiative to form La Plataforma
Democrática Cubana as a coalition of political parties within Cuba. He urged
dissidents to form these parties, the Liberal Party, the Coordinadora
Socialdemócrata (Elizardo Sánchez, Vladimiro Roca) and the Partido Demócrata
Cristiano (Oswaldo Payá). He explained to them that the purpose in forming these
parties was not just ideological but a means of tapping the resources of the
like-minded international organizations and of getting access to European
governments. But with the collapse of European socialism there was once again an
increase in violence. From 1990 to 2000 there were some 108 terrorist actions
against Cuba including the shelling of hotels from the sea and the placing of
bombs in five hotels. Prominent leaders of counter-revolutionary groups move
back and forth freely between violent and non-violent actions. The dissident
organizations within Cuba have ties with many of them. Even though the role of
the dissidents is public relations at present, they have occasionally been
assigned minor intelligence tasks by the US Interest Section, such as finding
the home addresses of Cuban leaders who might be targeted for assassination.
There are a large number of counter-revolutionary groups that split, unite,
change names, overlap and quarrel. They disagree on tactics and vie for
resources. Therefore there are frequent attempts to unite them. There are
various umbrella groups such as the Concilio Cubano that includes 140 groups. In
January 2004, the Carter Center hosted another such conference to gather the
counterrevolution together.
It is often said that US policy toward Cuba is irrational, given the absence of
a Cuban threat to US security such as Soviet missiles or terrorist bases, and is
continued only because of the connections and the campaign contributions of the
Cuban rightwing in Miami. But the real reason for US hostility is more
political: Cuba represents a bold challenge to US domination of Latin America,
living proof that a small third world country can stand up to the colossus of
the north. Most of all, Cuba shows that another world is possible. It is this
continuing challenge that gives the Miami gang political clout in Washington as
well as Florida. This clout is more a consequence than a cause of Washington’s
policy. In this way, the political influence of the Miami Cubans is analogous to
that of the pro-Israel lobby in the United States: in both cases a policy
originating in US geopolitical concerns creates the space for the ethnic-based
lobby to have an impact.
The emigrés have friends in high places in government and are represented in
Congress especially by Lincoln Diaz-Balart and Ileana Ross Lehtinen. The Bush
administration has been particularly eager to recruit emigrés such as James
Cason and Otto Reich into State Department and National Security posts.
The US agencies and the emigré foci work together but also have their conflicts.
The FBI and CIA don’t completely trust the emigré groups and infiltrate them.
Occasionally operations of one or another Miami group has been interrupted by
the Coast Guard or FBI and their activities have become public. After a brief
flurry of publicity the culprits usually are quietly released. At times the
criminal activity of emigré terrorists cannot be hidden, as when in 1984 Eduardo
Arocena of Omega-7 was tried for the murder of a Cuban diplomat in New York. In
this case, the defendant got even with the CIA by revealing that he had released
in Cuba plant disease germs provided by the CIA.
Within Cuba the rise and fall of “dissident” activity reflects outside political
events. With the end of the Soviet bloc, enemies of the revolution expected the
imminent collapse of the Cuban revolutionary government and increased hostile
activities in all arenas, especially with information warfare. Here is where the
internal “dissidents” come in. Their main task is to provide ammunition to
discredit Cuba. They do this by inventing incidents or inflating real
deficiencies of the society so that they can be presented as the norm.
The “dissidents” that are known are those engaged in more open activities (as
distinguished from those engaged in espionage and sabotage). They number perhaps
a few hundred individuals belonging to a shifting set of organizations with
similar goals. The distinction between the Human Rights Party (some 15 members)
and the Cuban Foundation for Human Rights or the Comité Pro Derechos Humanos, or
the Asociación de Periodistas Independientes de Cuba and the Federación de
Periodistas de Cuba is usually that their leaders can’t get along with each
other and compete for attention and funding. The Comité had some 15-20 members
all of whom earned their visas and left, so that the present group is completely
new. Groups claiming to speak for “free” unions, librarians, journalists or
doctors arise, regroup, disappear and then show up again under new labels but
with familiar faces.
Disaffected individuals become “dissidents” for a variety of reasons and then
join the “dissident” world of cliques creating images of their own political
importance and competing for US support. They often leave their jobs to work
full time as professional “dissidents” living on subsidies from abroad but claim
they were fired because of their dissent. Although at present there is no
significant social base for the counterrevolution in Cuba, the growing sector of
employees of foreign corporations and proprietors of small businesses (now
numbering some 150,000 people and, with their families, perhaps half a million)
may some day begin to demand political influence as a class, perhaps around
issues of taxation. This might change the political situation from the
maneuverings of marginal disaffected individuals to one of class conflict.
The dissidents are all linked directly or indirectly to US operations through
the United States Interest Section in Havana, the CANF, and foreign governments
of Spain, Czech Republic, Norway, and Lithuania, among others, and foreign NGOs.
On visits to Miami their leaders meet with emigrés involved in both propaganda
and terrorist activities. For instance, Social Democrat Elizardo Sánchez Santa
Cruz met with leaders of the PNUD (Partido Nacional de Unidad Democrático), a
group that supports armed actions. None of these organizations straighforwardly
call themselves Partido Terrorista Revanchista or Coordinadora Unitaria de
Asesinos, of course. Today the major strategic ploy of the US government and its
Cuban assets is the call for a democratic and peaceful “transition,” and its
newer allies posture as “moderates.”
How Cuba Works
The Cuban revolution was one of the great liberating events in Latin American
history; it threw off half a century of United States imperial domination that
had sustained a corrupt pseudo-democracy while sponsoring the systematic looting
of the country’s wealth. Cuba began to build a kind of life that is equitable,
just, sustainable, and participatory. Even without the continued hostility and
aggression from the United States, this was an overwhelming task.
When the old ruling class left the country, it took with it its colonels, police
chiefs, torturers, and the corrupt politicians who had looted the national
treasury. It left behind a poor, plundered country with decrepit industries,
eroded landscapes, high unemployment and illiteracy, few doctors (most of them
in Havana), and a typical colonial economy of sugar monoculture. The Cuban
working people have improvised, copied, backtracked, invented, compromised and
forged ahead to create the present work in progress that has won the admiration
of people throughout the world. It is far from perfect. Socialists do not talk
of perfection. The term “workers’ paradise,” used now as a putdown by enemies of
the revolution, is not a claim by participants or observers who know the
enormous difficulties, frustrations, and contradictions of the process of
changing a whole society and also changing themselves.
Cuba is a socialist society with a mostly socialist economy. Two different
principles of distribution have coexisted in Cuba: the socialist principle “to
each according to work” and the communist principle “to each according to need.”
The principle of distribution according to work accords wages with a remarkably
small spread to all who work, who have worked (pensioners), or who study: the
median wage for all wage-earners in Cuba is 250 pesos a month, while a cabinet
minister earns only 450. In addition, goods in short supply such as
opportunities for vacations at tourist hotels are given as bonuses and awards to
outstanding workers. Cooperative farmers earn their share of the cooperative’s
returns, often taken as monthly advances as well as at the annual settling of
accounts.
The principle of distribution according to need is reflected in social
consumption available to everyone: free healthcare and education up to and
including the university level, subsidized basic rations, school meals, and
daycare, cheap and widespread access to cultural and sport activities. In
addition to what is universally available, special arrangements are made to meet
unequal needs: diabetics, pregnant women, and nursing mothers get special
rations. There are schools for the disabled with employment guaranteed
afterward, and special programs for the many young people who dropped out at the
start of the Special Period (when jobs were not available and education no
longer guaranteed employment). There is teacher training for those who work with
deaf-mute and autistic children and university programs for seniors. Teachers
are sent to children too isolated to get to school daily, and photovoltaic solar
collectors are placed in schools in remote locations that are off the national
electric grid. There are also programs to develop special talents in the arts
and sports.
That said, it is important to recognize that after the collapse of the Soviet
Union and, with it, the bulk of its international trade (which brought on what
is known in Cuba as the Special Period), foreign capitalist enterprises and
joint foreign/Cuban companies have been allowed to operate in Cuba in order to
capture some needed hard currency. Small-scale private businesses were also
legalized. Capitalist economics undermines these socialist/communist principles
of distribution. It promotes inequality by paying exorbitant salaries to
marketing and managerial personnel, especially in the tourist industry.
Profitability, marketability, and family connections determine reward in private
restaurants, private repair services, the private sale of their own tapes by
musicians, and remittances from family abroad. Although the opportunities for
corruption are much more limited than in the United States, there was a range of
remunerative activities (theft, diversion of state property, gambling,
prostitution, and black marketeering) that grew during the height of the Special
Period, when people individually had to take care of what was formerly provided
collectively. There was a general relaxation of social discipline in that
emergency, a tolerance for victimless crimes committed to solve urgent personal
economic problems. It will take some time to recover from the impact of this
period on people’s consciousness.
Most Cubans own their own homes and the others pay minimum rent toward purchase.
Of the millions of children who sleep in the streets in the third world, not one
is Cuban. Healthcare is not only free but also uniformly distributed. Cuba has
the best healthcare in the developing world and is even ahead of the United
States in some areas such as reducing infant mortality. Quality education
includes such innovations as a limit of 20 children per teacher in primary
grades, 15 in junior high and 10 in high school. Since everybody has a right to
education, there are some schools in the most isolated places with only a single
or a few pupils. Cultural and recreational facilities are also widely diffused
throughout the country. Employment is a right, and when industries reduce their
staff or close, the workers are guaranteed other jobs with at least equal pay,
or else retraining, return to school, or unemployment compensation. Today
unemployment stands at about 3%.
Most Cubans believe that they are inventing a new kind of democracy, superior
both to what Cuba had before the revolution and to what they see today in the
United States and other capitalist countries. In these liberal democracies
public office is a marketable commodity and the end result of all the political
excitement at election-time is that the same group of people who own the economy
continue to own the government. Cubans describe their own system as a way of
getting as many people as possible to help run the country through a mixture of
participatory and representative processes.
Cubans are very aware of the history of defeats in the early struggles
for national independence and workers’ rights, defeats caused in large measure
by divisions in the movements. This has given Cubans a strong sense of the
importance of unity as a political goal. Their system is designed to reach
consensus rather than promote adversarial conflict. Consensus is sought through
extensive discussion at countless meetings in the workplace, the neighborhood,
and the 2,200 non-governmental organizations. In fact, when I once asked a
meeting of ecologists how aliens on a spaceship flying over Cuba would know
there was socialism down below, the answer was, “Everybody is at meetings.” The
purpose of the meetings is to reach a consensus strong enough to mobilize the
active participation of the membership, their enthusiasm, energy, and ideas. The
premium placed on consensus is a source of strength for the revolution, but also
can at times lead to intolerance of deviant opinion.
At these meetings the major issues of concern to Cuban society are discussed.
The Federation of Cuban Women led the discussions on the Family Code and
regularly examines the status of women in order to identify obstacles to full
equality and make proposals for removing them. The farmers’ association leads on
questions of agriculture, and so on. In 2004 the new farmers’ cooperatives
initiated discussions on their relations with the state, the degree of autonomy,
how to reconcile their need for an adequate income with the need of the urban
population for inexpensive food. In 1993, at the height of the economic crisis
of the Special Period, workers’ parliaments were convened at thousands of
workplaces to discuss which of the revolutionary achievements had to be retained
at all cost, what compromises could be made, which of the emergency measures
that the National Assembly was proposing were acceptable. They rejected a tax on
wages. Every six months the union leadership meets with the heads of government
departments to examine issues of wages, bonuses, compliance with the regulations
of labor protection, the grievance system, and other issues of concern to the
unions and to the country.
Cubans from the age of 16 vote in elections for the municipal and provincial
assemblies and for the National Assembly.[8]
The elections are non-partisan rather than single-party. The Communist Party
runs no candidates although individual members are prominent among those
nominated. Nominations for municipal assembly elections take place in open
neighborhood meetings, where from two to eight candidates are proposed. There is
no campaigning, nor any of the apparatus of lobbyists, speechwriters, and public
relations consultants that goes with it. Rather, biographies of the candidates
are posted giving their occupation and contributions to society. In some ways
they resemble job resumés, or the candidate listings for the Boards of Directors
of food cooperatives or professional societies in our country. The voting is by
secret ballot and the counting is public. In about 10% of the districts, run-off
elections have to be held because nobody has won more the 50% of the votes.
Elected representatives hold weekly office hours and twice a year have formal
report-back meetings with their constituents.
Direct elections are also held for the provincial and national assemblies, with
the difference that at these levels there are single candidacies that are
determined by candidacy commissions composed of
representatives from mass organizations led by a union representative.
Among the concerns of the candidacy
commissions is the composition of the elected bodies by gender, race,
age, and occupation. It is important to have all sectors of the society
represented, and progress in the participation of underrepresented groups is
noted with satisfaction.
Another aspect of election results is their role as referendums on the
revolution. Counterrevolutionaries call on Cubans not to vote or to turn in
blank or damaged ballots. Some 10% of the eligible voters either do not vote or
do not submit valid ballots. Not all of these represent protest. However this
gives a rough idea of the extent of disaffection. When I ask friends whether
they are satisfied with their representation, I get a mixed response. Some
representatives carry out their duties formally and respond to complaints in
bureaucratese, while in other districts they energetically promote their
neighborhood’s interests.
Cuba has a parliamentary rather than presidential form of government. The
31-member Council of State, elected by the National Assembly every 5 years, acts
on behalf of the National Assembly when the latter is not in session. Fidel
Castro is the elected head of the Council of State. A few words are in order
about the role of Fidel Castro. He is undoubtedly the outstanding political
leader in the Americas in the last hundred years. Like Bolívar and Martí he led
the struggle to free his country from foreign rule, in this case from the
pseudo-republic run from the US Embassy. Unlike the other two he has continued
to lead the construction of a new society based on equality, social justice, and
sustainability. He has a dual role, as a symbol of the revolution and as its
most able politician. When crowds throughout Latin America cheer “Fidel! Fidel!”
he knows that it is a cry of admiration for the Cuban revolution rather than his
personal charisma. Within Cuba, his formal position is as a delegate to the
National assembly, elected from his home district in Santiago by secret ballot.
The National Assembly then elects him to head the Council of State, also by
secret ballot. Many Cubans see him as a superb visionary and strategist and a
not very good administrator. My personal preference would be for him to
relinquish the administrative position of Prime Minister and concentrate on what
he does best, but this is the Cubans’ decision, not mine.
There are unresolved problems of Cuban democracy, but the ones the Cubans are
concerned with are not the ones that foreign critics are most interested in. One
example is that membership in elected bodies is not a full-time paid job.
Delegates continue at their day jobs. They do not always have the expertise to
rule on the more technical issues that arise. Another is the lack of resources
for governments to use, especially at the local level.
The struggles against racism and sexism are vital elements in meeting Cuba’s
goals of equity. Old Cuba experienced a combination of an inherited Spanish
colonial racism and an imported North American variety. Advances in eliminating
racism are visible in the widespread and growing Afro-Cuban leadership, in the
self-identification of Cubans as an Afro-Caribbean people, and in the deeply
felt solidarity with Africa that sent Cuban soldiers to fight the South African
apartheid regime when it invaded Angola. It is seen in the recognition of the
Yoruba and Congo religions as co-equal with Christianity. But racist
discrimination persists. For instance, there are no black prima ballerinas in
the National Ballet, and Afro-Cubans are still underrepresented in academic
fields and overrepresented in vocational schools. After making racial
discrimination illegal, Cuba has become aware that this is not enough and that
action is needed to extirpate racism from the culture as well as to prevent its
re-introduction by foreign investors. One Spanish hotel chain was thrown out of
Cuba in part because of racist hiring practices.
The full equality of women has been a revolutionary goal from the beginning,
with its specific content evolving as consciousness deepens. The Cuban Family
Code recognizes equal responsibility of men and women to contribute to
maintaining the household and proclaims equal rights to work, study, and
leisure. However women still work 4-6 hours a day at housework in addition to
their paid jobs and participation in all sorts of organizations and in
government. There are many stories people tell about how the Family Code works
out in the complex struggles within the family. This struggle is also seen in a
high divorce rate. As one women’s leader explained: “Men dream of women who no
longer exist, and women dream of men who do not exist yet.” Still, among the
children of my friends, relations between men and women are much more
egalitarian than in the older generation.
Women occupy 36% of the seats in the National Assembly, are a majority of the
professionals and 26% of the directors. In my own areas of experience, the
Ministry of Science, Technology, and the Environment, the minister and at least
one vice minister are women. The director and all vice directors at the
Institute of Citrus Research, the dean of the faculty of mathematics and other
centers were all women, many of them Black.
Nevertheless sexist attitudes and discrimination persist, and women are not yet
50% of leadership. The Federation of Cuban Women recently held workshops on why
there are not more women leaders. They refuted the idea that women are reluctant
to take on those posts, and blamed continued underestimation of women’s capacity
to lead.
At the time of the revolution in 1959, ecology was not part of the program for
the new society. There was, however, awareness of the erosion and deforestation
caused by four centuries of foreign rule and that, as a small country, Cuba had
limited land and fresh water. Many separate ecologically sound programs were
initiated but the prevailing view was developmentalist. That viewpoint,
especially popular among economists and planners, saw development as the
progression from “backward” to “advanced” along the path previously followed by
Europe and North America. It required making use of vast quantities of energy,
and a narrowly calculated “efficiency.”
In agriculture this meant high inputs of pesticides, fertilizers, mechanical
power, and expensive animal feed in giant monocultures, i.e., industrial
agriculture. The ecologists argued that this kind of modernization undermined
the productive capacity of the land, made systems more vulnerable to natural and
economic disasters, and poisoned nature and people. They developed an
alternative approach based on biological pest control, the use of
nitrogen-fixing crops and bacteria, on compost, earthworms, and beneficial fungi
to improve soil fertility. They proposed a combination of mechanical and animal
traction, with a diversity of crops among regions, within farms and even within
fields.
In 1975 the new Cuban Constitution proclaimed environmental protection as a duty
of the state and the whole society, and all enterprises were required to include
environmental impacts in their plans. Despite the continued predominance of the
developmentalists in agriculture and industry, there existed a variety of
programs in ecological agriculture, alternative energy, urban planning, and
occupational health. These, along with some programs working to protect
biodiversity, resist desertification and erosion, and replant forests, gradually
coalesced into an ecological perspective in the course of the struggle.
The ecologists won. When imports from the Soviet Union and eastern Europe were
suddenly cut off and the high-tech path was no longer an option, there was in
place an articulate community of ecologists, a tested alternative technology,
and a spreading ecological consciousness available to meet the emergency.
Ecologists-by-conviction were joined by the new ecologists-by-necessity.
Nevertheless, there were setbacks because of material scarcity of the period,
for example, the cutting of wood for fuel, and a laxity in the enforcement of
environmental regulations. But there were also notable achievements: organic
agriculture has become the rule in the organopónicos and huertos
orgánicos, the urban vegetable gardens that provide a great deal of the food
for the cities and are spreading on rural farms. Forest cover has increased from
14% of the Cuban land surface at the time of the revolution to about 23% today
toward a target of 27%. Freon is now being replaced as a refrigerant by the
Cuban sugar cane derivate LB-12 which does not destroy the ozone layer. The
water pollution level is being reduced at the rate of 5-10% per year. Cuba has
signed on to the international treaties concerning the environment and climate,
and holds workshops to evaluate its own compliance. An ecological society is
gradually becoming a conscious goal reflected in policy and education. Cuban
socialism is evolving toward a society in which the goals of development are the
overcoming of poverty, the improvement in the quality of life, and a sustainable
relation with nature rather than a race for unlimited increases of production
and consumption at all cost.
Conclusions
The campaign against Cuba is an integral part of the United States’ new
imperial stance in the world, its claim to the right to intervene in other
countries and “take out” leaders they don’t like or force “regime change.” We
should be demanding that Congress reverse the laws aimed at strangling or
coercing Cuba, laws that violate international law. If the US escalates its
aggression against Cuba, no matter what the excuse, we should be ready to go out
in protest immediately, to defend one of the very few societies in which equity,
the satisfaction of basic human needs, participatory democracy, and
international solidarity are first principles.
We need to free our movement from cold war ideology. Only then can we begin to
challenge the disinformation war against Cuba. We have to be ready to reject new
excuses for the blockade and other coercive measures and to correct the
dismissal of Cuban achievements. What we can learn from Cuba is that there are
living alternatives to the way we do things here and that the Canadian national
health system is not the only model for providing healthcare for everyone. In
healthcare, education, and environmental protection, catching up with Cuba can
be a worthy national goal.
We would then be in a position to offer Cuba real criticism, well informed and
respectful. Foreign progressive critics have had their impact in the past, in
the struggle against homophobia, for example, and for ecological agriculture.
The rich American traditions of people’s struggles can be a source of valuable
insight for the Cubans, while their creative solutions to enormous problems can
be a source of hope for us.
Cuba warrants the respect, appreciation, and solidarity of progressives in the
United States and throughout the world.
Acknowledgement
I thank Rosario Morales for help in reworking and editing the manuscript.
[1] [Ed. Note: see Rosa Miriam Elizalde and Luis Báez, “The Dissidents,” reviewed elsewhere in this issue.]
[2] Cited in Global Justice, Publication of the Center on Rights Development Vol.4 #1, Fall 1993, from Gustavo Arcos, Twenty Years and Forty Days: Life in a Cuban Prison.
[3] Christopher Marquis, “Cuba Leads Latin America in Primary Education, Study Finds,” New York Times, December 14, 2001.
[4] See also Sarah Boseley, “Cubans tell NHS the secret of £7 a head healthcare,” Guardian (London), October 2, 2000
[5] Cuba’s Report to the UN Secretary General on General Assembly Resolution 58/7, "Necessity of Ending the Economic, Commercial and Financial Embargo Imposed by the United States of America Against Cuba" (2004), p. 31.
[6] Judith Miller et al., Germs: Biological Weapons and America’s Secret War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001).
[7] See Philip Agee, “Terrorism and Civil Society as Instruments of US Policy in Cuba,” Socialism and Democracy no. 34 (Summer-Fall 2003).
[8] On Cuba’s constitutional structure, see Peter Roman, People’s Power: Cuba’s Experience with Representative Government, updated edition (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).