“An
Apocryphal Document: The Breackreazon Memo, also called Breckinridge’s”
By Rolando Rodríguez in Havana
For over a century there has been a document about the authenticity of which many a skirmish has been fought. The document in question is the purported letter or memo containing instructions supposedly given either by –according to some versions— the Assistant Secretary or –according to others— the Under-Secretary of the U.S. War Secretariat, respectively J. M. Breackreazon and J. C. Breckinridge, to a Lieutenant-General, J. S. Miles, the so-called Army Chief, in the form of orders pertaining to the campaign that he was to pursue in Cuba.
In that memo, the above-mentioned Breackreazon or Breckinridge, orders Miles to win the support of the Island’s colored people for a plebiscite to decide on annexation, to be convened, and furthermore asks for everything within the range of US cannons to be destroyed, as well as to carry to an extreme point the blockade, for hunger and pestilence to decimate the peaceful Cuban population and also to produce a decrease in the numbers of the Mambí Army. That Army should be constantly assigned exploration and vanguard tasks, so that it would suffer the weight of the war on two flanks. The whole memo also recommended diabolical actions of that nature in order to destroy the people of Cuba.
Why is it that this communiqué, in spite of its many dark points, has enjoyed such luck and been considered authentic by a considerable number of people, to the extent that many media and very strict historians have reproduced it in toto or partially, regardless of rather solid elements that deny its fidelity? It is a well-known fact that in the first few years of the 20th Century it was reproduced by the papers El Eco, in Holguín (Cuba), and Listín Diario, in Santo Domingo, both in 1908; in the compendium of Diario del Salvador, in 1911; El Día, in Valparaíso (Chili), on the following year, and by La Independencia, in Santiago de Cuba, in 1913. It was also noted by Emilio Roig de Leuchsenring, who Published it in 1912 in his work "Acotaciones Jurídicas. Los Estados Unidos y América Latina" (“Legal Marginal Notes: The United Status and Latin America”, in Revista Jurídica,[1] quoted from a work by Nicaraguan writer Alejandro Bermúdez, published in El Foro, of San José (Costa Rica) and also from Enrique Collazo, in his book La guerra de Cuba (War in Cuba).[2] Nevertheless, it must be noted that by then, this protagonist of our independence wars showed certain doubts about its authenticity “because of its nature and conditions, and also for (I) not having been able to see the original.” We believe that there has been one reason for so many re-publishings: US behavior vis-à-vis the Cuban case since the 19th Century and its annexionist intentions; additionally, its expansionism and interventionism in the Caribbean basin since then and, in not a small dose, its unruly policy of interference throughout all of Latin America. All this made the document earn certain appearance of probability and, above all, there was abundant desire to have it proven true in order to have the confessed, irrefutable proof of imperialist perversion.
Nevertheless, none of this allows to transform the document into an authentic one, and one might affirm that it was possibly elaborated between late 1897 and mid-1898 by friends of Spain, enemies of the Island’s independence, ready to maintain the domination of the metropolitan power and of the colonial regime. In the last analysis, to believe in the malicious essence that US policy towards Cuba has been for Cuba, this letter is unnecessary. The expansionism of the power of the North and, afterwards, its imperialism, have outdone the most merciless attempts to subject the Island. In spite of these, we Cubans have had sufficient bravery and gallantness to free ourselves from the awkward operations sometimes conceived to accomplish the burdensome designs expressed in well-trodden document.
Let us see the reasons that lead us to consider it apocryphal:
· The purported memo that should have been addressed, according to certain versions, by the Assistant Secretary, or, according to others, by the Under-Secretary of the U.S. War Secretariat, appears to have been written in very different ways on successive occasions: J. M Breackreazon, J. M. Breacseason, J. M. Breackseason, J. M. Breackreazón, J. C. Breekenridge, J. G. Brekenridge or J. C. Breckinridge; the name appeared written in all these ways, and there are even more.
·
· In 1934, in an article in the American Historical Review, Thomas M. Spaulding already pointed out that the letter, reproduced by Horatio Rubens en 1932 in his book Libertad: Cuba y su apóstol,[3] the source of which he does not quote, was addressed to J. C. Brekenridge with a "k" followed by "e" (in the Spanish version of Rubens’ work it appears as J. G.), to General J. S. Miles. But it happened that J. C. Breckinridge (with "ck" followed by "i") was Inspector-General of the US Army and not Under-Secretary nor Assistant Secretary of War. Both observations can be found in the book by War Secretary Russell A. Alger, The Spanih-american War.[4] The Under-Secretary was then George D. Meiklejohn. Spaulding, who confirms Breckinridge’s post, argued in all logic that, given his condition as Inspector-General of the Army, Breckinridge was second in the chain of command of that institution, and therefore this would thus be a counter-sense: a subordinate giving orders to his boss.
·
· A further reason argued by Spaulding was that, in the letter, Miles was addressed as Lieutenant-General, when at the time he was a Major-General. He would only earn the title of Lieutenant-General in 1900.[5] Another erroneous question that deserves to be straightened out is that the initials attributed to Miles are J. S., when those of Major-General were N. A., from Nelson A. In Rubens’ version, the letter is dated 24 December 1897.
·
· This letter had been reproduced 32 years before by Severo Gómez Núñez, in the third volume of his work La Guerra Hispano-Americana,[6] printed in Madrid in 1900. He says generically that it was published in Germany and that the version that he includes in his book was taken from the Havana daily La lucha, but he does not detail the journal’s date. A curious fact is that several anomalies can be noted: this letter is not signed by no one called Breckinrige nor Breckenridge, but by "J. M. Breackreazon", and follows the abbreviation "Asst. Sig."(Observe the wrong abbreviation “Sig.”) and it is addressed to “Lieutenant-General J. S. Miles”. Therefore, it is not only signed by another actor, but he erroneously notes Miles’ military rank and also uses initials that are not those of the name of the chief of the US Army. Furthermore, in the transcription, when noting the date of the letter, the month in which it was written is omitted, because it only says "24 of 1897". At the end of the letter, Gómez Núñez places the following comment: “US policy unmasked; comments are unnecessary, but let us ask: Will Europe consent to this crime?”, and it is signed by a purported “Doctor Johann Schullez”. In a different type-form, he adds, as if it were now the author’s comment: “It did consent!” It must be noted that if Gómez Núñez quotes as the source the daily La lucha, Cuban historian Gustavo Placer, in his work "Reflexiones sobre un documento controvertido",[7] states that in a search done at the Cuban History Institute, among the collections of 1898, 1899 and 1900 of this paper, the letter does not appear. Another element adding to the mystery around this controversial document. By the way, in an Internet search of a notable figure named Johann Schullez, no one appears; Johann Schulze does appear, but there are some 50 000 individuals with this name.
·
· This supposed memo was again reproduced five years later; that is,, in 1905, by Spanish historian Juan Ortega y Rubio, in his work Historia de la regencia de María Cristina de Habsbourg-Lorena, and he points out that it had appeared in the Berlin Allgmeine Zeit (Allmeigne Zeit or Zeitung, means “general diary”) on 22 April 1898.[8] Although Ortega y Rubio does not say exactly that he took it from that diary, he does lets us think that it was from there that he copied. One can note almost all the same anomalies with respect to Gómez Núñez: the letter is signed by "J. M. Breackreazón" (but this time he places an accent –a sign that does not exist in English— at the end of the name), transcribing the abbreviation as "Asst. Siy." (not "Sig", but "Siy"; it does not mean anything in English either) and again the letter is addressed to “Lieutenant General J. S. Miles”. Once again, in the transcription, when the date is noted on the letter, the month is omitted, and only "24 of 1897" appears. The big difference of Ortega y Rubio’s version with respect to that of Gómez Núñez, is that the commentary of the so-called Dr. Johann Schullez does not appear.
·
· In these conditions, through Cuba’s Embassy to Germany I requested the search of the letter in the so-called Allgmeine Zeit. I had to verify if it did not contain the same mistakes appeared in Gómez Núñez’s and Ortega y Rubio’s works. But if, on the contrary, it was discovered that it was addressed by “Assistant Secretary J. M. Breakcreazon" (with or without the accent) to Lieutenant-General J. S. Miles (not to N. A. Miles) and the month did not appear either, only "24 of 1897", we would be led to think that the document was a German fabrication, because that version would be the “original” one, the basis of all the others, and in its elaboration severe mistakes would have been made. The reason for this montage would then be related to the wishes of Kaiser Wilhelm II to assist Spain to avoid the danger of war with the US over Cuba, and to rally European support. After all, Germany was interested in placing the US in a bad position, because it was already clear that from the viewpoints of one and the other power that rivalry between them would sooner or later lead to an armed conflict. Confrontation around Samoa had already made it obvious. Furthermore, the German Navy wanted a base in the Caribbean and to that end was trying to acquire one in the Bay of Samaná in Santo Domingo. But the young power was opposed and was upholding to this end the Monroe Doctrine. The Teutonic nation considered this doctrine an insolence and an act of defiance on the part of the US. One of those who supported this thesis was none other than Prince Bismarck, whose words pronounced from his retreat at Friederichruhe, his estate en Eastern Prussia, were estimated as the Oracle of the Nibelungen. In fact, in 1897, only a few days after the US representative in Berlin explored vis-a-vis the Chancery the German position towards the possible annexation of Cuba in case of a war with Spain, to demonstrate that the matter was in the backburner, the old Iron Chancellor would make statements to the press about the Monroe Doctrine and, after showing his disdain towards it, he would say that North Americans believed that their wealth gave them the right to be a great power and to despise the independence of other American or European states.[9] Now, the Cuban embassy wrote to the Prussian Ibero-American Institute of Cultural Heritage and requested a research around the so-called Allgmeine Zeit. A reply was received, signed by the State Library in Berlin. On behalf of said library and of the Institute, the library director, Peter Alterkrüger, replied: "Unfortunately, among the existing titles that most closely resemble the requested one, [Allgmeine Zeit], the article was not found. There is scant probability that such a long article would have been printed in a diary of those days. It should possibly be from a magazine, but no article was found that would correspond to its bibliographical description or a similar one.” It must be noted that it cannot be a magazine, for Zeitung means, in German, diary, periodical. Therefore, one can almost affirm that such a journal never existed in Germany and that it was not there that the very hackneyed letter originated.
·
· Now then, I decided to follow another lead. According to Ortega y Rubio this letter was reproduced by El Fénix, of Sancti Spíritus, Cuba, organ of the local Autonomist Party. Indeed, the memo appears in said diary on 20 July 1898; that is, given the results of research in Germany, the earliest date that has turned up until now. In El Fénix it is said, of all things, that it reproduces the letter appeared on the date "24 of 1897" in the Berlin Allgmeine Zeit.[10] It is highly suspicious that this document of such importance for the Spanish cause would appear in a publication in the hinterlands of the Island and was not reproduced by the Havana papers Diario de la Marina or Unión Constitucional, or, as far as we know, in some diary in Madrid either. This is queer to such an extent that the Sancti Spiritus diary felt the need to explain that the document had reached its hands through “a series of casual occurrences”.[11] It is, on the other hand, highly curious that in Ortega y Rubio’s reproduction almost the same mistakes as in El Fenix’s transcription should have been followed: it appears addressed by "J. M. Breakcreazon" (although with no accent), to a "Lieutenant-General J. S. Miles” (not to Major General N. A. Miles) and the month does not appear either, just "24 of 1897". This time, however, the abbreviation “Sry” appears correctly to abbreviate Secretary; and, because El Fénix’s version (given the reply received from Germany) is the oldest known up to now. This makes us think that it was from here that Ortega y Rubio took it, with the same misprints. That is to say that El Fénix has almost exactly the same information of Ortega y Rubio and practically the same errors. However, there is one curious element: in the letter printed in the paper from Sancti Spíritus, appears the paragraph signed by the so-called Doctor Johann Schullez. This amounts to a call for Europe to support Spain. This, however, does not appear in the Spanish book.
·
· On 15 May 1913, in Washington, the Assistant Secretary of State acknowledged receipt, to the US Embassy in Havana, of a clipping from La Independencia, of Santiago de Cuba, and told its representative that, having consulted the War Secretariat, the latter assured that no consideration whatsoever should be given to the matter, and continued to inform that said Secretariat had already replied to the State Secretariat, on November 23 1908 and ll August 1911, and had cautioned that neither in the files of the Assistant Secretary nor in those of the Secretariat the purported instruction existed and that it lacked authenticity.[12]
·
· In 1926 appeared La guerra en Cuba, the posthumous book by Enrique Collazo, who had written it in 1912. In this version of the letter already very outstanding changes appear with respect to the versions of El Fénix, of Severo Gómez Núñez and of Ortega y Rubio: in the date, the month of December is included, and the one who signs is now J. C. Breckinridge (not Breckenridge). Also, although the wrong rank of Lieutenant-General is kept for Miles, his initials change, and the name appears as N. A. Miles. Among other changes one can detect the elimination of paragraphs, because someone might have thought convenient to –together with an effort to come closer to a certain veracity through the name changes— eliminate the instructions related to things that did not happen, or to eliminate the term "confederation", when referring to the US in one of the paragraphs, a term that no US authority would have used after the Civil War to refer to what in any case they called the Union. “Confederation” was a real heresy, because that had been the title of the rebel Southern State. Collazo says that he did not have the original in sight, so where did he take it from, then?
·
· I can state that in 1994 I searched in the Nacional Arquives in Washington D.C., in the branch of the War Secretariat as well as the Secretariat of State, until 1933, and did not find any copy of this document. One might argue that it was destroyed or not designated to be put to public knowledge, but I have found many documents that deserved to have been hidden and, nevertheless, there they were.
·
· Furthermore, the well-known and respected US historian Philip Foner, who worked hard and for many long years in the US National Arquives accepted, as we can see in his book La guerra hispano-cubano-norteamericana y el surgimiento del imperialismo yanqui, the dubious nature of said document.[13]
·
· It is argued, as a substantial argument, that Breckenridge might have writen the memo, because the US Library of Congress, where dozens of feet of documents of his family are deposited, those belonging to this actor show that he was an imperialist Conservative capable of writing such instructions. The only problem is that the famous text appears, in its oldest known version, written by a so-called J. M. Breackreazon. Besides, in any case, the last name would have been Breckinridge, as we have already seen.
·
Anyway, the argument that convinces me the most of its lack of authenticity is that the letter is out of context. Mariano Aramburo, celebrated as a man of letters and a linguist, President of the Cuban Academy of Language, member of the Academy of Arts and Letters, and of whom it is said that he is an authorized voice to be consulted when he assures that “the make and style [of the document] leave no margin of doubt about its authenticity"[1] might have known much of literature, but, as we will see, little of history. Furthermore, those who take his word for it must be reminded of his old autonomist affiliation, so it was convenient for him to believe in the writing’s veracity. But let us make an analysis of texts and contexts in relation to the document. To that end we will take off from the text of El Fénix, because it is the oldest known and also because after 1912 paragraphs were omitted.
It says: “This Secretariat, in agreement with that of Foreign Affairs and that of the Navy, believes itself obliged to complete the instructions that about the aspect of military organization in the coming Caribbean campaign have been given…”
Supposing that the letter was from 24 December 1897, because it must be remembered that in the 1898, 1900 y 1905 versions no month is noted:
The text speaks of a “Secretariat of Foreign Affairs”, and since the founding of the US that was the Secretariat of State or State Department. It would have been easier to translate Secretariat of State or Department than this Secretariat of Foreign Affairs.
At that date, the War Secretariat had not given instructions to draw up campaign plans in the Caribbean. One compelling sample of the initial state of preparations for an intervention in Cuba can be found in a memo from the assistant of the General Aide of the Army of that country, of 28 December 1897. In that memo, Colonel Arthur L. Wagner asked for authorization to send to Cuba two officers of the Military Intelligence Division to be acquainted with the situation of “enemy forces” because, if, as it well said that no efforts had been spared to find out its “numerical and battle strength”, there were questions pertaining to its “state of mind and efficiency” that could only be detailed through the analysis by members of its armed institution.[14] This document reveals that, still, the US Army needed to establish many particulars about the probable field of operations in Cuba, and therefore it cannot be said that it only needed to complete its instructions.
It must also be remembered that, at the time, the US was feverishly negotiating with Spain for the latter to leave Cuba without a war, through the purchase of the independence, of which the US would be guarantor, and this would have doubtlessly led to annexation.
It says that “the Caribbean problem appears under two aspects: one related to the Isle of Cuba and the other to Puerto Rico, as also our aspirations are different, as well as the policies that will be pursued towards them.”
In the first place, the military decision about the invasion of Puerto Rico was taken much later than December 1897; the difference in the treatment dealt to Cuba was only established in the Joint Resolution of 20 April 1898, and an Under-Secretary of War cannot express ideas about foreign policy as the ones that are outlined there in such a categorical way. These would be more akin to the Cabinet or to the President and they do not have to be included in instructions of a military nature to the head of the Army.
By the way, the paragraph on Puerto Rico states that “the civilian and ecclesiastical authorities that would remain at the occupied spots (...) would be invited to enter into our services.”
In the 1912 version, reproduced by Collazo, that text disappears because, as occupiers declared the separation on Church and State, they could not invite the ecclesiastical individuals to enter into their services. In other words, this version has already been manipulated.
Referring to Cuba, the letter gets into details such as the race ratio in the Isle; it judges its inhabitants and catalogues them as “indolent and apathetical” and, regarding their schooling, assures that there are to be found from the “the most refined” to “the grossest and abject kind of ignorance”. It adds that its people “are indifferent in religious matters and therefore the majority are immoral,” and also exhibit “very lively, very sensuous passions” while having “but vague notions of fair and unfair”. To complete the list of lovely things, it adds that “they are prone to procuring their enjoyments not through work but through violence”, and as a results of their “lack of morality, they despise human life.” A whole rosary of vices of the worst kind is thrown on the Cuban people.
This is not to say that some Saxon brain might not have valued thus –it will be seen— but what sense has this whole lengthy discourse in a memo of instructions about the military campaign? Would it not seem rather that there was an attempt to draft a text that would anger the inhabitants of Cuba vis-à-vis North Americans? Does this exposition of shortcomings not conform to the interests of the Isle’s autonomists in order to achieve the antipathy of Cubans towards North Americans at a time of war?
The document also instructs about Cuba: “Whatever is in the range of our cannons must be destroyed through iron and fire; the blockade must be carried to an extreme point, for hunger and pestilence, its constant companion, to decimate the peaceful Cuban population and also to produce a decrease in the numbers of its Army; and the allied army must be constantly assigned exploration and vanguard tasks, so that it would suffer the weight of the war on two flanks.”
Note the countersense. It refers to Cuba and speaks of “its army”, that is to say, the Spanish one, because after that it speaks of what would have been the hypothetical ally, the Cuban army. This language that takes the Spanish army as that of the island’s population seems to be a slip in which only the same Spaniards would incur, or the autonomists or Europeans favorable to Spain. Precisely, the US, in order to justify its intervention, would argue with maximum malice that the Spanish army was massacring the Cuban population; in other words, a population that was not its own. Something more. Remember that North Americans could only refer to the Cuban army as an allied one after Estrada Palma, without the knowledge of the Cuban Council of Government wrote, in April 1898 (four months after the supposed date of the letter) to McKinley in order to comunícate to him that the Republic of Cuba would instruct its generals to execute the plans of the North American chiefs and in the light of which, vis-à-vis the fait accompli, was confirmed on 12 May 1898 by the Council of Government.[15]
Now comes a jewel. It says: “The most convenient base of operations would be Santiago de Cuba and the Eastern Department..."
This is a practically impossible precision, because trustworthy documents prove that, by that date, at the War Secretariat there was no idea of the campaign plan to be developed and when the Maine has not reached a Cuban port, something it would only do on 25 January 1898. Even after the explosion of the vessel, on 15 February 1989, regular units of the US Army (they only had slightly over 28 000 men at the time) [16] were disseminated in the wide territory of the Union and reserves had not been called to arms. It must be borne in mind that it was only on 6 March of that year that McKinley convened Senator Cannon, Chairman of the Means and Arbitration Committee of the Senate to his office and told him that although he was doing his best to avoid the war, it would come and he needed money to prepare for it. And he then made a revealing comment: who knows where this conflict might lead them?, because it could go beyond a confrontation with Spain; in other words, with Europe. This apprehension was manifest when Cannon suggested to the President that he should send Congress a message with the request for funds. The man from Ohio refused to do so because, as he argued, he was still negotiating with Spain, and Europe might interpret such a request as a declaration of war, and he would be accused of exhibiting a sly conduct. At last Cannon agreed to pose the issue of credit as his own personal idea, and immediately the chief of the White House noted down on a piece of paper the figure he wished, US$ 50 million. [17] At that time General Miles insisted on mobilizing troops into camps in order to discipline them, arm them, uniform them and duly instruct them.[18] More yet, in the first plan traced by Miles, due to the fear of casualties that they calculated yellow fever would cause, it was recommended to await until the dry season, in November, to invade Cuba. Meanwhile, the only action of consideration that would be undertaken would be the landing at Tunas de Zaza of some 6 000 men, who would march to meet Gómez and his forces, with the goal of giving them equipments and food provisions, and they would return immediately to the beach to re-embark. On the other hand, the War Secretary, Russell A. Alger, wanted to prepare voluntary forces for an immediate landing in the largest of the Caribbean isles [19], and, to promote the support of participants in the insurrection, he entrusted in April a Lieutenant of the Division of Military Intelligence, Andrew S. Rowan, with the task of going to Cuba to take a (verbal) message to Calixto García, in Oriente, about the need for the Cuban Liberating Army to cooperate in the actions of US forces.[20] Rowan only got to the General from Holguin on May 1st. As Gustavo Placer rightly points to in his above-mentioned work, [21] only the US Navy had previous movement plans. In fact, it was on the day of the naval victory at Cavite, this same May 1st, that McKinley convened Long and Alger, the Secretaries of the Navy and War; Miles by the Army and Admiral Sicard by the Navy, and argued in favor of the immediate invasion of Cuba, and Miles objected on the grounds of his fears concerning yellow fever and ignorance about the position of Cervera’s fleet. But after the debate, it was decided to disembark a force of 40 000 or 50 000 men at Mariel to begin the attack on Havana.[22] To that end, instructions were sent to General Ruffus Shafter, who was desperately trying to organize one of the eight bodies of the Army that it was decided to set up with a view to having them leave immediately for Cuba and to capture the chosen port.[23] Miles, concerned that those orders were out of the blue, succeeded in having McKinley approve the postponement of the departure until 16 May 1898. What made him change his plans and move to the Eastern capital the focus of military operations was the unexpected arrival of Cervera’s fleet to Santiago de Cuba on 19 May. Apparently by mid-May, while progress was made on the decision to send the expeditionary force to Santiago de Cuba, McKinley made another one: Puerto Rico would be occupied to establish there a permanent colonial government.[24] As we see, it is absurd to speak of military plans by December 1897.
The memo adds, furthermore, that from the Eastern Department the “slow invasion through the Camagüey” could be monitored, and simultaneously “a numerous army would be sent to the Pinar del Río Province” with the aim of completing the sea blockade of Havana “with its land ring”, but its true mission would be only to prevent the Spaniards from continuing to occupy the interior, “for, given the conditions of impregnability of Havana” it would not be convenient to be exposed to “painful deaths.”
Curiously, vis-a-vis such a detailed plan as the one contained in this letter, it was only after May 19 1998 that Miles would present War Secretary Alger an operations plan consisting in a landing of the troops to the south of Oriente, and after having destroyed the Spanish fleet through cannon shots, to make US forces converge with those of Calixto García and to march towards Las Villas to meet Máximo Gómez, who would be conveniently supplied. Later on, there would be a disembarkment at Mariel or Matanzas or even closer to the isle’s capital to fight the final battle there. This is totally contrary to what is stated in the memo, that, by the way, does not say how it could be that without this battle –more so: avoiding it— would they be able to make the Spaniards surrender.
A few hours after having presented this project, Miles proposed a different one. First they would disembark in Puerto Rico and Santiago de Cuba. Once having captured those objectives, they would begin to take the ports from the East to the West of the island and to supply the Mabises with all sorts of resources. In this way, jointly with all of Gómez’ and Garcia’s forces, they would advance to the whereabouts of Santa Clara. Lastly, the occupation of the isle would be completed through the landing of troops in the West.[25] This plan was rejected: the rallying point was, without discussion, Santiago de Cuba, where Cervera’s fleet was since 19 May. The order was quickly given to Shafter to leave with his army corps in the direction of the South of Oriente.
Later on, the letter argues: “Once the regular Spanish forces have been dominated and withdrawn, an indefinite span of time will follow devoted to partial pacifying, during which we will continue to militarily occupy the whole country, supporting, with our bayonets, the Independent Government to be formed, at least informally, while it is a minority entity in the country. Terror on the one hand, and convenience itself on the other, will determine that this minority will strengthen and balance its forces, thus turning into a minority the autonomist element and the Spaniards that would choose to remain in the country.”
Perhaps this paragraph, as few others, will give a clue about the origin of the memo. It proclaims that pro-independence forces were a minority. Who would say something like that, besides the autonomists and the Spaniards on the island? North Americans knew quite well, through the reports of Consul Fitzhugh Lee, that the pro-independence forces were not the minority of the people of the isle. On the other hand, with what right? Issuing from where? would an Under-Secretary dare trace such a plan that would be, in any case, a matter for his government? Furthermore, why would he show this to the head of the Army? What was his need? Much less, to write it down. As McKinley’s plan would prove beyond a doubt, and as was much later reflected in the April discussion of the joint resolution, the President never had the least interest in acknowledging and less yet of installing, provisionally or otherwise, a pro-independence Cuban government. Almost from this paragraph on it can be deducted that the autonomist pen had traced the text: they were majority. One can be certain that at this stage of the game, only they could dream to think so or, at least, to affirm it.
Furthermore, it says: "The probable time to start the campaign will be next October; but it will be convenient to employ the maximum activity to finalize, to the smallest detail when it refers to recruiting, organization, mobilization, armament and collection of supplies for eating and war, and gathering of means of transportation, according to the already agreed instructions, and sent to you, in order to be ready, in the contingency that we should be obliged to precipitate developments to annul the development of the autonomist movement that might annihilate the separatist movement.”
Of course, the campaign began on 14 June 1898, with the disembarkment on the south of Oriente, not in October. It is possible that the person who drafted the false letter would have written it in May, before the beginning of land operations in Cuba, but if he would have done it in late June or even after the surrender of Santiago de Cuba, he would have counted on the fact that Spain would not sue for peace almost immediately after the fall of that city, but that the combats would continue on the rest of the Island with the invasion towards the West. With respect to all the rest that is affirmed, as we previously expounded on, in December 1997 there were no such instructions sent to Miles. Anyway, the best part of the paragraph is when it alludes to the possibility that the autonomist movement might “annihilate the separatist movement.” This fantasy could only be written by autonomists. On 8 January 1898, Consul Lee had written to Under-Secretary of State William R. Day: "autonomy not cutting any ice",[26] and had repeated it in such a public way that Cangosto, secretary of the government-general of the Isle, asked for clarifications about this statement.[27] Not even the indescribable Dupuy de Lôme, Spanish Minister in Washington, in his letter to journalist Canalejas, dared affirm it. As for the Spaniards –perhaps less than for Oversees Minister Segismundo Moret- the autonomist alternative was by this time a mere fig leaf to try to contain the pressure from Washington. This statement is simply ridiculous and it practically amounts to the signature of the authors of the memo.
Concluding:
In all evidence, the original of this document is the version appeared in El Fénix. It is the oldest known and thus any analysis should begin there. Afterwards, those of Severo Gómez Núñez and Ortega y Rubio would appear. Thanks to the three versions and its errors we can affirm that the letter is totally apocryphal and that, on the road, and at a given time, essential data were changed to try to bring it closer to the truth: one Breackreazon, of whom the least indication did not exist in the War Secretariat, turned into Breckinridge or Breckendrigde, and initials J. S. –that mean nothing— were metamorphosed into the true initials of Major General Miles; that is, N. A. This should have been done by someone between 1905 (Ortega y Rubio’s version) and 1912 (Collazo’s version). In other words, a last name was sought that at least was known to exist at the Secretariat of War, and the initials of Major General Miles were changed. But in all certainty, the person who made the modifications ignored that on the supposed date of the memo, Miles’ military rank was that of Major General and not Lieutenant-General and therefore kept it. But in any case, one must insist on the fact that the largest evidence of the apocryphal nature lies in the text of the letter itself.
Even if countering every possibility by what the German Library affirmed, the so-called Allgmeine Zeit would surface, there would be no doubt that the letter would be no more than a German montage, to support Spain’s effort to put the US in a bad situation vis-à-vis Europe.
I reiterate that I am inclined to believe that the montage was fabricated at Sancti Spíritus, after the outbreak of the war, possibly between May and July 1898, perhaps under the wing of the former Coronel of the Ten Years’ War, conspicuous Marcos García, against whom Martí had so many reservations and who was designated, under the autonomic regime, firstly Major of Sancti Spíritus and later Governor of Las Villas province, when the war had already exploded. I believe that this memo was never written at the War Secretariat in Washington, although later facts would demonstrate that the extreme malevolence in the attitude of the United States vis-à-vis Cuba, coming from way back, made the letter worthy of being legitimate.
It must be borne in mind that from the early XIX century strong annexionist currents were manifest among the power groups in the US, in its very Congress, government and media, towards the Island. In November 1805, Thomas Jefferson went as far as to tell Anthony Merry, British representative to the US: "Possession of the Island of Cuba is necessary for the defense of Louisiana and Florida because it is the Key of the Gulf",[28] and twice in 1823 designs on the Isle were made evident, via the Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams: firstly, through the theory that Cuba, separated from Spain, would, as a ripe fruit, forcibly fall in the lap of the US” and also by virtue of the Monroe Doctrine. At the same time, actions were pursued to prevent the Island from turning independent owing to Latin American solidarity, from Bolívar as well as from Mexico.
As years went by, to US geo-political ambitions on the largest of the Antilles was added the weight of the slave regime in the South of that nation, in a continuous need of expansion, and there were not few attempts to buy the Isle, carried out by several US governments. This pretense was best expressed in 1854, in the Ostende Manifest, through which three US diplomats, meeting by instructions from the State Department, fixed US thought vis-à-vis Cuba: “Most certainly –they said— the Union could never rest, nor conquer a true security, while Cuba remains beyond its borders”.[29]
When the Ten Years’ War broke out, US governments not only did not give the least support to the Cuban struggle, but hindered it in every possible way. If Cuba was not to be the property of scantly threatening Spain, it should belong to the US. Then, during the Independence War, the governments of Cleveland and McKinley again adopted a posture contrary to Cuba’s redemption. Other additional reasons that moved the US at this stage to abstain from supporting the struggle of the Island’s sons, but to try to annex it instead, would be expressed by Henry Cabot Lodge, an unflinching imperialist, who would write in Forum magazine: "From the Rio Grand to the Artic Ocean there should be but one flag and one country (...) England has sprinkled the Caribbean with strongholds that are a permanent threat for our Atlantic coastline. On those islands we should have at least one strong naval station, and when the Nicaraguan Canal is built, the Isle of Cuba, still lightly populated and endowed with almost unlimited fertility, would become a need for us".[30]
A convincing datum about the will of the White House to capture Cuba would be revealed, on 29 June 1897, by the Tribune, the paper directed by Whitelaw Reid, courtly adviser to McKinley and almost his spokesman. In an article, he affirmed that, for 75 years, the US had favored the annexation of the largest of the Antilles and finally believed it to be inevitable.[31] Reid’s intimate connexion to McKinley leaves no doubt that public opinion was being prepared for the foreseen eventuality.
In the same hungry sense, General Steward L. Woodford, a personal friend of McKinley’s, US Minister to Spain, would write to Dear Mr. President, on 17 October de 1897: "Peace [in Cuba] might give rise to annexation as a necessary ends result. I hope that annexation will no occur until Cubans have learned how to govern themselves, or until enough North Americans have traveled there to create a firm and intelligent citizenship".[32]
On the other hand, the US Consul in Havana, Fitzhugh Lee, informed Washington at the time that when peace arrived, and the Island would have been purified by the presence of a sufficient number of its intelligent and enterprising citizens, men educated in the institutions of democracy, transformed into the country’s spine, and the rest of the indigenous population would be quickly Americanized, then the acceptance to annexation would come.
Cubans would be shocked to learn that in McKinley’s words to Congress in April 1898, he had requested authorization to use US armed forces to remove Spain from Cuba, and there he stated “the use of hostile measures against both warring parties”;[33] in other words, to consider Spaniards as well as Cubans the enemy.
Around the famous memo it is also timely to recall that when the US was unavoidably interested in the cooperation of the experienced and war-hardened Liberation Army, its media lauded the heroic character of the Mambises; but when the victory was at hand, the brave Cuban fighters began to be presented in another light. Then, many of the correspondents who had come to the war painted them in the most horrendous colors, and this was to be swallowed by a majority non-critical public, trained to believe, without blinking, what the media said, and that Cuba might be absorbed without protests. Suddenly, the image created around the rebel soldier was that of an assassin, a bandit that would kill with one blow 50 prisoners, as the Journal of New York accredited,[34] adding that they robbed supplies and took backpacks from dead bodies and fled in the midst of the fight. Furthermore, he was a lazy and bad ally that had refused to assist US troops to open roads or dig trenches.[35] Any vilification whatsoever could be attributed to him.
The bad opinion about the Mambises went as far as high-ranking US chiefs. Facing the threat of a bombing against Santiago de Cuba, in the course of the war, and when foreigners were allowed to leave the city, General Shafter, chief of disembarked US forces, took the liberty of instructing Calixto García that Cuban troops should avoid injuring in any way the evacuated individuals, [36] something that the big Cuban knew how to answer appropriately.
It is also impossible to leave aside the fact that Theodore Roosevelt, then 2nd chief of the Rough Riders and future US President, with the purpose of reviling Mambí soldiers, would write about his “allies”: “Cuban soldiers were mostly Black and Mulattoes and were dressed in rags and armed with all sorts of old rifles. They were totally incapable of facing a serious combat or of sustaining themselves against a very inferior number of Spanish troops, but we expected to use them as explorers and in skirmishes. For various reasons, it was proven (...) that not one Cuban should have been in the US Army. They did not play literally any role, while turning into a source of problems and impedimenta, and consumed many supplies".[37] These insults, rotund and false, a product of the brains of such an outstanding imperialist, self-appointed as a member of a superior race, forgot that these brave combatants were probably the ones that prevented the Spanish troops from pushing US troops into the sea. This has been acknowledged, among others, by Spanish generals Linares and Pando.
We must also bear in mind the words of General Samuel Young, who made the campaign of Santiago de Cuba, referring to the insurgents as "degenerates, totally devoid of honor and gratitude” and “as incapable of self-government as the savages of Africa”.[38]
Once the Spanish-Cuban-American war ended, the issue of annexation again came to the forefront. The General of volunteers, Leonard Wood, was designated to head the Eastern Department, occupied by US troops. In a letter to War Secretary, Alger, Wood would say: “On the other hand, we consider that the Governor of Cuba should be a civilian, a businessman who knows the customs and needs of the people, fluent in Spanish, sensible, a man of integrity, honorable and enjoying the esteem of North Americans and foreigners. The example of such a man would push forward annexation, short of which every Spanish, Cuban or foreign owner agrees that there will be no durable prosperity. The Marquis of Pinar del Río, one of the richest and most influential men in Cuba is actually in New York. He came to Havana as a poor child, he obtained his title, has been a representative to Spanish Courts about twenty times and has an outstanding level of information. He believes that annexation is the only path towards prosperity.” [39]
Who was the individual proponed by General Word to be Governor of the Island? None other than Leopoldo Carvajal, a Spaniard, big owner of cigar factories and, listen well, former Coronel of Volunteers and ex President of the Constitutional Union Party. None other and none less!
In the summer of 1899, when Republican senator Chauncey Depew once again expounded on his –unfortunately, expansionist— viewpoints, he declared that soon migration to Cuba from the country to its North would increase to such an extent that the majority of the population would be, consequently, North American.[40]
On the other hand, Robert P. Porter, McKinley’s Special Commissioner and the Treasury Secretariat for Cuba and Puerto Rico, would note at the time: “The task of final absorption might require a whole generation, but it will surely come. Once annexed, Cuba will turn into an English-speaking country...".[41] Something similar would be said by Richard B. Olney, former Secretary of State for President Cleveland, Wall Street lawyer and financier, closely linked to business sectors in the US, who proponed to turn Cuba legally into what he considered already was in fact: a territory of the Union.[42] He considered that acquisition as necessary and unavoidable for the US.[43] By the way, former President Cleveland, who earlier favored keeping Cuba under the Spanish yoke, now supported the view that Cuba was not even prepared to be immediately annexed to become a state, a territory or a colony of the US. He thought, with a racist and pejorative viewpoint, that it should experience a prior ethnic cleansing.[44]
Under US intervention of almost three years maximum efforts were made for Cuba to accept annexation or, at least, US indirect rule. Cuban resistance was obstinate, until at last came the imposition of the Platt Amendment that would allow, among other humiliations, for the possible permanent intervention of US troops on the Isle, as well as the compulsory setting up of coal provision bases for the fleet of the Northern power and, already in full 20th Century, more than once the boots of US soldiers tread on Cuban soil, made the Island’s governments dependent on sneezes in Washington to blow noses in Havana, constituted the support beam for the tyrannies of Machado and Batista and, meanwhile, with an enormous appetite, its capitals would capture the best servings of the Island’s wealth and constitute the Cuban neo-colony. These, and another long list of vexations and offenses would gradually create a considerable amount of resentment in the Cuban people and would allow for no one to be surprised that the terms of the notorious letter or memo might have been true.
Every element and paragraph previously taken from the memo and many other fragments of Cuban history would suffice to argue in favor of the credibility that the Breackreazon document was so widely attributed. But, furthermore, if this document is not a legitimate one, it is, on the other hand, unnecessary to prove the wicked role of US imperialism in our history, and no one can affirm that we used those crooked elements to document our truths.
REFERENCES
[1] Revista Jurídica, La Habana, año I, vol. II, octubre de 1912, pp. 358
y ss.
[2] Enrique Collazo, La guerra de Cuba, Casa Editora Librería Cervantes,
La Habana, 1926, p. 186 y ss.
[3] Horatio Rubens: Libertad; Cuba y su Apóstol, La Rosa Blanca, La
Habana, 1956, 296 y ss.
[4] Russell A. Alger: The Spanish-American War, Harper & Brothers
Publishers, New York, 1901, pág. 8.
[5] American Historical Review, vol XXXIX, abril de 1934, pp. 485 y ss.
[6] Severo Gómez Núñez: La Guerra Hispano Americana, Imprenta del Cuerpo
de Artillería, tomo III, 1900, pp. 189 y ss.
[7] Departamento de Historia Militar, del Instituto de Historia de Cuba:
Boletín de historia militar, pp. 62 y ss.
[8] Juan Ortega y Rubio: Historia de la regencia de María Cristina de
Habsbourg-Lorena, tomo III, Imprenta, Litografía y Casa Editorial de
Felipe González Rojas, Madrid, 1905, pp. 439 y ss.
[9] "De White, Berlín, a Sherman, secretaría de Estado", 19 de octubre de
1897. National Archives of United States (US/NA), Record Group (RG) 59,
General Record of the State Department, Diplomatic Dispatches, Germany,
vol. 64.,
[10] El Fénix, 20 de julio de 1898. Archivo Provincial de Sancti Spíritus.
[11] Ibíd.
[12] National Archives & Record Services (NA & RS): Microcopy 509 roll 1,
Archivos del Departamento de Estado relativos a las relaciones políticas
entre los Estados Unidos y Cuba.
[13] Philip Foner: La guerra hispano-cubano-norteamericana y el
surgimiento del imperialismo yanqui, Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, La
Habana, 1978, volumen 1, pág. 268, nota.
[14] "Memorándum de Arthur L. Wagner, asistente del ayudante general", de
28 de diciembre de 1897. US/NA, RG 296, War College Division, General
correspondence, no. 6821.
[15] Actas de las asambleas de representantes y del Consejo de Gobierno
durante la Guerra de Independencia, Imprenta El Siglo XX, La Habana, 1933,
t. IV, p. 56.
[16] "Report of the Comission Appointed by the President to Investigate
the Conduct of the War Department in the War with Spain ", Washington ,
1899, p. 9. US/NA, RG 107, Office of Secretary of War, General
Correspondence.
[17] Walter Millis: The Martial Spirit, The Viking Press, New York , 1930,
pp. 115 y 116.
[18] Ibíd., p. 153.
[19] Ibíd., p. 154.
[20] "De Rowan al Adjutant General", 27 de junio de 1898. US/NA RG 296,
War College Division, General Correspondence, doc. 6 821; Philip Foner,
op. cit., vol. II, p. 6.
[21] Departamento de Historia Militar del Instituto de Historia de Cuba,
Boletín cit., pp. 62 y ss.
[22] Russell A. Alger, op. cit., p. 46; G.J.A. O'toole: The Spanish War,
W.W. Norton and Co., New York, London. s/f., p. 199; Walter Millis, op.
cit., p. 207.
[23] Russell A. Alger, op. cit., p. 47.
[24] Walter Millis, op. cit., p. 226.
[25] Ibíd., p. 51 y 52.
[26] "De Lee a Day", 8 de enero de 1898. NA & RS, microcopy T-20, roll
131.
[27] "De Cangosto a Lee", 11 de enero de 1898. Archivo Histórico Nacional,
España, sección de Ultramar, leg. 4963, expte. 552.
[28] Citado por Jesús Pabón: Días de ayer, Barcelona, 1963, p. 146.
[29] Donald Barr Chidsey: La guerra hispano-americana; 1896-1898,
Barcelona-México D.F., 1973, p. 175.
[30] Herminio Portell Vilá: Historia de la guerra de Cuba y sus
relaciones con los Estados Unidos y España, Jesús Montero Editor, La
Habana, 1941, pp. 43 y 44
[31] David Healy: US Expansionism; the Imperialist Urge in the 1890s. The
University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1976, p. 50.
[32] "De Woodford a McKinley", 17 de octubre de 1897. NA & RS, microcopy
31, roll 123.
[33] "Mensaje del presidente McKinley al Congreso de Estados Unidos", de
11 de abril de 1898. Foreign Relations of the United States , Diplomatic
Papers, 1898. United States Government Printig Office , Washington , 1899.
[34] "De Alger a Shafter", 6 de julio de 1898. US/NA, RG 94, no. 203 045.
[35] "De Estrada Palma a Calixto García", 23 de julio de 1898. Archivo
Nacional de Cuba (ANC), Copiador de correspondencia de la Delegación de
Nueva York, del Partido Revolucionario Cubano, t. 18, sigt. 26.
[36] Aníbal Escalante Beatón: Calixto García; su campaña en el 95,
Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, La Habana, 1978, p. 591.
[37] Fitzhugh Lee y otros: Cuba's Struggle Against Spain, The American
Historical Press, New York, 1899, p. 645.
[38] Walter Millis, op. cit., p. 362.
[39] "De Wood a Alger, 19 de enero de 1899". US/NA, RG 350, General
Records 1898-1945, caja 33.
[40] Diario de la Marina, 21 de junio de 1899.
[41] Robert P. Porter: Industrial Cuba, Young People´s Missionary
Movement of the United States y Canada, New York, 1899, p. 44.
[42] Philip Foner, op. cit., vol II, p. 208
[43] David Healy, op. cit., p. 55.
[44] Herminio Portell Vilá, t. IV, op. cit., p. 72.
[1]. Mariano Aramburu: Doctrinas jurídicas, Cuba intelectual, La Habana,
1916, p. 158.