The author formerly worked for the Cuban foreign ministry [MINREX]
and now lives in Miami.  originally wrote this for Cuba-L list serve
moderated by Nelson Valdes. 
=====================================================

CUBA: THE REASONS BEHIND A COSTLY DECISION
By Domingo Amuchastegui
April 5, 2003

The Cuban government's crackdown on certain sectors of the local dissident movement was an extremely costly decision, and not just because of a strong international reaction against it. The high price paid by Cuban authorities encompasses a wide range of its top priorities that have suffered considerable damage.
They are the following:

-- The April conference in Havana known as La Nación y la Emigración lost much of its expected political results. Friendly émigrés willing to participate felt embarassed and frustrated. Finally, the holding of the conference -scheduled for April 13th-16th, was cancelled, based on arguments that avoided mentioning the crackdown and its negative impact.

-- The considerable gains within U.S. Congress received a serious blow, placing many of the lawmakers in a very awkward position.

-- After months of political dialogue and negotiations, the EU was about to admit Cuba into the Cotonu Agreement and its many benefits (250 million euros in five years among others), as announced by Commissioner Paul Nielson prior to his successful visit to Havana. Now the EU has condemned the crackdown and -according to a recent meeting of experts in Madrid- the process of admission is "paralyzed" and surrounded by all kinds of "uncertainties."

-- And last, but not least, the crackdown takes place precisely in the midst of the Geneva sessions on Human Rights and facing a very mild project from a group of Latin American countries. Anyone could ask if Cuban authorities want to commit some sort of political suicide or is this a major blunder, something that is not very likely for a regime that has been in power for 44 years. A more opportunistic approach could suggest: If it is not a matter of life and death, they could have waited a couple a months, gaining considerable advantages... The obvious questions then arises:

Why this costly decision?

Because of these particular dissidents becoming a sudden and unexpected threat? Certainly not. Some time ago, El País correspondent in Havana, concluded that : "Los disidentes no le hacen ni cosquillas a Fidel Castro." Then -if this is the case- what are the real reasons?

For some Fidel Castro decided to take advantage of the War on Iraq to wipeout the dissident movement. Then why not during the attack on Panama, Gulf War I, the Balkans or the more recent on Afghanistan? The argument does not seem to fit very well.

For others, this is the beginning of an oslaught of "repression and terror."

Are the dissidents taking the streets of Havana?

Are they demonstrating in the streets or, in the eyes of experts, to have enough strength to bring down the Cuban regime that may justify or explain such an onslaught? This does not seem to be the case.

For Emeritus Professor Edward Gonzalez at the University of California and analyst for the Rand Corporation, the possibilities of a democratic transition "are remote," the current correlation of forces is overwhelming against "Cuban democrats," and courageous dissident leaders "are better known to foreign governments and international human rights groups than to the majority of Cubans in the island."

If there is the intent of wiping out the dissident movement or an actual long-term onslaught, then why letting Payá collect 11,000 signatures to support his Proyecto Varela and turned it in to the National Assembly with ample international coverage?

Why allowing Payá to travel abroad to collect his Sakharov Prize given by the EU, meeting with State Secretary Colin Powell, and visiting Miami?

Why being more lenient to dissident socialdemocratic organizations in Cuba?

Why the different dissident organizations that called upon the people to boycott government-sponsored one party elections were not repressed in 1992, 1997 or last years?

Why was former President James Carter invited to Cuba -knowing perfectly well what he was going to advocate for- and his support to Payá´s project was totally covered by the Cuban official media?

Why Cuban intellectuals write for Encuentro, in Madrid, and nothing happens to them? All kinds of dissidents meet with U.S. lawmakers and EU officials visiting Havana and nothing happens to them?

Such actions conform a pattern that does not fit all too well into the paradigm of overall repression. There has to be something else that current debates are overlooking.

To understand the reasons, we should focus, first, on Carter´s most recent statement asking Cuban authorities for the immediate release of the dissidents that were arrested, which implies a rather explicit condemnation of what happened. But, at the same time, Carter concluded urging the U.S. government to work with the Cuban side to deflate the current tensions and stabilize a "relationship of mutual respect." Obviously enough, he is placing some degree of responsability on the U.S. side; thus, the issue involves not only actions against the dissidents but the involvement of the U.S.

Across the Atlantic, a more explicit approach surfaced at the Madrid meeting of experts, where Mr. Altozano stated: "From the U.S. Interest Section in Havana dissidents were kindled seeking to generate a reaction from the Cuban government."

Is it the U.S. Interests Section to be blamed for what is happening?

Of course not; we all know they follow instructions whether their names are Huddleston or Cason. And such instructions have been changing, especially since Otto Reich was appointed by President Bush and the latter made public his "Initiative for a Free Cuba."

Both Interests Sections -- just like everybody else in the trade of Diplomacy and Intelligence -- carry out their activities quite normally, and FBI and State Security play their game after them.

But never, not even in 1959 and 1960, the heads of the Interests Sections were directly involved in work-contacts, distribution of materials and resources, and other activities alike. For these activities diplomatic missions have their operatives and other positions (press, cultural, and all kinds of attachés).

When one instructs its head of missions to get directly involved is because, to say the least, they are looking for trouble in addition to breaking the rules and conventions.

Dissidents attend social activities at the embassy and nothing happened for years and years.

But never a diplomatic mission, protected by diplomatic immunity, will host workshops or training sessions of any sort for well-known opponents to the government to which that mission is accredited; such activities are conducted by operatives and attachés, unless you want to risk a serious diplomatic incident with undeclared intentions and goals.

And this is what we are witnessing in Havana since the final period of Ms. Huddleston and since the beginning of Mr. Cason's term, last September. As an inevitable reaction you start having actions and counter-actions, restrictions of movements, verbal confrontations, new OFAC regulations against Cuba, and others.

If we place such a change of policies in a broader picture where U.S. policies are becoming more and more confrontational under the Preemptive Doctrine and your country, Cuba, is still in the terrorist list of nations, worries and concerns start rising high. The Cuban security syndrome starts dominating within the mindset and actions of the Cuban leadership. After all, current developments world-wide and U.S. role are -as recently stated by well-known Cuban-American sociologist and professor at Princeton University, Alejandro Portes- granting additional credibility to Fidel Castro's hypothesis about the U.S. as an aggressor. In view of such trends and prevailing perceptions, Fidel Castro has always reacted resorting to unexpected actions and placing tensions at a higher level. That is his understanding of forcing a crisis to be negotiated more successfully, if not confronted. The crackdown on certain dissidents and threatening with closing down the Interests Sections, are his initial moves. Others may come depending on how the U.S. handles the recent, and almost consecutive, kidnappings of planes and boats in view of the existing bilateral agreements between Cuba and the U.S. There is one last clarification to be made. The term "certain dissidents" clearly indicates that not all dissidents are considered the same and, subsequently, are being treated differently.

Dr. Portes made a valuable remark when explaining that Cuban dissidents are faced with a dilemma: They need resources and assistance from abroad, but when they turn to the U.S. Interests Section in search of help is like the kiss of death, their legitimacy and credibility falls apart and all kinds of questionings fall upon them. Dr. Portes added a final remark: The current set of events are a very serious blow for any notion for a democratic transition. The fact is that the vast majority of dissidents that have being arrested, are those more closely connected to Miami's most fierce anti-Castro organizations, being funded and supported by various means and ways by the latter as well as by USAID/NED programs, and that have a well-proven connection to the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, in particular to the latest actions personally conducted by its head person, James Cason. Prominent figures like Payá, Sánchez Santacruz, Morúa, Vladimiro Roca, Arcos, G'omez Manzano, and others have not been touched. Some may argue that this is Fidel Castro´s own game of¨divide and rule. This is not the case; such dissident leaders have known, since the beginning of their struggle, that there is one key rule to be respected : Stay away, as much as you can, from the U.S.

One last thing must not be overlooked. In a long history of confrontation and conflict, U.S.-Cuba relations have managed to reach a significant amount of agreements after serious crises (on piracy, economic zones and fisheries, Interests Sections, immigration, and others).

Several recent crises have managed to circumvent a final clash and reach settlements and cooperation (like during the shooting down of the Brothers to the Rescue and in the field of drug-trafficking).

In the current Cuban agenda there are some additional relevant topics like the Cuba Adjustment Law and the five intelligence agents, captured and sentenced in Miami.

When dealing with the present crisis, the eyes of Fidel Castro may very well be looking far-ahead to these two other issues; after all, Cuban experts like to remind everyone that dealings with republican administrations, from Nixon to Reagan, proved to be rewarding in mutual communication and agreements.



previously posted:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/CubaNews/message/16299