Havana. August 12, 2005

The failed revolution

• Betraying the organizers of the September 4, 1933 movement of sergeants and enlisted men, Fulgencio Batista placed it at the service of the United States

BY JOAQUIN ORAMAS

DURING early 1933, Cuba was a country at war, in spite of the bloody repression unleashed by the Gerardo Machado dictatorship.

There were demonstrations, street meetings – known popularly as “lánganas” – student strikes; petards and other incendiary devices often exploded, attacks against members of the regime were carried out; the trade union movement was organizing strikes by workers and campesinos, especially those in the sugar, transportation, tobacco and agricultural sectors, and who together with the great masses of the unemployed, were shaking up the country.

At the time, poverty began to call on the doors of the mansions and luxury homes of Havana’s wealthy families. Cuba was one of the countries that suffered the most from the depression that led to the collapse of the U.S. economy in 1929. Its dependence on one single product – sugar – and a single market – the United States, to which Cuba sold more than 80% of its exportable goods – exacerbated the suffering from the crisis on the island.

As the country headed for a general strike organized by the Communist Party and other organizations, and on observing that the Cuban powder keg was about to explode, in early 1933 U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt decided to send Benjamin Sumner Welles to Cuba. Welles was deputy secretary of state for Latin American affairs at the time, and a personal friend of the president.

Among other things, the new ambassador came with instructions to prevent a revolution hostile to the interests of the U.S. administration. During his mandate, he would permit Machado to continue as president until May 20, 1935, the date ending the “term” to which he was elected – by himself – in 1928. The traditional politicians ran to lend their support to the mediator, and agreed to take part in the wheeling and dealing.

The University Student Directorate (DEU), Communist Party and the followers of Antonio Guiteras, among others, exposed the foreign intervention, denounced its imperialist goals, and intensified the revolutionary struggle.

On August 12, 1933, Gerardo Machado, overthrown by the actions of a large section of the Cuban people, fled to the Bahamas, accompanied by a number of his cronies. The previous day, the army high command, so faithful to its leader, had withdrawn its support for the dictator, ordering him to leave the country. Welles was not able to get General Alberto Herrera accepted as the new president; instead, a consensus was reached on the designation of Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, son of the national hero who led the first “Cry of Independence” on October 10, 1868.

Ambassador Welles managed to convert the son of the worthy patriot into a new puppet of the U.S. administration, which showed its support through U.S. Navy warships anchored in Havana’s port to intimidate the people and prevent any revolutionary action against the new order.

This unpopular government lasted for only 22 days, falling on September 4, 1933, after the popular unrest extended to the ranks of the army, which, as part of the social fabric, could not be immune to the ideas of struggle; its membership was divided up into right-wing and opposition groups and political parties. Existing discontent in the armed forces because of the low pay for soldiers, 24 pesos per month; the poor state of their barracks; insufficient clothing and shoes for troops; the delay in implementing a 1923 law giving sergeants the possibility of being promoted; the despotism of officers and racism – particularly toward Blacks; the ambitions to promotions that would be frustrated if an expected purge of the Army were carried out, were some of the reasons that unleashed the storm of September 4, 1933, out of sight of the control exercised by the Welles administration, and which led to Céspedes being removed from office.

The military conspiracy was initiated by Sergeant Pablo Rodríguez, company quartermaster and also president of the Enlisted Men’s Club. Rodríguez had obtained authorization to hold an assembly of sergeants and enlisted men at the Columbia Military Barracks. On the morning of September 4, the declaration took place with that barracks as its center. The coup, which was not a bloody one, obtained the immediate support of sergeants, cadets and soldiers from all the garrisons, where the most qualified person, even if only a corporal or lower officer, took command of the forces. The authority of all the top officers of the army and the navy were provisionally suspended.

The movement was sympathetically received by the people and progressive organizations.

Fulgencio Batista proceeded to take advantage of a trip to Matanzas by the conspiracy’s organizer, and using his characteristic craftiness, set himself up as chief of the new command, in which he rose quickly to general. His goal was to obtain Welles’ support, and he did so. The coup of September 4, 1933 brought change not only to the Army and its traditional structure, but also to the national political scene.

On September 5, the “Proclamation to the People of Cuba” was published, under the previous day’s date, signed by more than 15 civilians and just one soldier, Batista Zaldívar, whose signature was the only one accompanied by the title “chief sergeant of the Armed Forces of the Republic.” The document stipulated the convening of a constituent assembly and, among other things, announced that the “Cuban Revolutionary Grouping is taking power as the provisional Revolutionary Government.”

The Revolutionary Grouping agreed, at the time, to instigate a collegial form of government, for which it created an Executive Commission of five members.

“The Pentarchy,” as it was popularly known, disintegrated on September 10, having lasted just five days.

As soon as it was created, Pentarchy member Sergio Carbó, a journalist by profession, authorized – without the consent of anyone else – Sergeant Fulgencio Batista’s promotion to colonel, and he in turn proclaimed himself chief of the army.

The 100-day government emerged as an unexpected obstacle to Summer Welles’ objectives in Cuba, but was accepted as a lesser evil by U.S. officials in the light of unpredictable events.

Right when the U.S. envoy believed that he was about to fulfill all of his goals, the September 4, 1933 coup overturned an unpopular government.

Faced with the new situation, Washington immediately proposed eliminating those who had gotten in its way, by promoting a new puppet government and concretizing the instructions given to Welles. The U.S. line translated into refusing to diplomatically recognize what was called the 100 Days’ Government; sending a powerful fleet of 29 warships to Cuba to pressure the regime, encouraging the opposition and strengthening Welles’ position. It supported all the right-wing conspiracies; and initiated, developed and executed a reactionary military uprising, with the brand new Colonel Batista as its strongman in Cuba.

After the Pentarchy was dissolved on September 10, the Columbia Revolutionary Grouping or Junta agreed to designate Dr. Ramón Grau San Martín as the Republic’s maximum leader. That same day, Grau took office and designated a cabinet that included, among others, Antonio Guiteras, appointed Secretary of Government, who advocated revolutionary decree-laws entailing the beginning of changes in Cuban society. That worried the oligarchy and Washington, which sent Ambassador Jefferson Caffery to replace Welles.

On January 15, 1934 a military junta led by Fulgencio Batista forced Grau San Martín to resign, dissolving the 100 Days’ Government. One week later, the new U.S.-backed strongman imposed Colonel Carlos Mendieta.

A new era of military dictatorship had begun, imposed by Washington through its sergeant, who took over the September 4th Movement.

The Revolution of the 30s failed, as stated by Raúl Roa, one of its leaders and later the Foreign Minister of Dignity of the Revolutionary government, which made real all of its frustrated aspirations.

 

   
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