The ANC and the government must meet
to negotiate an effective political settlement

LETTER FROM PRISON TO PRESIDENT P.W. BOTHA
JULY 1989
by Nelson Mandela

Prior to a July 5, 1989, meeting with then South African president P.W. Botha, Mandela drafted the following declaration. Made public at the end of January 1990, it was the first major statement released by Mandela since his trial by the apartheid regime on "sabotage" charges in 1964. The text was made available by the ANC.

THE DEEPENING political crisis in our country has been a matter of grave concern to me for quite some time, and I now consider it necessary in the national interest for the African National Congress and the government to meet urgently to negotiate an effective political settlement.

At the outset I must point out that I make this move without consultation with the ANC. I am a loyal and disciplined member of the ANC. My political loyalty is owed primarily, if not exclusively, to this organization and particularly to our Lusaka headquarters, where the official leadership is stationed and from where our affairs are directed.

In the normal course of events, I would put my views to the organization first, and if these views were accepted, the organization would then decide on who were the best qualified members to handle the matter on its behalf and on exactly when to make the move. But in the current circumstances I cannot follow this course, and this is the only reason why I am acting on my own initiative, in the hope that the organization will, in due course, endorse my action.

I must stress that no prisoner, irrespective of his status or influence, can conduct negotiations of this nature from prison. In our special situation, negotiation on political matters is literally a matter of life and death, which requires to be handled by the organization itself through its appointed representatives.

The step I am taking should, therefore, not be seen as the beginning of actual negotiations between the government and the ANC. My task is a very limited one, and that is to bring the country's two major political bodies to the negotiating table.

I must further point out that the question of my release from prison is not an issue, at least at this stage of the discussions, and I am certainly not asking to be freed. But I do hope that the government will, as soon as possible, give me the opportunity from my present quarters to sound the views of my colleagues inside and outside the country on this move. Only if this initiative is formally endorsed by the ANC will it have any significance.

I will touch presently on some of the problems which seem to constitute an obstacle to a meeting between the ANC and the government. But I must emphasize right at this stage that this step is not a response to the call by the government on ANC leaders to declare whether or not they are nationalists and to renounce the South African Communist Party [SACP] before there can be negotiations. No self-respecting freedom fighter will take orders from the government on how to wage the freedom struggle against that same government and on who his allies in the freedom struggle should be.

To obey such instructions would be a violation of the long-standing and fruitful solidarity which distinguishes our liberation movement, and a betrayal of those who have worked so closely and suffered so much with us for almost seventy years. Far from responding to that call, my intervention is influenced by purely domestic issues, by the civil strife and ruin into which the country is now sliding. I am disturbed, as many other South Africans no doubt are, by the specter of a South Africa split into two hostile camps—blacks (the term blacks is used in a broad sense to include all those who are not whites) on one side and whites on the other—slaughtering one another; by acute tensions which are building up dangerously in practically every sphere of our lives—a situation which, in turn, preshadows more violent clashes in the days ahead. This is the crisis that has forced me to act.

I must add that the purpose of this discussion is not only to urge the government to talk to the ANC, but it is also to acquaint you with the views current among blacks, especially those in the Mass Democratic Movement.'

If I am unable to express these views frankly and freely, you will never know how the majority of South Africans think on the policy and actions of the government; you will never know how to deal with their grievances and demands. It is perhaps proper to remind you that the media here and abroad has given certain public figures in this country a rather negative image, not only in regard to human rights questions, but also in respect to their prescriptive stance when dealing with black leaders generally.

The impression is shared not only by the vast majority of blacks but also by a substantial section of the whites. If I had allowed myself to be influenced by this impression, I would not even have thought of making this move. Nevertheless, I have come here with an open mind, and the impression I will carry away from this meeting will be determined almost exclusively by the manner in which you respond to my proposal.

It is in this spirit that I have undertaken this mission, and I sincerely hope that nothing will be done or said here that will force me to revise my views on this aspect.

I have already indicated that I propose to deal with some of the obstacles to a meeting between the government and the ANC. The government gives several reasons why it will not negotiate with us. However, for purposes of this discussion, I will confine myself to only three main demands set by the government as a precondition for negotiations, namely that the ANC must first renounce violence, break with the SACP, and abandon its demand for majority rule.

The position of the ANC on the question of violence is very simple. The organization has no vested interest in violence. It abhors any action which may cause loss of life, destruction of property, and misery to the people. It has worked long and patiently for a South Africa of common values and for an undivided and peaceful nonracial state. But we consider the armed struggle a legitimate form of self-defense against a morally repugnant system of government, which will not allow even peaceful forms of protest.

It is more than ironical that it should be the government which demands that we should renounce violence. The government knows only too well that there is not a single political organization in this country, inside and outside Parliament, which can ever compare with the ANC in its total commitment to peaceful change.

Right from the early days of its history, the organization diligently sought peaceful solutions and, to that extent, it talked patiently to successive South African governments, a policy we tried to follow in dealing with the present government.

Not only did the government ignore our demands for a meeting; instead it took advantage of our commitment to a nonviolent struggle and unleashed the most violent form of racial oppression this country has ever seen. It stripped us of all basic human rights, outlawed our organizations, and barred all channels of peaceful resistance. It met our demands with force and, despite the grave problems facing the country, it continues to refuse to talk to us. There can only be one answer to this challenge: violent forms of struggle.

Down the years oppressed people have fought for their birthright by peaceful means, where that was possible, and through force, where peaceful channels were closed. The history of this country also confirms this vital lesson. Africans as well as Afrikaners were, at one time or other, compelled to take up arms in defense of their freedom against British imperialism. The fact that both were finally defeated by superior arms, and by the vast resources of that empire, does not negate this lesson.

But from what has happened in South Africa during the last forty years, we must conclude that now that the roles are reversed—and the Afrikaner is no longer a freedom fighter, but is in power—the entire lesson of history must be brushed aside. Not even a disciplined nonviolent protest will now be tolerated. To the government a black man has neither a just cause to espouse nor freedom rights to defend. The whites must have the monopoly of political power, and of committing violence against innocent and defenseless people. That situation was totally unacceptable to us and the formation of Umkhonto we Sizwe was intended to end that monopoly, and to forcibly bring home to the government that the oppressed people of this country were prepared to stand up and defend themselves.2

It is significant to note that throughout the past four decades, and more especially over the last twenty-six years, the government has met our demands with force only and has done hardly anything to create a suitable climate for dialogue. On the contrary, the government continues to govern with a heavy hand and to incite whites against negotiation with the ANC. The publication of the booklet Talking with the ANC ... , which completely distorts the history and policy of the ANC; the extremely offensive language used by government spokesmen against freedom fighters; and the intimidation of whites who want to hear the views of the ANC at firsthand are all part of the government's strategy to wreck meaningful dialogue.

It is perfectly clear on the facts that the refusal of the ANC to renounce violence is not the real problem facing the government. The truth is that the government is not yet ready for negotiation and for the sharing of political power with blacks. It is still committed to white domination and, for that reason, it will only tolerate those blacks who are willing to serve on its apartheid structures. Its policy is to remove from the political scene blacks who refuse to conform, who reject white supremacy and its apartheid structures, and who insist on equal rights with whites.

This is the real reason for the government's refusal to talk to us, and for its demand that we should disarm ourselves while it continues to use violence against our people. This is the reason for its massive propaganda campaign to discredit the ANC and present it to the public as a communist-dominated organization bent on murder and destruction. In this situation the reaction of the oppressed people is clearly predictable.

White South Africa must accept the plain fact that the ANC will not suspend, to say nothing of abandoning, the armed struggle until the government shows its willingness to surrender the monopoly of political power and to negotiate directly and in good faith with the acknowledged black leaders. The renunciation of violence by either the government or the ANC should not be a precondition to, but the result of, negotiation.

Moreover, by ignoring credible black leaders and imposing a succession of stillborn negotiation structures, the government is not only squandering the country's precious resources, but it is in fact discrediting the negotiation process itself and prolonging civil strife. The position of the ANC on the question of violence is, therefore, very clear. A government which used violence against blacks many years before we took up arms has no right whatsoever to call on us to lay down arms.

I have already pointed out that no self-respecting freedom fighter will allow the government to prescribe who his allies in the freedom struggle should be, and that to obey such instructions would be a betrayal of those who have suffered repression with us for so long.

We equally reject the charge that the ANC is dominated by the SACP, and we regard the accusation as part of the smear campaign the government is waging against us. The accusation has, in effect, also been refuted by two totally independent sources. In

January 1987 the American State Department published a report on the activities of the SACP in this country, which contrasts very sharply with the subjective picture the government has tried to paint against us over the years.

The essence of that report is that, although the influence of the SACP on the ANC is strong, it is unlikely that the party will ever dominate the ANC.

The same point is made somewhat differently by Mr. Ismail Omar, member of the President's Council, in his book Reform in Crisis, published in 1988, in which he gives concrete examples of important issues of the day over which the ANC and the SACP have differed. He also points out that the ANC enjoys greater popular support than the SACP. He adds that despite the many years of combined struggle, the two remain distinct organizations with ideological and policy differences which preclude a merger of identity.

These observations go some way towards disproving the accusation. But since the allegation has become the focal point of government propaganda against the ANC, I propose to use this opportunity to give you the correct information, in the hope that this will help you to see the matter in its proper perspective and to evaluate your strategy afresh.

Cooperation between the ANC and the South African Communist Party goes back to the early twenties and has always been, and still is, strictly limited to the struggle against racial oppression and for a just society. At no time has the organization ever adopted or cooperated with communism itself. Apart from the question of cooperation between the two organizations, members of the SACP have always been free to join the ANC. But once they do so, they become fully bound by the policy of the organization set out in the Freedom Charter.

As members of the ANC engaged in the anti-apartheid struggle, their Marxist ideology is not directly relevant. The SACP has throughout the years accepted the leading role of the ANC, a position which is respected by the SACP members who join the ANC.

There is, of course, a firmly established tradition in the ANC in terms of which any attempt is resisted—from whatever quarter—which is intended to undermine cooperation between the two organizations.

Even within the ranks of the ANC there have been, at one time or another, people—and some of them were highly respected and influential individuals—who were against this cooperation and who wanted SACP members expelled from the organization. Those who persisted in these activities were themselves ultimately expelled, or they broke away in despair. In either case their departure ended their political careers, or they formed other political organizations, which, in due course, crumbled into splinter groups.

No dedicated ANC member will ever heed a call to break with the SACP. We regard such a demand as a purely divisive government strategy. It is in fact a call on us to commit suicide.

Which man of honor will ever desert a lifelong friend at the instance of a common opponent and still retain a measure of credibility among his people? Which opponent will ever trust such a treacherous freedom fighter? Yet this is what the government is, in effect, asking us to do—to desert our faithful allies. We will not fall into that trap.

The government also accuses us of being agents of the Soviet Union. The truth is that the ANC is nonaligned, and we welcome support from the East and the West, from the socialist and capitalist countries. The only difference, as we have explained on countless occasions before, is that the socialist countries supply us with weapons, which the West refuses to give us. We have no intention whatsoever of changing our stand on this question.

The government's exaggerated hostility to the SACP and its refusal to have any dealings with that party have a hollow ring. Such an attitude is not only out of step with the growing cooperation between the capitalist and socialist countries in different parts of the world, but it is also inconsistent with the policy of the government itself, when dealing with our neighboring states.

Not only has South Africa concluded treaties with the Marxist states of Angola and Mozambique—quite rightly in our opinion—but she also wants to strengthen ties with Marxist Zimbabwe. The government will certainly find it difficult, if not altogether impossible, to reconcile its readiness to work with foreign Marxists for the peaceful resolution of mutual problems, with its uncompromising refusal to talk to South African Marxists.

The reason for this inconsistency is obvious. As I have already said, the government is still too deeply committed to the principle of white domination and, despite lip service to reform, it is deadly opposed to the sharing of political power with blacks. And the SACP is merely being used as a smoke screen to retain the monopoly of political power.

The smear campaign against the ANC also helps the government to evade the real issue at stake, namely, the exclusion from political power of the black majority by a white minority, which is the source of all our troubles.

Concerning my own personal position, I have already informed you that I will not respond to the government's demand that ANC members should state whether they are members of the SACP or not. But because much has been said by the media, as well as by government leaders regarding my political beliefs, I propose to use this opportunity to put the record straight.

My political beliefs have been explained in the course of several political trials in which I was charged, in the policy documents of the ANC, and in my autobiography, The Struggle Is My Life, which I wrote in prison in 1975. I stated in these trials and publications that I did not belong to any organization apart from the ANC. In my address to the court which sentenced me to life in prison in June 1964, I said, "Today I am attracted by the idea of a classless society, an attraction which springs in part from Marxist reading, and, in part, from my admiration of the structure and organisation of early African societies in this country... .

"It is true, as I have already stated, that I have been influenced by Marxist thought. But this is also true of many leaders of the new independent states. Such widely different persons as Gandhi, Nehru, Nkrumah, and Nasser all acknowledge this fact. We all accept the need for some form of socialism to enable our people to catch up with the advanced countries of this world and to overcome their legacy of extreme poverty."

My views are still the same. Equally important is the fact that many ANC leaders who are labeled communists by the government embrace nothing different from these beliefs. The term communist when used by the government has a totally different meaning from the conventional one. Practically every freedom fighter who receives his military training or education in the socialist countries is, to the government, a communist.

It would appear to be established government policy that, as long as the National Party is in power in this country, there can be no black freedom struggle and no black freedom fighter. Any black political organization which, like us, fights for the liberation of its people through armed struggle must invariably be dominated by the SACP.

This attitude is not only the result of government propaganda. It is a logical consequence of white supremacy. After more thanthree hundred years of racial indoctrination, the country's whites have developed such deep-seated contempt for blacks as to believe that we cannot think for ourselves, that we are incapable of fighting for political rights without incitement by some white agitator.

In accusing the ANC of domination by the SACP and in calling on ANC members to renounce the party, the government is deliberately exploiting that contempt.

The government is equally vehement in condemning the principle of majority rule. The principle is rejected despite the fact that it is a pillar of democratic rule in many countries of the world. It is a principle which is fully accepted in the white politics of this country.

Only now that the stark reality has dawned that apartheid has failed, and that blacks will one day have an effective voice in government, are we told by whites here, and by their Western friends, that majority rule is a disaster to be avoided at all costs. Majority rule is acceptable to whites as long as it is considered within the context of white politics.

If black political aspirations are to be accommodated, then some other formula must be found, provided that formula does not raise blacks to a position of equality with whites.

Yet majority rule and internal peace are like the two sides of a single coin, and white South Africa simply has to accept that there will never be peace and stability in this country until the principle is fully applied.

It is precisely because of its denial that the government has become the enemy of practically every black man. It is that denial that has sparked off the current civil strife.

By insisting on compliance with the above-mentioned conditions before there can be talks, the government clearly confirms that it wants no peace in this country, but turmoil; no strong and independent ANC, but a weak and servile organization playing a supportive role to white minority rule; not a nonaligned ANC, but one which is a satellite of the West and which is ready to serve the interests of capitalism.

No worthy leaders of a freedom movement will ever submit to conditions which are essentially terms of surrender dictated by a victorious commander to a beaten enemy, and which are really intended to weaken the organization and to humiliate its leadership.

The key to the whole situation is a negotiated settlement, and a meeting between the government and the ANC will be the first major step towards lasting peace in the country, better relations with our neighbor states, admission to the Organization of African Unity, readmission to the United Nations and other world bodies, to international markets and improved international relations generally.

An accord with the ANC, and the introduction of a nonracial society, is the only way in which our rich and beautiful country will be saved from the stigma which repels the world.

Two central issues will have to be addressed at such a meeting: firstly, the demand for majority rule in a unitary state; secondly, the concern of white South Africa over this demand, as well as the insistence of whites on structural guarantees that majority rule will not mean domination of the white minority by blacks.

The most crucial task which will face the government and the ANC will be to reconcile these two positions. Such reconciliation will be achieved only if both parties are willing to compromise. The organization will determine precisely how negotiations should be conducted. It may well be that this should be done at least in two stages—the first where the organization and the government will work out together the preconditions for a proper climate for negotiations. Up to now both parties have been broadcasting their conditions for negotiations without putting them directly to each other.

The second stage would be the actual negotiations themselves when the climate is ripe for doing so. Any other approach would entail the danger of an irresolvable stalemate.

Lastly, I must point out that the move I have taken provides you with the opportunity to overcome the current deadlock and to normalize the country's political situation. I hope you will seize it without delay. I believe that the overwhelming majority of South Africans, black and white, hope to see the ANC and the government working closely together to lay the foundations for a new era in our country, in which racial discrimination and prejudice, coercion and confrontation, death and destruction, will be forgotten.



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Scanned from pamphlet
"Intensify the struggle to abolish apartheid"
Nelson Mandela, Speeches 1990

Published by Pathfinder, 1990