MIAMI HERALD
Posted on Sun, Mar. 20, 2005

The Castro Obsession
Cuban exiles, the CIA and a secret war:
A new book focuses on a post-Bay of Pigs
program to get rid of Castro

This is taken from ''The Castro Obsession: U.S. Covert Operations Against Cuba, 1959-1965'' (Potomac Books, 2005). The chapter entitled ''Miami: Perpetual Intrigue'' is excerpted here.

For South Florida, first Mongoose [codename for the post Bay of Pigs U. S. covert anti-Castro program] and then the Cuban Missile Crisis only intensified a frenzied decade that began in the mid-1950s, when Castro's 82-member guerrilla band landed in southeastern Cuba. Mongoose contributed to an already-substantial population of CIA agents, Cuban exiles, wannabe soldiers-of-fortune and assorted other adventurers either involved -- or wanted to be -- in the secret war against Castro. Then the missile crisis came to make Miami the hottest spot in the Cold War -- apart from the three capitals involved -- and further fuel the perpetual intrigue simmering beneath the city surface.

An alphabet soup of Cuban exile groups numbering in the hundreds had sprung up, each trying to outdo the other in anti-Castro militancy. More than one such organization had no more members than the leader who announced its existence. To fuel fund-raising, they called press conferences and issued war communiqués proclaiming actions against Cuba that most often never occurred. Stirring an already boiling pot was JMWAVE, codename for the secluded headquarters of the CIA's frontline command post in Washington's ''back alley'' war against Castro.

For JMWAVE, its activities were to reach a peak in late 1962 and early 1963 leading up to, and during, the missile crisis and its immediate aftermath. Functioning under the cover of Zenith Technical Enterprises, JMWAVE operated from Building 25 at the University of Miami's secluded South Campus, a former U.S. Navy installation. Ted Shackley, a rising CIA star, was in charge as station chief from early 1962 through mid-1965. Some 300-to-400 agents toiled under Shackley's leadership, making JMWAVE the largest CIA station in the world after the headquarters in Langley, Va.

With its estimated $50 million a year budget in 1960s dollars, the CIA station's economic impact on South Florida was tremendous. CIA front companies numbered ''maybe 300 or 400 at one time or another . . . we had three or four people working on real estate to manage those companies designed to hold properties,'' said Shackley. ''We could only use properties for short periods of time. We couldn't stay in any one place very long.'' The properties included marinas, hunting camps, merchant shipping, airlines, a motel, leasing and transportation firms, exile-operated publishing outfits, ''safe houses'' strung throughout the area and, of course, Zenith Technical Enterprises. The station itself had more than a hundred cars under lease. It ran the third largest navy in the Caribbean, after the United States and Cuba. Shackley estimated there were up to 15,000 Cubans ``connected to us in one way or another.''

The tenor of the times and the threat next door contributed to a tolerant and even cooperative atmosphere by South Florida residents toward JMWAVE activities. ''There was, first and foremost, a great deal of patriotism in South Florida,'' recalled Shackley. ``When we needed things, we were dealing with people who had a memory of the Korean War and World War II. There was a strong anti-Castro feeling among Americans. And the influx of Cubans in late 1961 and early 1962 were the cream. What's important to understand is that it made it easy to work in that environment, a pro-government environment. I can't remember going to a businessman and asking him for cooperation who was not pleased to cooperate with the government and help.''

When authors David Wise and Thomas B. Ross blew the Zenith cover and identified it as a CIA front in the June 16, 1964, edition of Look magazine, the agency promptly changed the station's cover name to Melmar Corporation and went about business as usual from the same location.

`GOOD TENANT'

Gene Cohen, University of Miami vice president and treasurer at the time, denied knowing that Zenith was a CIA cover. ''As far as we're concerned, the university is leasing space to an organization we consider a good tenant which pays rent promptly,'' said Cohen. ''There's nothing to indicate a connection with the CIA.'' As the still nave young reporter who spoke with Cohen and wrote the story appearing in The Miami Herald, the author's typed notes show that Cohen added ''off the record'' that it probably wouldn't have made any difference if the university did know Zenith was a CIA operation since ''we're all on the same side,'' reflecting a near universal South Florida attitude at the time.

Maybe Cohen didn't know, but University President Henry King Stanford certainly did, said Shackley. ``He knew who we were and what we were doing. I would meet him occasionally but only when we had a problem. I didn't see him often.''

While JMWAVE was by far the biggest, it was neither the first nor the only CIA presence in Miami. That distinction belonged to Justin F. ''Jay'' Gleichauf, who arrived shortly after Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista fled into exile on New Year's Day of 1959. Gleichauf told his story more than 40 years later in an unclassified CIA publication. ''I had no inkling [when Batista fell] that within two weeks I would be in Miami as head -- and sole staffer -- of a newly authorized office of the Domestic Contacts Division in the Directorate of Intelligence,'' he wrote.

Gleichauf opened an overt CIA office at 299 Alhambra Circle in Coral Gables. Its basic function was to be a Cuba ''listening post.'' To aid his effort, Gleichauf listed a CIA number -- but no address -- in the phone book and passed out business cards with his home number, resulting in calls from ''a motley collection of weirdos'' as well as some irate Castro supporters.

There was ''something like 700 exile groups,'' recalled Gleichauf. ``One guy was head of something called AAA, and claimed they had 5,000 men under arms. They were ready to go as soon as they got the green light, . . . [they] made a lot of promises. It turned out to be completely ineffectual. It was all bull. The green light was money. It was a racket, one guy and his brother-in-law, and existed only on paper.''

From his arrival in January 1959, Gleichauf did double duty for the CIA on the overt and covert side until the spring of 1960, when President Eisenhower authorized the operation that evolved into the Bay of Pigs. Shortly after the authorization, a CIA colleague from the Clandestine Service joined him in Miami to open the Western Hemisphere Division's new Forward Operating Base (FOB). His duties were to coordinate ''all support, training and preparatory activities for operations against Cuba,'' according to a heavily censored and undated CIA review of the Miami Station declassified in 1995.

Bob Reynolds arrived to head the covert office in September 1960 and left a year later. The office, too, was initially in Coral Gables with ''very thin cover,'' although Reynolds said he did not recall the address nor did he think it was then named JMWAVE.

COVERT OFFICE MOVED

By the time Reynolds departed Miami in the fall of 1961, the Bay of Pigs had failed, with planning for a new covert campaign against Castro already underway. Before his departure, Reynolds said he arranged to relocate the covert office from Coral Gables to the old Richmond Naval Air Station, the University of Miami's secluded South Campus.

Shackley left Miami in June 1965, after beginning the scale-down of what had been the frontline command post for the secret war. A further substantial cutback and reorganization of JMWAVE was underway by late 1966. ''Many covert entities were terminated and personnel reassigned,'' according to the Miami Station review.

By early 1968, ``it became apparent that as a result of sustained operational activity in the Miami area over a period of years the cover of the Miami Station had eroded to a point that the security of our operations was increasingly jeopardized.''

The decision was made to deactivate JMWAVE and replace it with a smaller operation ''which would be better able to respond to current needs.'' By then, CIA personnel at the station -- still operating under commercial cover -- had been reduced from a peak of some 400 to 150.

The new station began operation, this time under official cover with about 50 persons, in August 1968 at a U.S. Coast Guard facility in what then was described as a ''run-down'' part of Miami Beach.
http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/special_packages/focus/11172242.htm

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Posted on Sun, Mar. 20, 2005

Q&A with Don Bohning
 

Herald: The book focuses on Operation Mongoose. What was that?

Don Bohning: It was a post-Bay of Pigs covert program to get rid of Castro, officially approved by President Kennedy Nov. 3, 1961. It was not an exclusive CIA operation, and included the Departments of Defense, Justice and Treasury and the U.S. Information Agency. Its nominal chief was Gen. Edward Lansdale, but Bobby Kennedy was the real director. Mongoose effectively ended a year later with the Cuban missile crisis.

Herald: Why was that an important period?

DB: First, the atmospherics that accompanied Mongoose contributed to the Soviet decision to install missiles in Cuba, fearing another U.S. invasion. And second, because in order to resolve the missile crisis, Kennedy gave Moscow a no-invasion-of-Cuba pledge.

Herald: What impact did it have on Miami?

DB: Several, among them a considerable economic impact. The CIA station at the UM South Campus at the time grew to be the largest in the world, outside the agency's Langley headquarters.

Herald: What impact did it have on Cuba?

DB: There is no doubt that, first, the Bay of Pigs, and then Mongoose, helped consolidate Castro's control of Cuba.

Herald: What lessons from that period could the U.S. government apply to the current situation with Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez?

DB: I would say don't jump to conclusions, although in the case of Castro there was probably more reason to be worried about Fidel because by late 1959 he was clearly allied with the Soviet Bloc. Today there is no Soviet Bloc or Cold War, so Chávez is more of a nuisance than a threat.

Herald: After Mongoose the CIA was perceived as a rogue agency, out there trying to kill Castro with Mafia hit men and exploding cigars. Do you think that in 10-20 years we'll see the CIA accused of rogue actions in the war on terror?

DB: This question reflects a widely held but, I think, erroneous view of the CIA's actions at the time. Anybody who has read the documents and interviewed many of the people involved will see that the CIA was carrying out the general policies of Eisenhower and Kennedy to get rid of Castro.

The possible exceptions are the various assassination plots against Fidel, which span more than the Mongoose period. While there is no evidence that either Eisenhower or the Kennedy brothers had knowledge of the plots, most CIA people I spoke with were convinced that Bobby, at least, knew about and encouraged them while maintaining ``plausible deniability.''

As for the CIA being accused down the road of running rogue operations in the fight against terrorists, I would doubt it since it's already quite evident that the CIA is and has been doing what the administration ''neo-cons'' want done.

http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/special_packages/focus/11172249.htm


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