It is a formidable example of the vigor and strength of the Latin American revolution and of the colonial revolution, this Cuban revolution which, on the very borders of the fortified citadel of imperialism, is developing the broadest revolutionary mobilization of the masses and carrying to their conclusions the most radical measures against imperialism. Condemned at the Conference of Costa Rica, the leaders of this revolution were cheered by the Negros and Puerto Ricans in Harlem: the Cuban revolution is polarizing forces in hat-in America,, and stimulating and giving drive to the most exploited sectors in the United States itself, in Harlem and in the South.

Cuba, with the base at Guantánamo, formed part of the U S military system. With its strong government, Cuba was part of the system of political and social' balances laboriously constructed by imperialism on its borders after the oil expropriations in Mexico. With its sugar pro-dilation subsidized, Cuba formed an integral part of sugar production in the U S South, whereby it 'satisfied the need's of the U S internal market without exposing the high-cost sugar production of the southern states to the jolts of 'competition in_ the world market.

It is this whole system that has been shaken and broken by the Cuban revolution.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FORCES OF THE REVOLUTION

After 'having been deeply shaken by the general strike and the fall of the Machado' dictatorship and the Platt Amendment in 1933, imperialist domination could be reestablished only by a development of the forces of repression and a deep corruption in political circles, which permitted the emergence of an' 'arbitrator, Batista, based on the forces of the army. The regimes of Grau San Martin and of Prío Socarras served only to de>ñonstrate the failure of parliamentary democracy. the Stalinists got the workers' movement bogged down in class collaboration. Eduardo Chiba's, heading up 'sectors of youth and university peo-file, took the leadership of an intransigent struggle against the 'corruption of the Prío• government. The powerlessness of this petty-bourgeois campaign was demonstrated on that 'day in 19'50 when Chibas turned a revolver on himself during a television broadcast where he was making his cam-

;tip. For most of the petty-bourgeois sectors who were following him, hips 'suicide sealed the-breakwith illusions about democratic paths to the "regeneration" of political life in Cuba. A few days later, Batista took power by acoup d'état, and, a few days after that, he was personally congratulated about it by Nelson Rockefeller.

Chibas's suicide and Batista's coup d'état marked the end of a stage in the political struggle in Cuba. The old political bureaucracy adapted itself, the did w ark ers' vanguard, stupefied and powerless, dispersed. Against this adaptation and resignation, sectors of the youth, emerging from the Partido Ortodoxo, Chibas's party, renewed the revolutionary tradition of 1933, the "insurrectional thesis." Among them was Fidel -Castro who had' been active as one of the most 'ardent supporters of Chibas.

The .process of formation of a political force possessing a capacity for action was long and contradictory. While the old workers' vanguard that had not accepted 'collaboration with Mujal dispersed and became atomized 'in little groups or fell back on a trade-union .activity which was — taking into 'account the 'conditions of the -repression — of very small scope, these young petty-bourgeois hurled themselves into the struggle with a 'great lack of confidence in the revolutionary capacity of the working masses. They conceived of the struggle as the heroic action of small and .determined minorities.

The 1953 attack on the 'Moncada Barracks, led by Fidel Castro, was a typical puisch.i'st action. A hundred of the attackers and their helpers were killed, 'assassinated: a score survived, among them 'Fidel himself and his brother Raul. But this coup 'de main and the courageous 'defense that they put up in Blatista's courts, in a situation of the atomization of the oppositional forces and the absolute •powerlessness of the big parties, . drew •attention to this little group. To a youth that had lost confidence in peaceful parliamentary-democratic paths, Fidel Castro's group was-convincing, not by its 'programme (it said nothing, in its defense during the .Moncada trial, that had not been said much more completely in the. previous 30 years), but by its determination and its daring, because it liad thrown itself into insurrectional action.

The landing from the Gramma "in December 1956, 'though it was once more a,cast of the dice, in which half the expedition was exterminated, was carried out in a situation where a netwoak of groups was already organized in Cuba. And

the action of this determined little group was, by its very audacity, to reach a junction with a re- volutionary force, that of the peasants, and develop and organize their action. 1

This advanoe detachment of the urban petty bourgeoisie, who wanted to finish with the :dictatorship and clean up the capitalist regime, and who had to base themselves on the most exploited peasants of Cuba, perhaps discovered there the deep roots of the regime of corruption that these peasants were combating and the immense social forces that could be mobilized in a revolutionary way. It was during the fight in the Sierra Maestra that this revolution took on the character of an agrarian revolution which it kept during its whole first stage.

The revolutionary path thus taken awoke acid stimulated immense forces, unsuspected even by those who started on it, and these forces, by Mobilizing, left a deep mark an the revolutionary process and even on the very team that had begun the action.. The entry of mass forces developed the thought and programme of the revolution, as well as its social content.

The intervention of the masses of the workers was not important during the insurrectional stage. But it was a general strike that caused the failure of Batista's 'attempt, on the first of January 1959, to turn the power over to a military junta led by Caudillo; it was this general 'strike which, according to Fidel Castro's own statement, gave the keys of Havana to the "rebels." And once the revolution had gone beyond its democratic and agrarian stage, when it was a question of confronting capitalist and 'imperialist forces, the role of the working class was to become predominant and decisive.

REVOLUTIONARY MEASURES

Greeted on their arrival in the cities by immense petty-bourgeois crowds who for the moment far exceeded the workers, hailed by imperialist public opinion which, faced by the accomplished fact, was looking for a new compromise, the. revolutionary forces had as first clash with this "democratic" public opinion when they set up revolutionary tribunals and executed the civil war criminals. Behind this jacobinism lay, not so much clear objectives, gas a force that was thus showing its determination not to compromise with the old regime and the legal forces of bourgeois 'democracy, and. wars proving intransigent and disposed to make radical changes.

1 There is something more than a symbol in the fact that it was Crescencio Pérez, an old peasant fighter, who helped 'Fidel Castro to pass through the lines of Batista's army to reach the Sierra Maestra, and who provided him with his first liaisons with the peasants,

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The dissolution of the old army and sits replace. rent, by the rebel army formed in the Sierra, in the insurrection, was .another step along thi:. road, as was also the replacement of the cadres of the state's administrative 'apparatus. By not reaching a compromise with the old forces, the leadership of the revolution was consistent with its declarations, and 'simultaneously maintained the 'separation between the two camps that was to render it, even when it became the government. open to the influence of the maturing of the mass revolutionary movement.

THE AGRARIAN REFORM

The agrarian reform was the first revolutionary measure that attacked the old economic structure and the old class privileges and opened the way to profound revolutionary economic and social changes. Cuban agrarian reform was not 'carried out, as in other under-!developed countries, on a backward terrain under the domination of a conservative feudal class forming an obstacle even to the capitalist development of the country. Cuba, the world's leading exporter of sugar, exporter of tobacco, producer of coffee and livestock, has gone through a relatively big capitalist development in the rural regions. As for 'sugarcane, 161 refineries employ half a million Igork• ers in harvesting, in the factories, and on the widespread network of little railways that link the refineries to the main railways and ports. Tobacco, coffee, and stock-raising have similar characteristics in their exploitation. These aie big capitalist enterprises that have set up the present structure of exploitation, replacing the hundreds of little firms (trapiches) which 'produced the sugar up to the beginning of the 'century. It was big U S firms like the UnitedFruit Company (the one that 'defeated the Guatemalan revolution) which engaged in investments in the exploitation of sugar and other agricultural products, as well as a 'serious number of Cuban 'capitalists.

The agrarian reform begun by the Cuban revolution caused it to grapple directly with the strongest capitalist sectors in Cuba, the imperiali,t investors. By expropriatiUg hundred's of thousands of acres, the revolution directly braved the capitalist regime such as it had developed in Cuba. The Cuban capitalists having lost their petty-bourgeois social base, their 'political :power, and their repressive apparatus, it was U S im peralis:m that remained the only capitalist force capable of taking up the defense of the privileges of the regime. Once B'atista's puppet regime had been overthrown, appeared as the support and representative of the capitalist sys`

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tem, as the only one with sufficient strength to take up its defense.

Yet the Cuban agrarian reform, such as it was decreed, is a capitalist agrarian reform. Great stretches of land were expropriated and given to the peasants a real improvement for them — but there remained in the hands of the old proprietors the centre of it all: the refinery, the railway, and some 30 caballerías (990 acres) of land round the factory, i e, the best and best-irrigated land, closest to the refinery, most accessible to modern transport, that in which the most important investments had been made. According to the law, the old proprietor could keep an area running up to more than 100 caballerías (3,310 acres), whose productivity ins more than 50% 'higher than the average. That ins to say that the former owner kept the producing centre and the land favored' by differential rent.

This created a first 'contradiction in the first great revolutionary measure of the new government: most of the sugar-cane land was transferred to the peasants who organized themselves to farm it: but the refining 2 of the sugar and part of the best land remain in the hands of the former owners, who in addition have the right, according to the law, to 'indemnization after 20 years for the expropriated land. If account 'is taken of the fact that it is the government that sells the sugar produced, on the international market, and assigns the quotas to each refinery, the role of the owner of the refinery continues to be the key to production. While he is of no use, he is an obstacle to any planning of agricultural production and to any attempt to develop the economy by basing it on the production that has undergone the greatest capitalist development. For its own development plans, the state sees that it is 'deprived of the main source of accumulation in the Guban economy because this remains not only in private hands but in the hands of the capitalists whose lands have already, to a large extent, been expropriated, •i e, to open enemies of the revolution.

This was one of the factors that prevented the capitalist" nature of this agrarian reform from standing out. The agrarian reform, thus conceived, did not sawed in getting 'itself accepted by the capitalists. It was carried out, not with them, but against them, and by relying directly on the peasant masses, the rural workers, sand the workers and poor petty bourgeois of the villages.

The peasants and the sugar cooperatives sell their cane M the refining centre, Theoretically they have the right to have their sugar ground by paying the refinery and to sell it directly, but this is impractical because it is too cumbersome.

This agrarian reform was considered by capitalism and imperialism to be a declaration of war. That is to say that the agrarian reform went beyond the functioning of the capitalist regime and did not find in Cuba a bourgeois class capable of channeling it and profiting by it with sufficient force to reabsorb into capitalist fune_ tinning this transformation in the rural regions.

It was not the measures taken to carry out this agrarian reform which made of it the beginning of an irreversible process in the Cuban economy, which led to the expropriation of the major part of big capitalist property; it was the social forces that were driving it and the extreme weakness of capitalism that was unable to absorb these measures.

The peasants who received the land and organized into cooperatives obtained a real i'm'prove_ ment in their lot. The coOperatives enabled them to have access to technical guidance provided by the Instituto Nacional de la Reforma Agra- ria, ensured them of regular income, almost a salary, and opened up collective improvements in medical care, food, and housing.3

This real improveinent in the lot of the peasants, who, together with the unemployed, formed the most backward sector of the Cuban messes, is the deepest root planted by the agrarian reform in Cuba, with the result that the former owners have no illusions about being able to reverse the process without a 'defeat of the revolu- ton as a whole.

THE ALLIANCE WITH THE WORKERS' STATES

The field in which, more than in the agarian' reform, the Cuban revolution demonstrated its scope and its ,dairing, before the expropriation of the imperialist companies, was, as the Latin American Bureau of the Fourth International pointed out at the time, that of its foreign policy, The difficulties and the dashes with imperialism that took plane after the agrarian reform, the support given by the United States to Cuban counter-revolutionary forces, sabotage, bombardments, the explosion of La Coubre in the port of Havana — these things stirred up new interventions by the masses, This • time, the mobilization and intervention of the proletariat at the side of the peasants and the poor petty bourgeoisie were fundamental. The C T C, the trade-unions, have been playing an increasing role, and the worker and peasant militias are the expression

3 The "people's stores," marketing organizations set up by the I N R A, provide more varied foodstuffs end the .possibility of selling the articles produced locally by the peasants, the fishermen's cooperatives, etc.

 

30

of the revolutionary mobilization against imperialism and counter-a-evolution..

Impelled by this force and this revolutionary mobilization, pushed to a daily more open confrontation with the capitalist forces and imperialism, the Cuban government sought to rely on the workers' 'states; and on forces other than itself within the 'colonial and semi-colonial revolution. Earlier, Fidel Castro had unsuccessfully sought an agreement with the United States during his trip there at the beginning of his government, and with the Latin American bourgeoisie's at the Conference of the 21 in Buenos Aires. Then, 'driven by the 'contradictions with imperialism and by the revolutionary mobilization of the Cuban masses, he sought for support on the side of the workers' states, and this tended to produce a delimitation, not only with imperialism, but also with the Latin American bourgeoisies already frightened by the spur that the Cuban revolution was giving to the 'revolutionary movements in their own countries.

The alliance with the workers' states and breaking through the diplomatic and economic encirclement imposed by imperialism may be placed among the most important achievements or the Cuban revolution. They shattered the myth of imperialist power and 'domination, of Latin America as a "private hunting-grounds" of Yankee imperialism; they opened up to the Latin American revolution the field of alliance with and economic support from the workers' states and with the African and Asiatic revolution.

The astute and audacious policy in the sale of sugar, successfully •carried out, partly offset the weight of Yankee imperialism's measures of economic pressure. Without withdrawing from the International Sugar Agreement, the Cuban government was in a position to countercheck these pressures. Cuba sold about three million tons on the U 'S market at prices about 80% higher than the world-market price. This' tonnage formed' more than half Cuba's normal exports. But, as exports are 'subject to quota's', Cuba d'i'd not harvest or export all the sugar that it could have exported. If the United States stopped buying from Cuba, it could sell all this sugar on the world market at 'low prices, upsetting that market (and also the U Sdo'm'estic market, where the sugar-beet enterprises could produce only at high costs). On the other hand, the exporting countries cannot all guarantee permanent export surpluses. Mexico in these , last years has swung between an export of 200,000 tons and no export surplus at all. Puerto Rico — where, last year, 13 S investments endeavored, in view of the Cuban agrarian reform, to step

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up production -- ins harvesting about 300,000 tons, In general, sugar •consumption• is increasing, in the backward' 'regions in process of 'development, and in the workers' states. In the advanced capitalist states, the increase is only proportionate to population increase. The USSR was able to shift from being an exporter in 1959 to being an importer in 1960.

It is on these elements that the Cuban government based its offensive 'policy, winning additional markets. 4

The 'breaking of the oil blockade, the obten. Lion of Soviet credits, the furnishing by the USSR and the other workers' states of machine-tools for the beginnings of industrialization, open up new prospects for the Latin American revolution, which, in Bolivia and other countries, has been marking time for years now at the same level, exposed to imperialism's 'blockade acrd blaekm'ail. But above all it was Soviet military aid that shattered all the theories of the "geopoliticians" of the type of Haya 'de la Torre, Figueres, and other petty-bourgeois leaders who find, in the -geographical situation of Latin Ante. rica as a neighbor of the United States, the justification for their impotence and their capitulation to imperialism.

THE CONFISCATIONS
OF THE IMPERIALIST ENTERPRISES

It was during the struggle against imperialism, for the support of the agrarian 'reform, that the revolutionary movement of the Cuban masses increased its intervention and its strength, and consciously realized the real reasons for its situation, its misery and exploitation. At the same time that the middle sectors of the petty bourgeoisie were lessening their active support and abandoning the streets (when they were not 'be. coming openly hostile), the working masses were becoming the most offensive, coherent, and active sector of the 'revolution. The struggle against the military threat, the mobilization against aggressions 'aá1'd' the counter-revolution, became transformed into a struggle against the economic power of the imperialist enterprises. Now these imperialist enterprises are the backbone of capitalism .in 'Cuba. There are no great industrial enterprises. Few factories emplov

4 This year the harvest was prolonged in order to pro' duce a higher tonnage available for export, and on this basis, Cuba was able to present itself at the International Sugar Board with sufficient justification to get itself as:

signed additional quotas to make up for the deficits of

other exporters. The diminution of 700,000 tons in the U S market was partly (if the lower prices of the interna. tibnal market are taken into account) offset by an increase

in exports elsewhere.

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more than 100 wor tobacco; imported which can perfecto and all sort's ;of

articles, etc. The ways, electricity, ries, nidkeI mine: enterprises, and t all 'directly in the U S government, a bacco, and 'other e] of U S companies struggle against 'i with and rapidly 1st struggle:

Apart from the land even these a vern'ment), and tit the others have

that the bulk of t in Cuba are in the that for the first fora plan 'of econ gar enterprise's co op-en the way to 1. hlem of agrarian 'p condition to .any 'Y form. 6

In fact, m'aintei most of the indus prises in Cuba wi of economic level face of the 'mobil'ia priations, and the ment, private capil profits, and thus Cuban economy w propriations 'put ii main sources of ac bilities for a Mani With this plannin possibilities 7 'by economy will be E possibiliti'e's of aid workers' 'states, 'es]

The revolution, the agrarian ref(

5 The naval base en

Lion to North Americ.

6 Together with the

in the government's I supporters of Batista

expropriated from tb Portant ones) furnish

7 To do this, it will Propriation of all the as well as of the Guar of skilled manpower i is to be found.

 

 

hn is increasing in uss of development, In the advanced , only proport'ion'ate USSR was able ex in 1959 to being

that the Cuban ve 'policy, winning

ockade, the obten.

furnishing by the ;ens' states of ma. of industrialization,

he Latin American tnd other countries, rs now at the sa me m's blockade and vas Soviet military ries of the "geopo. i de la Torre'. Fi geoas leaders who tion of Latin Ame. ml States, the just• and their oapitu•

 

FRPRISES

;ainst imperialism, a reform, that the he Cuban masses

its strength, and reasons for its sittion. At the same if the petty hour. etive support and they were not be. rking masses were

coherent, and on. The struggle the mobilization iounter-revolution, uggle against the tialist enterprises• ses are the back-here are no great factories employ

;ed in order to pro-export, and on this at the International ion to get itself a-i for the deficits bl

700,000 tons in tic irices of the interna. offset by an incresse

t)URTI7 71!'TERNATIONAL

more than 100 workers. Cuba exported sugar and tobacco; imported rice and wheat (both of which can perfectly well be grown on the island) arid all sorts of foodstuffs, textiles, household articles, etc. The big enterprises are: the railways, electricity, telephone systems, oil refineries, nickel mines, banks, hotels and tourist enterprises, and the Guantanamo naval base, 8 all directly in the hands of tU S trusts and the 11 S goy ernment, and the sugar, stock-raising, tobacco, and other enterprises, mostly in the hands of U S companies. That is why in Cuba, the struggle against imperialism became identified with and rapidly developed into an anti-capitalist struggle:

Apart from the railways, the Nioaro mines (and even these are being occupied by the government), and the Guantanamo naval base, all the others have been confiscated. That means that the bulk of the great capitalist enterprises in Cuba are in the hands of the government and that for the first time it controls the ` elements for a plan of economic development. The 46 sugar enterprises confiscated from U S companies open the way to beginning to solve the key problem of agrarian production and planning, a precondition to any real success of the agrarian reform. 6

In facet, m'ainten'ance of private ownership in most of the industrial and public service enterprises in Cuba was rendering illusory any plan of economic development by the government. In face of the mobilization of the masses, the expropriations, and the 'controls imposed by the government, private capitalists were not reinvesting their profits, and thus the relative possibilities of the Cuban economy were being squandered. The expropriations put in the state's hands some of the main sources of accumulation and open up possibilities for a planning of economic development. With this planning 'based on 'control of internal possibilities 7 by the government,, the planned economy will be better able to take advantage of possibilities of aid from the USSR and' the other workers' states, especially insetting up industries.

The revolution, the mobilization of the masses, the agrarian reform, and the expropriations

5 The naval base employs 3,500 Cuban workers in addition to North Americans and Jamaicans.

6 Together with the 12 sugar centres which were already ill the government's hands . (for having belonged to former supporters of Batista or for tax reasons), these centres Crpropriated from the Yankees (generally the most important ones) furnish about half Cuban sugar production.

7 To do this, it will be necessary to advance to the expropriation of all the sugar centres, and of the railways, as well as of the Guanuinaino naval base, where the nucleus of skilled manpower in naval and metal-working industries is to be found.

these have broken the capitalist order and the old equilibrium, and the productive forces can find their new equilibrium and their 'development only in the nationalization of all the big enterprises and yin the 'planning of the economy on the basis of support by the industry of the workers' states and the management of production by the working .masses.

THE MASSES AND THE
LEADERSHIP OF THE REVOLUTION

The exploited masses as a whole have mobilized in Cuba. The capitalist structure reached by the Cuban economy was built on a superexploitation of the worker and peasant masses. The small peasants, who formed' the first circles in which the insurrection 'developed, had been relegated to the least productive land, where sugar=cane, tobacco, and livestock could not be developed. The sugar workers 'had work, on an average, only for three months out of the year; the rest of the time they had to keep alive with what they had earned during the harvest. Industry,' weak and already sta:grant for several years, could not absorb the available manpower. Each year 60,000 young men came on to the labor market, which had no possibility of absorbing them. At the moment of the triumph of the revolution, there were 700,000 unemployed. Out of a population of less than seven million, it can be understood what this figure represents.

It was this situation that gave to a political revolution a social character, which turned a little putschist group into the leaders 'of hundreds of thousands of toilers. The decisiveness and intransigence of this group were nurtured, not only., by a "moralizing" mystique, but by' deep lying social causes, by a profound disequilibri'tim that shook up these university students and hurled them, in disregard of 'democratic paths, into insurrection.

It is because of this profound social 'dissequilihrium that, once the masses had mobilized, no compromise, no intermediary equilibrium,could

be lasting. It is the intervention of the' masses which is preventing a capitalist solution of the crisis, which is pushing the contradictions of the regime to their ultimate consequences. No' pro-

blem of the masses scan be solved if the revolution stops half way; none of the probleMs mentioned above has been solved up to now. There are certain improvements, but no solution. That is the objective reason for the intransigence, audacity, and decisiveness 'of the Cuban re-

volution.

Those who see only Fidel Castro and consider the masses to be only an echo are surprised at

FOURTH INTERNATIONAL `€ FOURTH-

the "stupidity" and lack of "foresight" of the State Departnr tít, which drove the Cuban leaders to take more 'and more radical measures in reaction to the attacks and hostility of imperialism. The dynamic element giving drive to these transformations is . these revolutionarily mobilized masses. It is Yankee imperialism that has found itself forced to reply aggressively to these revolutionary developments that are daily ripening on its very borders.

In Cuba itself, the polarization is ever clearer. In the first 'stage of the insurrection and the victory, the government, before it took social meas-ares, was :drawing along behind it various layers of the petty bourgeoisie and even of the bourgeoisie. The permanent idevolopment of the revolution, the more decisive intervention of the government, were accompanied by the desertion of a great part of the capitalist elements. Even the middle strata of the urban petty bourgeoisie began to withdraw to the degree that the revolution, the alliance with the workers' states, arid anti-i'mperi'alist and anti-capitalist measures deepened.

The old bourgeois parties having lost their rank-and_file following and their cohesion, it was the Church that headed up the resistance to the revolution's forward march by trying to base itself on those petty-bourgeois strata who Were the most privileged and the most hostile to revolution. This battle, which has not yet reached its culminating point, will require a new development of the revolution's thought and ideology.

It is the urban and ru'r'al working class, the peasantry of the cooperatives and the small' peasants, and the poor petty bourgeoisie of the cities, that are supporting and giving drive to the revolution.

THE DEVELOPMENT

OF MASS ORGANIZATIONS

In the whole first stage, when the petty bourgeoisie formed the basic nucleus of the mobil'izati'on, the mass movement found expression in great concentrations and demonstrations in support of Fidel Castro's leadership. The leading staff derived its strength from these gigantic mobilizations, but the capacity for resolutions amt. initiatives remained in the hands of the government, based on the organized forces of the rebel army and the cadres of the 26 July Movement, the political organization of the revolutionary forces.

As the movement grew more mature, side-byside with these forms of intervention, the Workers' and peasants' movement was developing its own forms: the trade unions and C T C (hindered during the whole first period by the remainsof the old Mujal bureaucracy) : the peasant cooperatives, whose leadership is elected and subject to recall by the members at any moment; and, lastly, the organization of the worker, peasant, student, and white-collar-worker militia. The 26 July Movement, whose cadres have

absorbed by the government, the army, and the trade unions, has not taken on new life as a mass party. 'Political life, political discussions, and political leadership fall on the trade unions, the cooperatives, the cadres of the rebel army, and the multiple state organizations` (I N R A, ministries, banks, etc) .

There is in fact •a parallel process going on: to the 'degree that the intervention of the masses ceases to be 'by mass-meetings 'and 'simple sup. port, and that the movement is getting channel. ized into organizations •and is intervening through its trade unions, militia, and cooperatives, the Old political apparatus of the insurrection, based on the action of the petty bourgeoisie, is b

ing inadequate and entering into conflict with the new farces.

Behind this dual process lie the basic con. tradietion in the development of the Cuban re• volution and the elements of its most serious internal crisis, infinitely more serious than the crises with Urrutia, Díaz Lanz, and other capitalist elements.

RESISTANCE OF THE LEADERSHIP

The attempts 'at a 'capitalist agrarian reform, the •non-expropriation of the native capitalists — not even, so far, those of the sugar enterprises -- the maintenance of the old state, apparatus, the imposition on the new army,' recruited in an insurrection and a civil war, of the traditional discipline and political interdicts, have been the elements of a capitalist leadership that 'still remains amid all the revolutionary steps forward. The masses reject the 'return to the old forms of "representative" bourgeois democracy, but the revolution has not yet begun 'a new form of state and governmental organization. The government imposed by the revolution bases itself on an uncontrolled state apparatus, and the •consciOu policy of Fidel Castro's staff is to keep all capacity for taking decisions and 'initiatives within this apparatus, while maintaining a paternalistic leadership of the masses.

This reflects •definitively the 'lack of confidenje in the revolutionary initiative of the masses, the remains of the old putsiehast conception, of a capitalist 'co'nception which today is taking refuge in the state apparatus and in the ,petty-bourgeois cadres of the government and the rebel army. The action taken by - Fidel del Castro himself to dissolve left groupings like "Acción y Sabotaje" ins'ide

the 26 July Movement, the attempt to form a "single party of the Cuban revolution" putting all forces under the centralized leadership of the gov

vernanent, the attacks made against the Trotskyist fraction by the Stalinists, with the support of some official newspapers, at the time of the Congress of Latin American Youth -- these are just so many attempts to go against the current of this 1evellopment and growing maturity of the workers' movement and to maintain 'an uncontrolled state apparatus.

THE TRADE UNIONS

It is in the leadership of the trade-union movement that this situation has found its clearest expression. It is there that the workers' forces in the revolution are ripening. After a first stage when the Miujalist bureaucrats were replaced' by the cadres of the clandestine struggle against Batista, by those who in the cities organized terrorism and tried to organize the workers, the tendency of the working 'class is to give itself a leadership that has been selected and' recognized during these 20 months of vigorous revolutionary action. New cadres are developing within the masses, and, since the working class puts all its faith 'and energies in the revolution, it tends to intervene with its own organizations and its own directives, going past the stage of a 'diffuse movement and of leaderships placed by the rebels at the head of the unions. The government is trying to control this movement andlimit its scope. Using the masses' support of Fidel Castmo and of revolutionary measures, it is trying to avoid a tendency struggle, •as well as independent maturity on the part of the workers' movement. The Minister of Labor openly intervenes in place of or •against the 'leadership of the 'C T 'C, 'and an underground struggle, which has not been called to the attention of the masses, brought about the change of the •C T C leadership elected at its congress.

THE NEEDS OF THE NEXT STAGE

The expropriations, the planning of the economy, the struggle against 'imperialism and native bourgeois reaction, the ,development of the revolution by the expansion of the creative power af•the people — these require in Cuba the devel opm'ent . of the management of the nationallized economy by the workers and by the toilers i1í. general, and the development of a state and government based on the trade unions, thecooperatives, the militia, and other forms of people's

erg alti rations.

Not having a regime that ensures direct representation of the 'different sectors in the state apparatus and the government, the interests of these sectors cannot be normally expressed or find overall satisfaction, and will tend to final expression through friction's, clashes, and struggles such are those going on today in the trade-union apparatus and at several echelons of the state apparatus and the rebel army. It is only an organization of a soviet type that can solve these contradictions and prevent their ripening into explosions in the future. The trend' toward a single party only accentuates the 'dangers.

Stalinism, incapable of taking part in the revolutionary process, 8 is today trying to win in - fluence as the agent, in the trade unions and in other fields, of this conservative bureaucratic action of the control of revolutionary forces which the government is attempting.

Nevertheless, the process of uninterrupted struggle, which has ended up in immense forward strides of the 'Cuban revolution, clashes more every day with this attempt at bureaucratic control over the revolution. The empirical leadership can become transformed into an obstacle if a revolutionary Marxist vanguard, does not 'develop and if the working class, through its various organizations, 'does not 'step up its leading political_ intervention by means of a workers' party based on the trade unions, which must be the real party of the Cuban revolution at this stage.

The Cuban Trotsikyists, the Fourth International, are supporting the revolution and its progressive measures with all their strength; at the same time they form the vanguard force which. is fighting to develop the forces that can ensure the continuity of the revolutionary process up till its culmination in a proletarian socialist revolution. These forces are objectively developing in Cuba, and the T'rotskyists, whose very action is fought against 'by the Stalinists and the conservative forces of the capitalist apparatus stihll existing, are tending to link up with the most living and dynamic sectors, the leadership-,in-formation of the Cuban revolution.

8 The Stalinist party, the P S P — whose policy of clash collaboration (which in the past led it to support Batista and Mujal) and whose tepid programme have been totally overwhelmed by the revolution and its measures — is today adapting itself to the temporary needs of the government staff, by basing itself on the solidarity of the workers' states, its sole political capital. Its alliance with the government corresponds to their common resistance Jo leaving initiatives to the masses, and it was with this Justification that the P S P has picked up again the Stalinist banner of anti-Trotskg,ism,

1 October 1960